Eric Schniter

Intergenerational Wealth Transmission and the Dynamics of Inequality in Small-Scale Societies

Origins of Egalitarianism Wealthy contemporary societies exhibit varying extents of economic inequality, with the Nordic countries being relatively egalitarian, whereas there is a much larger gap between top and bottom in the United States. Borgerhoff Mulder et al. (p. 682; see the Perspective by Acemoglu and Robinson) build a bare-bones model describing the intergenerational transmission of three different types of wealth—based on social networks, land and livestock, and physical and cognitive capacity—in four types of small-scale societies in which livelihoods depended primarily on hunting, herding, farming, or horticulture. Parameter estimates from a large-scale analysis of historical and ethnographic data were added to the model to reveal that the four types of societies display distinctive patterns of wealth transmission and that these patterns are associated with different extents of inequality. Some types of wealth are strongly inherited and, hence, contribute to long-term economic inequality. Small-scale human societies range from foraging bands with a strong egalitarian ethos to more economically stratified agrarian and pastoral societies. We explain this variation in inequality using a dynamic model in which a population’s long-run steady-state level of inequality depends on the extent to which its most important forms of wealth are transmitted within families across generations. We estimate the degree of intergenerational transmission of three different types of wealth (material, embodied, and relational), as well as the extent of wealth inequality in 21 historical and contemporary populations. We show that intergenerational transmission of wealth and wealth inequality are substantial among pastoral and small-scale agricultural societies (on a par with or even exceeding the most unequal modern industrial economies) but are limited among horticultural and foraging peoples (equivalent to the most egalitarian of modern industrial populations). Differences in the technology by which a people derive their livelihood and in the institutions and norms making up the economic system jointly contribute to this pattern.

Domestication Alone Does Not Lead to Inequality: Intergenerational Wealth Transmission among Horticulturalists

We present empirical measures of wealth inequality and its intergenerational transmission among four horticulturalist populations. Wealth is construed broadly as embodied somatic and neural capital, including body size, fertility and cultural knowledge, material capital such as land and household wealth, and relational capital in the form of coalitional support and field labor. Wealth inequality is moderate for most forms of wealth, and intergenerational wealth transmission is low for material resources and moderate for embodied and relational wealth. Our analysis suggests that domestication alone does not transform social structure; rather, the presence of scarce, defensible resources may be required before inequality and wealth transmission patterns resemble the familiar pattern in more complex societies. Land ownership based on usufruct and low‐intensity cultivation, especially in the context of other economic activities such as hunting and fishing, is associated with more egalitarian wealth distributions as found among hunter‐gatherers.

Risk and the evolution of human exchange

Compared with other species, exchange among non-kin is a hallmark of human sociality in both the breadth of individuals and total resources involved. One hypothesis is that extensive exchange evolved to buffer the risks associated with hominid dietary specialization on calorie dense, large packages, especially from hunting. ‘Lucky’ individuals share food with ‘unlucky’ individuals with the expectation of reciprocity when roles are reversed. Cross-cultural data provide prima facie evidence of pair-wise reciprocity and an almost universal association of high-variance (HV) resources with greater exchange. However, such evidence is not definitive; an alternative hypothesis is that food sharing is really ‘tolerated theft’, in which individuals possessing more food allow others to steal from them, owing to the threat of violence from hungry individuals. Pair-wise correlations may reflect proximity providing greater opportunities for mutual theft of food. We report a laboratory experiment of foraging and food consumption in a virtual world, designed to test the risk-reduction hypothesis by determining whether people form reciprocal relationships in response to variance of resource acquisition, even when there is no external enforcement of any transfer agreements that might emerge. Individuals can forage in a high-mean, HV patch or a low-mean, low-variance (LV) patch. The key feature of the experimental design is that individuals can transfer resources to others. We find that sharing hardly occurs after LV foraging, but among HV foragers sharing increases dramatically over time. The results provide strong support for the hypothesis that people are pre-disposed to evaluate gains from exchange and respond to unsynchronized variance in resource availability through endogenous reciprocal trading relationships.

Menu-Dependent Emotions and Self-Control

We study a dynamic model of self-control where the history of ones decisions (understood as emotions) has influence on subsequent decision making. We propose that effort and regret are emotions produced by previous decisions to either resist or yield to temptation, respectively. When recalled, these emotions affect an individuals preferences, in turn affecting self-control decision at a particular point in time. Our model provides a unified explanation for several empirical regularities puzzling economists and cognitive scientists. We explain non-stationary consumption paths characterized by compensatory indulgence and restraint cycles, why the amplitude of consumption cycles increases with foresight and decreases with emotional memory, and, finally, we show how unavoidable options that might show up on ones menu influence choices, consequent emotions, consumption paths, and preferences for commitment.

Functional Disability and Social Conflict Increase Risk of Depression in Older Adulthood Among Bolivian Forager-Farmers

OBJECTIVES To present an explanatory framework for depression in older adulthood in a small-scale society. We propose that depression is a consequence of functional disability, which can reduce subsistence productivity and resource transfers within and across generations. Social conflict can also disrupt resource flows and should be associated with depression. METHOD To evaluate depression among Tsimane forager-farmers of Bolivia, we developed a reliable interview based on focus groups and a review of validated depression scales. Older adults (mean ± SD age = 62 ± 9, n = 325) were recruited regardless of their health status. Demographic, economic, and medical data were collected during annual censuses and routine medical exams. RESULTS Depression is associated with reduced energetic status, greater physical limitations, and reduced subsistence involvement after controlling for potential confounds such as age, sex, number of reported unresolved conflicts, and market involvement. Depression is also associated with greater reported conflict, particularly with non-kin. DISCUSSION Tsimane depression is associated with disability, reduced subsistence productivity, and interpersonal conflict, all of which can disrupt resource flows. Depression appears to be a response to conditions regularly experienced over human history, and not simply a by-product of modernity.

Predictable and Predictive Emotions: Explaining Cheap Signals and Trust Re-Extension

Despite normative predictions from economics and biology, unrelated strangers will often develop the trust necessary to reap gains from one-shot economic exchange opportunities. This appears to be especially true when declared intentions and emotions can be cheaply communicated. Perhaps even more puzzling to economists and biologists is the observation that anonymous and unrelated individuals, known to have breached trust, often make effective use of cheap signals, such as promises and apologies, to encourage trust re-extension. We used a pair of trust games with one-way communication and an emotion survey to investigate the role of emotions in regulating the propensity to message, apologize, re-extend trust, and demonstrate trustworthiness. This design allowed us to observe the endogenous emergence and natural distribution of trust-relevant behaviors, remedial strategies used by promise-breakers, their effects on behavior, and subsequent outcomes. We found that emotions triggered by interaction outcomes are predictable and also predict subsequent apology and trust re-extension. The role of emotions in behavioral regulation helps explain why messages are produced, when they can be trusted, and when trust will be re-extended.

Recalibrational Emotions and the Regulation of Trust-Based Behaviors

Though individuals differ in the degree to which they are predisposed to trust or act trustworthy, we theorize that trust-based behaviors are universally determined by the calibration of conflicting short- and long-sighted behavior regulation programs, and that these programs are calibrated by emotions experienced personally and interpersonally. In this chapter we review both the main-stream and evolutionary theories of emotions that philosophers, psychologists, and behavioral economists have based their work on and which can inform our understanding of trust-based behavior regulation. The standard paradigm for understanding emotions is based on mapping their positive and negative affect valence. While Valence Models often expect that the experience of positive and negative affect is interdependent (leading to the popular use of bipolar affect scales), a multivariate “recalibrational” model based on positive, negative, interpersonal, intrapersonal, short-sighted and long-sighted dimensions predicts and recognizes more complex mixed-valence emotional states. We summarize experimental evidence that supports a model of emotionally-calibrated trust regulation and discuss implications for the use of various emotion measures. Finally, in light of these discussions we suggest future directions for the investigation of emotions and trust psychology.

TRUST, RECIPROCITY, AND RULES: TRUST, RECIPROCITY, AND RULES

In the absence of enforceable contracts, many economic and personal interactions rely on trust and reciprocity. Research shows that although this reliance often works well, sometimes it breaks down. Simple rules mandating minimum standards on reciprocation prevent the most egregious trust violations, but may also undermine behavior that would have otherwise produced higher overall economic welfare. We test the efficacy of exogenously imposed minimum return rules using experimental trust games. We find that rules fail to increase trust and trustworthiness. Thus low minimum standards significantly decrease economic welfare. Although sufficiently restrictive rules restore welfare, trust and trustworthy behavior never returns.

Emotions and Behavior Regulation in Decision Dilemmas

We introduce a dynamic model of emotional behavior regulation that can generalize to a wide range of decision dilemmas. Dilemmas are characterized by availability of mutually exclusive goals that a decision maker is dually motivated to pursue. In our model, previous goal pursuant decisions produce negative emotions that regulate an individual’s propensity to further pursue those goals at future times. This emotional regulation of behavior helps explain the non-stationarity and switching observed between so-called “preferences” revealed in repeated decision dilemmas (e.g., by choosing A over B at time 1, then choosing B over A at time 2). We also explain how behavior regulation under dilemma conditions is affected by the set of available options and how the strength and decay rate of emotions affect the tendency to choose behaviors pursuant of extremely (rather than moderately) different options over time. We discuss how emotional behavior regulation insights provided by our model can extend to a variety of topics including approach and avoidance, temptation and self-control, moral balancing, impulse buying and shopping momentum, dieting and exercise, work and leisure, sleep regulation, cooperation, and competition.

Experimental tests of the tolerated theft and risk-reduction theories of resource exchange

Here we report the results of an experiment that tests the reciprocal risk reduction1 and ‘tolerated theft’ or taking hypotheses2 for why the human species is unique in having extensive exchange of resources among non-kin. We designed an experiment to determine whether, in response to variance of resource acquisition, people exchange food resources via taking or, alternatively, form reciprocal relationships based on giving. In the experiment, subjects forage individually, experience variation in resource acquisition, and then consume either by actions in which resources are taken from, or moved to, others in a group environment. The key feature of the experimental design is that individuals can transfer resources to others, attempt to take resources from others and defend against take-away attempts. Many subjects begin by attempting to take resources from others, who can resist those attempts at a cost to each. Over time, subjects shift to a cooperative strategy of voluntary reciprocal giving, a response not suggested by the instructions. These results provide evidence that people are independently able to overcome initial use of taking strategies, evaluate gains from exchange, and create endogenous reciprocal trading relationships as a response to unsynchronized variance in resource availability.Kaplan and colleagues find that, in virtual foraging environments in which resource availability is variable, over time, tolerated theft of the resources of others declines, as participants endogenously develop reciprocal exchange relationships to buffer risk.