Erica Edwards

Party Competition and European Integration in the East and West Different Structure, Same Causality

How does the ideological profile of a political party affect its support or opposition to European integration? The authors investigate this question with a new expert data set on party positioning on European integration covering 171 political parties in 23 countries. The authors’ findings are (a) that basic structures of party competition in the East and West are fundamentally and explicably different and (b) that although the positions that parties in the East and West take on European integration are substantively different, they share a single underlying causality.

Measuring party positions in Europe The Chapel Hill expert survey trend file, 1999–2010

This article reports on the 2010 Chapel Hill expert surveys (CHES) and introduces the CHES trend file, which contains measures of national party positioning on European integration, ideology and several European Union (EU) and non-EU policies for 1999−2010. We examine the reliability of expert judgments and cross-validate the 2010 CHES data with data from the Comparative Manifesto Project and the 2009 European Elections Studies survey, and explore basic trends on party positioning since 1999. The dataset is available at the CHES website.

Who’s Cueing Whom? Mass-Elite Linkages and the Future of European Integration

The 2005 French and Dutch referendum campaigns were characterized by an alleged disconnect between pro-European political elites and Eurosceptic masses. Past evidence regarding elite-mass linkages in the context of European integration has been conflicting. Whereas some scholars argue that political elites respond to the changing preferences of their electorates, others suggest that party elites cue the mass public through a process of information and persuasion. We contend that these conflicting results stem from the reciprocal nature of elite-mass linkages and estimate a series of dynamic simultaneous equations models to account for this reverse causation. Using Euro-barometer and expert survey data from 1984-2002, we find evidence of a dual-process model, whereby party elites both respond to and shape the views of their supporters. We also find that the strength of these results is contingent on several factors, including the type of electoral system, intra-party dissent and voter characteristics.

Mean voter representation and partisan constituency representation: Do parties respond to the mean voter position or to their supporters?

Do political parties respond to shifts in the preferences of their supporters, which we label the partisan constituency model, or to shifts in the mean voter position (the general electorate model)? Cross-national analyses — based on observations from Eurobarometer surveys and parties’ policy programmes in 15 countries from 1973 to 2002 — suggest that the general electorate model characterizes the policy shifts of mainstream parties. Alternatively, when we analyse the policy shifts of Communist, Green and extreme Nationalist parties (i.e. ‘niche’ parties), we find that these parties respond to shifts in the mean position of their supporters. The findings have implications for spatial theories and political representation.

Explaining the salience of anti-elitism and reducing political corruption for political parties in Europe with the 2014 Chapel Hill Expert Survey data

This article addresses the variation of anti-corruption and anti-elite salience in party positioning across Europe. It demonstrates that while anti-corruption salience is primarily related to the (regional) context in which a party operates, anti-elite salience is primarily a function of party ideology. Extreme left and extreme conservative (TAN) parties are significantly more likely to emphasize anti-elite views. Through its use of the new 2014 Chapel Hill Expert Survey wave, this article also introduces the dataset.

Struggle over Dimensionality Party Competition in Western and Eastern Europe

This article analyzes the impact of party strategies on the issue structure, and consequently the dimensional structure, of party systems across Europe. Conceptualizing political competition in two dimensions (economic left-right and social traditionalism versus liberalism), the authors demonstrate that political parties in both Eastern and Western Europe contest the issue composition of political space. The authors argue that large, mainstream parties are invested in the dimensional status quo, preferring to compete on the primary dimension by emphasizing economic issues. Systematically disadvantaged niche parties, conversely, prefer to compete along a secondary dimension by stressing social issues. Adopting such a strategy enables niche parties to divert voter attention and challenge the structure of conflict between the major partisan competitors. The authors test these propositions using the 2006 iteration of the Chapel Hill Expert Surveys on Party Positions. Findings indicate that while the structure of political conflict in Eastern versus Western Europe could not be more different, the logic with which parties compete in their respective systems is the same. The authors conclude that political competition is primarily a struggle over dimensionality; it does not merely occur along issue dimensions but also over their content.

Anchoring the experts: Using vignettes to compare party ideology across countries

Expert surveys are a valuable, commonly used instrument to measure party positions. Some critics question the cross-national comparability of these measures, though, suggesting that experts may lack a common anchor for fundamental concepts such as economic left–right. Using anchoring vignettes in the 2010 Chapel Hill Expert Survey, we examine the extent of cross-national difference in expert ideological placements. We find limited evidence of cross-national differences; on the whole, our findings further establish expert surveys as a rigorous instrument for measuring party positions in a cross-national context.

Party Ideology and European Integration: An East-West Comparison

On May 1, 2004, eight former communist societies entered the European Union, with two more anticipating membership by 2007. These are decisive events in the stitching together of Europe after the demise of communism. The prospect and experience of membership in the European Union is simply the most effective means yet devised to disseminate and consolidate the defining ideals of Western civilization— civil rights, markets, and democracy. Enlargement is a geopolitical process extending Western norms, and hence peace and economic growth, to bordering countries. But what are the consequences of enlargement for the European polity? Do East and West view the issues arising from European integration through the same or different eyes?

The Return of ‘Social Europe’: Ideas and Positions of German Parties towards the Future of European Integration

Ideas and positions of German parties towards European integration have long been characterised by the model of an economically and politically integrated state community. This general principle has been supported by a majority of delegates of all government and opposition parties, with the exception of the socialist left, from the Treaties of Rome until today. Are there now signs of strain in this cross-party consensus? This article compares the plenary debate on the ratification of the Treaty of Lisbon to the proceedings to the Treaties of Maastricht and Nice. The analysis illustrates that although a pro-EU consensus persists, it was weakened when the new Left Party entered the Bundestag. Responding to this and to the intensified problem of ‘positive’ (i.e. market-correcting) integration following Eastern enlargement, the Social Democrats have realigned their position towards a ‘social Europe’, for the first time clearly distinguishing their position from that of the Christian Democrats.