Eric D. Knapp

What is the Smart Grid

This chapter describes the Smart Grid, an “intelligent” system for power generation and distribution. It goes over the goals and infrastructure of the Smart Grid, as well as some concerns about its impact and potential vulnerabilities.

Chapter 3 – Hacking the Smart Grid

This chapter describes the potential methods and motives behind an attack on the Smart Grid. Knowing who might attack the grid and how they might proceed is imperative for understanding how to defend it. Since the Smart Grid is such an important infrastructure component, this understanding is vital to its proper implementation and continued operation.

Chapter 5 – Security Models for SCADA, ICS, and Smart Grid

This chapter describes security models for different Smart Grid protocols, including SCADA and ICS protocols. Many protocols are explained, along with their security models, interoperability, and methods and models of organizing them within an integrated system. Security methodologies are compared in order to create a working model for Smart Grid systems.

Chapter 2 – Smart Grid Network Architecture

This chapter introduces and explains the architecture of the Smart Grid network. Since the Smart Grid is made up of so many varied components, there are a large number of different systems and corresponding architectures that the Smart Grid operator should be familiar with. These systems can generally be divided into those that govern power generation, power distribution and transmission, and power monitoring (such as with home meters). The chapter also covers the interdependencies between these systems, as well as industry standards relating to the entire grid

Industrial Network Design and Architecture

The move from proprietary communications networks to more open networks means that, in order to design an industrial network for robust and reliable operation, you must first understand the basic network architecture and design principles of Ethernet and the Internet Protocol (IP). However, because of the unique nature of industrial networks, these principles must first be adapted to support industrial control and automation.

Risk and Vulnerability Assessments

Risk management involves an understanding of threats, vulnerabilities and consequences. To effectively manage risk, therefore, you need to understand how to identify and assess the assets in your industrial network. What devices are vulnerable, and to what types of attack? How could a specific device or system be exploited, and what would the consequences of that exploitation be? Using a variety of risk management standards and methodologies, the risk of a cyber incident can be measured, and used to improve existing security policies, countermeasures, and plans.

Industrial Cyber Security History and Trends

Industrial networks have been around for decades, running everything from manufacturing lines to some of the world’s most critical national infrastructures. More recently, with a shift toward common computing platforms and open network technologies, these systems have been exposed to new cyber threats.

Chapter 4 – Privacy Concerns with the Smart Grid

This chapter addresses some of the potential concerns with privacy intrusion that are inherent with the Smart Grid. The versatility and information-gathering potential of the Smart Grid have led to worries that individual privacy could be violated, and that the Smart Grid could be used as a tool to collect personal information. This issue must be addressed through industry standards, and the security of the Smart Grid is paramount to the protection of the consumer’s information.

Establishing Secure Enclaves

This chapter explains how to build a secure enclave. The first step of building a secure enclave is to identify any and all functional groups that refer to anything directly involved in or responsible for a given function. Common functional groups to consider when building enclaves in industrial networks include Control Loops, Supervisory Controls, Control Processes, Control Data Storage, Trading Communications, Remote Access, and even less tangible groups such as User groups and Industrial Protocol groups. A control loop consists of the devices responsible for a particular automated process. Each control loop is also connected to some sort of supervisory control—typically an HMI—that is responsible for the configuration, monitoring, and management of the automated process. If a master controller or master terminal unit (MTU) is used to manage multiple HMIs, each responsible for a specific part of a larger control process that device represents the root of yet another functional group. Many industrial automation and control system devices generate data, reflecting current configurations, the status of a process, alarms, and other information. This information is typically collected and “historized” by a Data Historian. The Data Historian system may connect to many devices throughout the control system network, supervisory network, and in some cases the business network.

Chapter 2 – About Industrial Networks

Publisher Summary nMany organizations are attempting to define methods of securing the industrial systems. The Homeland Security Presidential Directive Seven (HSPD-7) attempts to distinguish the critical versus noncritical systems. HSPD-7 does not include specific security recommendations, relying instead upon other federal security recommendations such as those by the NIST on the security of both enterprise and industrial networks, as well as the Homeland Security Risk- Based Performance Standards used in securing chemical facilities. National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) 800 series documents provide best practices and information of general interest to information security. All 800 series documents concern information security and should be used as references where applicable. Of particular relevance to industrial network security is, SP 800-53 (“Recommended Security Controls for Federal Information Systems”), which defines many aspects of information security procedures and technologies, and SP 800-82 (“Guide to Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition [SCADA] and Industrial Control Systems Security”), which discusses industrial control system security specifically. The Federal Information Security Management Act (FISMA) may or may not apply to certain critical infrastructures, depending upon their geographic location and/or their jurisdiction within the United States federal government. However, the standards include valid and useful guidelines for the security of critical environments, referring to and relying upon the NIST “800 series” Special Publication documents (especially SP 800-53 and SP 800-82).