Eric Chaney

The Feudal Revolution and Europe's Rise: Political Divergence of the Christian West and the Muslim World before 1500 CE

We document a divergence in the duration of rule for monarchs in Western Europe and the Islamic world beginning in the medieval period. While leadership tenures in the two regions were similar in the 8th century, Christian kings became increasingly long lived compared to Muslim sultans. We argue that forms of executive constraint that emerged under feudal institutions in Western Europe were associated with increased political stability and find empirical support for this argument. While feudal institutions served as the basis for military recruitment by European monarchs, Muslim sultans relied on mamlukism—or the use of military slaves imported from non-Muslim lands. Dependence on mamluk armies limited the bargaining strength of local notables vis-à-vis the sultan, hindering the development of a productively adversarial relationship between ruler and local elites. We argue that Muslim societies’ reliance on mamluks, rather than local elites, as the basis for military leadership, may explain why the Glorious Revolution occurred in England, not Egypt.

REVOLT ON THE NILE: ECONOMIC SHOCKS, RELIGION, AND POLITICAL POWER

Using centuries of Nile flood data, I document that during deviant Nile floods, Egypts highest-ranking religious authority was less likely to be replaced and relative allocations to religious structures increased. These findings are consistent with historical evidence that Nile shocks increased this authoritys political influence by raising the probability he could coordinate a revolt. I find that the available data provide support for this interpretation and weigh against some of the most plausible alternatives. For example, I show that while Nile shocks increased historical references to social unrest, deviant floods did not increase a proxy for popular religiosity. Together, the results suggest an increase in the political power of religious leaders during periods of economic downturn. [PUBLICATION ABSTRACT]

Democratic Change in the Arab World, Past and Present

Will the Arab Spring lead to long-lasting democratic change? To explore this question, I examine the determinants of the Arab world’s democratic deficit in 2010. I find that the percentage of a country’s landmass that was conquered by Arab armies following the death of the prophet Muhammad statistically accounts for this deficit. Using history as a guide, I hypothesize that this pattern reflects the long-run influence of control structures developed under Islamic empires in the premodern era and find that the available evidence is consistent with this interpretation. I also investigate the determinants of the recent uprisings. Taken in unison, the results cast doubt on claims that the Arab-Israeli conflict or Arab culture or Muslim theology is a systematic obstacle to democratic change in the region and point instead to the legacy of the region’s historical institutional framework.

Economic Dynamics in the Malthusian Era: Evidence from the 1609 Spanish Expulsion of the Moriscos

We investigate economic dynamics in the Malthusian era using the 1609 expulsion of Moriscos from Spain. Sharp population declines in former‐Morisco districts were accompanied by decreased output and increased per capita output. While these short‐run results are consistent with standard Malthusian predictions, Malthusian convergence was delayed up to 1786 in former‐Morisco districts. Archival sources and historical accounts suggest extractive institutions and cultural differences may have contributed to delayed convergence in population and output per capita. This historic episode provides an unusually rich setting to examine Malthusian dynamics, highlighting the potential for sustained differences in per capita output in the Malthusian era.

Separation of Powers and the Medieval Roots of Institutional Divergence between Europe and the Islamic Middle East

An influential literature sees the roots of sustained economic growth in Europe’s unique institutional framework. The events and the factors contributing to the emergence of these institutions, however, remain a topic of scholarly disagreement. Authors have sought the origins of these institutions in factors ranging from geography to culture. In this chapter, I propose a conceptual framework to better understand the emergence of Europe’s medieval institutional framework (which included parliaments, city states, juries and impersonal exchange among other institutions) through comparison with the institutional equilibrium in the Islamic Middle East before the rise of the Ottoman Empire (that is, I center my attention on the period between the 9th and 15th centuries CE).1

Váltságdíjtárgyalások – tranzakciós költségek melletti alkudozás empirikus vizsgálata

Ebben a tanulmanyban azt vizsgaljuk, hogy a feloldalas aszimmetrikus informacioju dinamikus alkumodelleknek van-e empirikus relevanciajuk valtsagdij-targyalasi helyzetekben. Vizsgalatunkhoz egy tortenelmi adatbazist hasznalunk, amely tobb mint tizezer, berber fogsagban levő - spanyol delegaciok altal kivaltott - fogoly adatait tartalmazza. Olyan tobbkoros targyalasokat figyelunk meg, amelyek az alulinformalt fel (az elado) szemszogeből ex ante hasonlok voltak, viszont bizonyos informaciokat csak a vevő tudott. Előszor egy redukalt formaju elemzes soran teszteljuk a dinamikus alkumodellek főbb kvalitativ előrejelzeseit. Ezek utan strukturalisan kiszamitjuk Cramton [1991] modelljet, hogy osszehasonlitsuk egymassal a ket kulonboző berber bazison folyo targyalasokat. A fő kovetkeztetesunk az, hogy az alkudozasra hasznalt tortenelmi intezmenyek a jelentős aszimmetrikus informaltsag ellenere igen hatekonyak voltak.* Journal of Economic Literature (JEL) kod: C78, D8, N43, N47.