Eric Darmon
University of Rennes
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Archive | 2014
Michael A. Arnold; Eric Darmon; Sylvain Dejean; Thierry Pénard
Most developed countries have tried to restrain digital piracy by strengthening laws against copyright infringement. In 2009, France implemented the Hadopi law. Under this law individuals receive a warning the first two times they are detected illegally sharing content through peer to peer (P2P) networks. Legal action is only taken when a third violation is detected. We analyze the impact of this law on individual behavior. Our theoretical model of illegal behavior under a graduated response law predicts that the perceived probability of detection has no impact on the decision to initially engage in digital piracy, but may reduce the intensity of illegal file sharing by those who do pirate. We test the theory using survey data from French Internet users. Our econometric results indicate that the law has no substantial deterrent effect. In addition, we find evidence that individuals who are better informed about the law and piracy alternatives substitute away from monitored P2P networks and illegally access content through unmonitored channels.
LIXème Congrès annuel de l'AFSE (Association Française de Science Economique) | 2014
Eric Darmon; Dominique Torre
To distribute software, commercial vendors of proprietary software have the opportunity to use some dual licensing (DL) strategy i.e. to provide their software under two different licensing terms (proprietary and open source). We investigate the relevance and impacts of this distribution strategy in the presence of an incumbent open source software competitor. We determine the conditions for this strategy to be profitable for the commercial firm and its impact on price, market shares and welfare. We show that dual licensing may be used as a complement for proprietary software when development spillovers are large. We examine how, in this case, a dual licensing strategy can be used to exclude the open source software from the market and how this is compatible with higher price and lower market share for the proprietary distribution. This situation can also generate conflicts of interests between proprietary software and users resulting in sub-optimal outcomes. Finally, our analysis reveals the key role played by development spillovers and software compatibility for the DL decision.
Archive | 2013
Michael A. Arnold; Eric Darmon; Thierry Pénard
In 2010 sponsored search advertisements generated over
Revue économique | 2016
Eric Darmon; Sylvain Dejean; Thierry Pénard
12 billion in revenue for search engines in the US market and accounted for 46% of online advertising revenue. A substantial portion of this revenue was generated by the sale of search keywords using an auction mechanism. We analyze a game-theoretic model to understand the interplay between organic and sponsored links in keyword auctions. Our model allows both the relevance of the advertising firm as well as the position of its sponsored link to impact click-through-rates. Our results demonstrate how the presence of organic links (links generated by the search engine algorithm) may lead to either more or less aggressive bidding for sponsored link positions depending on consumer attitudes toward sponsored links and the extent to which sponsored and organic links are complements or substitutes. In contrast to equilibrium results in existing literature, the firm with the highest value per click does not necessarily win the first spot in the sponsored search listings. It also may be optimal for a firm to bid an amount greater than the expected value (or sale) from a click.
Review of Network Economics | 2016
Eric Darmon; Thomas Le Texier
This paper aims to evaluate the effectiveness of the Hadopi (a French antipiracy agency) in reducing piracy of music and movies, and in promoting legal consumption.?We conjecture that Hadopi may have three potential effects, namely informational or educational effects (i.e. better awareness of Internet users about illicit practices) ; deterrent effects (i.e. increased monitoring of illegal distribution channels) ; and incentive effects (i.e. promotion of legal channels).?Using survey data from a representative sample of French Internet users, we find that Hadopi had differentiated impacts on music and films and series consumption patterns.?Our results show evidence of deterrent and information effects in the case of music while information and incentive effects tend to be more prevalent in the case of films and series. Classification JEL : K42, L82, O34.
Archive | 2014
Eric Darmon; Thomas Le Texier
Should rights be publicly or privately enforced in the case of digital piracy? The emergence of large-scale anti-piracy laws and the existence of illegal non-monitored channels raise important issues for the design of anti-piracy policies. We study the impact of these demand-side policies in two enforcement settings (namely, public and private enforcement settings) with an outside adoption option for users of an illegal non-monitored channel. Our results show that public enforcement generates higher monitoring and lower price levels, and also higher legal welfare than private enforcement. However, we identify potential conflicts of interest between the legal seller and the social planner when the efficiency of the illegal non-monitored channel is low. Introducing supply-side policies, i.e. policies targeted to suppliers of illegal content, we find that they may have unexpected impacts and can damage legal welfare. We also identify situations in which the two policies are substitutes or complements.
Annals of economics and statistics | 2014
Eric Darmon; Alexandra Rufini; Dominique Torre
In the case of digital piracy should rights be publicly or privately enforced? The emergence of large-scale anti-piracy laws and the existence of non-monitored illegal channels raise important issues for the design of digital anti-piracy policies. In this paper, we study the impact of these two enforcement settings (public vs. private) in the presence of an illegal non-monitored outside option for users. Taking account of market outcomes, we show that in both cases, the optimal strategies of the legal seller and the monitoring authority leads to rejection of the outside option out while accommodating to the presence of illegal monitored channels. Compared to private enforcement, public enforcement generates higher monitoring levels and lower price levels. Public enforcement also generates greater (legal) welfare. However, we identify potential conflict of interests between the legal seller and the social planner when the efficiency of non monitored networks is low. We provide some insights into the role of supply side anti-piracy policies.
Physica A-statistical Mechanics and Its Applications | 2005
Eric Darmon; Roger Waldeck
In this paper, we investigate the distribution strategy of a software publisher. The user adoption context is characterized by uncertainty about quality (experience good) and heterogeneous piracy costs. Users can purchase or get unauthorized/illegal copies (digital piracy) of the software during two periods (or not adopt at all). Between these two periods, users can acquire information through word-of-mouth. To maximize profit, the publisher needs to decide about price, quality and level of monitoring of piracy. We show that the software publisher can profit from accommodation a certain level of piracy of the product. We add to the literature by explicitly considering the opportunity for the publisher to cheat about future price and monitoring levels (misleading announcements). This strategy that is falsely permissive towards piracy, can sometimes appear more profitable. However, when the degree of sophistication of user expectations about the publishers strategy increases, only a strategy that is permissive (with respect to piracy) with non misleading announcements remains robust.
Economics Bulletin | 2009
Eric Darmon; Alexandra Rufini; Dominique Torre
Journal of Economic Interaction and Coordination | 2006
Roger Waldeck; Eric Darmon