Eric Giraud-Héraud

Multiproduct firm behaviour in a differentiated market

In this paper we offer a generalization of the circular model of product differentiation by introducing a multiproduct firm facing monoproduct competitors. We prove existence and explicitly characterize equilibrium when transportation costs are quadratic. We exhibit interesting equilibrium features for price policy, market shares, and profits. In equilibrium, the multiproduct firm uses its connected market shares to build asymmetric pricing schemes that allow a fraction of its product line (brands, stores or firms) to be shielded from outside competition and hence extracts maximum consumer surplus. Our results shed some light on the link between product differentiation and mergers and acquisitions activity (M&As).

Joint Private Safety Standards and Vertical Relationships in Food Retailing

In recent years, it has become common for downstream firms to impose Joint Private Standards (JPSs) on upstream producers. In this paper, we present an original model of a vertical relationship, explaining the incentives for and the effects of such JPSs with an example concerning food safety. The risk of a food crisis is endogenously determined. Using the concept of cartel stability (d’Aspremont et al., 1983), it is shown that liability rules are crucial for JPSs to emerge, that a JPS can become a minimum quality standard, and that a more stringent JPS does not necessarily reduce the market risk.

Internet et la distribution de biens physiques. Analyse de l'émergence de nouvelles structures verticales dans le secteur du vin

A lot of B-to-B and B-to-C projects have been set up by new comers in the wine sector. They lead the traditional stakeholders, involved in physical retailing, to reshape their own distribution strategies. In the first part of this paper, we analyze several models of wine distribution and the stakes raised by the introduction of the Internet technology. In the second part of the paper, we propose a theoretical analysis of (1) the opening of direct distribution channels for the producers, (2) the opening of new supply sources through market places for the distributors. Classification JEL : D43, L22, L81, O33, Q13

Willingness to Pay for Appellation of Origin: Results of an Experiment with Pinot Noir Wines in France and Germany

Ever-increasing international competition in the wine sector has sharpened the controversy among economists who are in charge of analysing the agricultural sector and regional development. The growth of exports from the so-called New World countries (Australia, South Africa, Chile, Argentina, United States) questions rural concepts of wine-growing economy and makes it necessary to reconsider consumers’ expectations and the whole economic organisation and marketing strategies of the wine sector.

Consumers' behaviour towards food safety: A litterature review

This paper deals with the actual expectations of consumers on food safety and their predictable behaviour in case of foodborne outbreaks. We present an overview of the purchase process for risky products and we show the reason why the consumer has a specific behaviour with respect to the sanitary risk. Moreover, by taking the results of different works that focused these effects in the meat and fruit & vegetables sectors, we show how the real quality signals on the European market (organic production, designation of origin, private retail labels, etc.) could promote consumer confidence.

UNION DOUANIERE ET COORDINATION DES ECHANGES

– We propose an analysis of international competion where a limited number of countries decide to cooperate on exchanges of an homogeneous good. We explain the reasons why such an agreement can be sustainable only if the cartel set up an importation tarif. However, the cartellisation, even with this trade restriction, improve the surplus of outside countries. We conclude the paper by an illustration with the Common Agricultural Policy within the European Union. * E. GIRAUD-HERAUD : INRA-Grignon et Laboratoire d’Econometrie de l’Ecole Polytechnique ; H. HAMMOUDI : THEMA, Universite de Cergy et INRA-Grignon ; A. SCHIAVINA : Autorita Garante della Concorrenza e del Mercato, Roma. Les auteurs remercient Jean-Christophe Bureau, Annie Hofstetter, Sophie Larribeau pour leurs commentaires ainsi que les membres du comite de l’AIP « Regulation des marches agricoles et agroalimentaires » de l’INRA-ESR qui ont finance ce projet.

Formation des cartels: concepts et application a la différenciation spatiale

Cet article propose d’analyser le lien entre la stabilite d’un cartel et les problemes qui ont prevalus a sa formation. Pour cela nous reconsiderons, dans un contexte dissymetrique, les concepts de stabilite proposes a l’origine par d’Aspremont, Jacquemin, Gabszewicz et Weymark [1983]. L’heterogeneite des agents dans l’industrie nous conduit alors a adopter une approche “individu par individu” permettant de dresser une typologie des participants potentiels a la formation du cartel. Nous illustrons cette analyse conceptuelle par une application a contexte de differenciation spatial.