Eric N. Waltenburg

Support For A Supreme Court Affirmative Action Decision A Story in Black and White

Unlike other policy-making institutions that actively attempt to shape public opinion, the Supreme Court is largely dependent upon others to disseminate its policy pronouncements to the public. One consequence: How the media frame the Court’s actions can affect public support for Court policies. This article presents the results of an experiment designed to take soundings on the effect of different media frames on White and Black support for a controversial affirmative action ruling. Using stimuli we created based on coverage of the Adarand v. Pena (1995) decision in the Black press and the mainstream press, we find that media framing has a significant effect on agreement with the Court’s policy among White subjects. For Blacks, the impact of the media framing is moderated by ideological predispositions. In addition, both White and Black support for the Court’s ruling is influenced by the media portrayal of Justice Clarence Thomas.

The Legitimacy-conferring Authority of the U.S. Supreme Court An Experimental Design

Convention holds that the Supreme Court, because of its special constitutional role, can confer an element of legitimacy on a policy simply by endorsing it. In this study, we conducted an experiment to test the legitimacy-conferring effect of Court rulings on public opinion in two policy areas—affirmative action and regulation of phone rates. We found that in both cases, the Supreme Court had an impact on policy agreement and behavioral intentions that was moderated by other important variables. We conclude that the Supreme Court plays an important role in shaping public opinion and political behavior.

Litigating federalism : the states before the U.S. Supreme Court

Introduction The States and the Commerce Power A Federalist Jurisprudence? The Evolution of Advocacy: The Offices of State Attorney General Patterns of State Participation Before the Court A Model of State Participation Before the Court The Recent Court and the Pro-State Bloc Conclusion Appendices Table of Cases Bibliographical Essay Bibliography Index

Supreme Court Legitimacy and Group-Centric Forces: Black Support for Capital Punishment and Affirmative Action

The Supreme Court has addressed capital punishment and affirmative action many times and, as a result, has had sweeping policymaking effects. For that reason, we argue that black opinion on capital punishment and affirmative action will be shaped by diffuse support for the Court. We also recognize the important role of group-centric forces in shaping black opinion. We find that diffuse support for the Court leads blacks with lower levels of race consciousness to be more supportive of capital punishment and less supportive of affirmative action, positions in line with the Courts decisions on these issues but contrary to black interests. The Court, however, is not able to throw its cloak of legitimacy around its policy position for blacks with the highest levels of group consciousness.

Supreme Court Justices’ Economic Behaviour: A Multilevel Model Analysis

Supreme Court justices are overlooked, but important, national policy-making players who render final and consequential decisions in cases on economic conflicts. The research question asks what forces explain the decisional behaviour of Supreme Court justices in economic rights cases between a private and a public party. Theoretically, the decisional behaviour of an individual justice is a function of his or her notion as to what makes ‘good’ law, pursued in a cultural-collegial setting that is oriented by majoritarian requirements, while constrained by the legal nature of the case being considered. Empirically, all economic decisions made by Norwegian Supreme Court justices in five-justice panels from 1963 to 2012 are analyzed. Our multilevel model demonstrates that individual, collegial and case-level forces all contribute to explain the justices’ votes. These results suggest that case-related dynamics, such as who the plaintiff is or the amount of disagreement between justices, matter, but also that ideology – via appointment mechanisms – matters when a nations high court justices decide economic cases. Understanding the foundational assumptions and the institutional procedures is vital when transporting judicial behaviour models across polities.