Erich Kirchler

The Economic Psychology of Tax Behaviour: List of figures

Tax evasion is a complex phenomenon which is influenced not just by economic motives but by psychological factors as well. Economic-psychological research focuses on individual and social representations of taxation as well as decision-making. In this 2007 book, Erich Kirchler assembles research on tax compliance, with a focus on tax evasion, and integrates the findings into a model based on the interaction climate between tax authorities and taxpayers. The interaction climate is defined by citizens trust in authorities and the power of authorities to control taxpayers effectively; depending on trust and power, either voluntary compliance, enforced compliance or no compliance are likely outcomes. Featuring chapters on the social representations of taxation, decision-making and self-employed income tax behaviour, this book will appeal to researchers in economic psychology, behavioural economics and public administration.

The Economic Psychology of Tax Behaviour: Frontmatter

Tax evasion is a complex phenomenon which is influenced not just by economic motives but by psychological factors as well. Economic-psychological research focuses on individual and social representations of taxation as well as decision-making. In this 2007 book, Erich Kirchler assembles research on tax compliance, with a focus on tax evasion, and integrates the findings into a model based on the interaction climate between tax authorities and taxpayers. The interaction climate is defined by citizens trust in authorities and the power of authorities to control taxpayers effectively; depending on trust and power, either voluntary compliance, enforced compliance or no compliance are likely outcomes. Featuring chapters on the social representations of taxation, decision-making and self-employed income tax behaviour, this book will appeal to researchers in economic psychology, behavioural economics and public administration.

The Economic Psychology of Tax Behaviour: Contents

Tax evasion is a complex phenomenon which is influenced not just by economic motives but by psychological factors as well. Economic-psychological research focuses on individual and social representations of taxation as well as decision-making. In this 2007 book, Erich Kirchler assembles research on tax compliance, with a focus on tax evasion, and integrates the findings into a model based on the interaction climate between tax authorities and taxpayers. The interaction climate is defined by citizens trust in authorities and the power of authorities to control taxpayers effectively; depending on trust and power, either voluntary compliance, enforced compliance or no compliance are likely outcomes. Featuring chapters on the social representations of taxation, decision-making and self-employed income tax behaviour, this book will appeal to researchers in economic psychology, behavioural economics and public administration.

The Economic Psychology of Tax Behaviour: The Economic Psychology of Tax Behaviour

Tax evasion is a complex phenomenon which is influenced not just by economic motives but by psychological factors as well. Economic-psychological research focuses on individual and social representations of taxation as well as decision-making. In this 2007 book, Erich Kirchler assembles research on tax compliance, with a focus on tax evasion, and integrates the findings into a model based on the interaction climate between tax authorities and taxpayers. The interaction climate is defined by citizens trust in authorities and the power of authorities to control taxpayers effectively; depending on trust and power, either voluntary compliance, enforced compliance or no compliance are likely outcomes. Featuring chapters on the social representations of taxation, decision-making and self-employed income tax behaviour, this book will appeal to researchers in economic psychology, behavioural economics and public administration.

The Economic Psychology of Tax Behaviour: Tax compliance decisions

A taxpayer may voluntarily decide to pay taxes or make an explicit decision to avoid paying the full share. A single persons contribution does not really make much difference in the overall contributions to public goods. Therefore, not paying ones taxes is advantageous as the amount of public goods and ones participation in them remains almost unchanged, while at the same time one saves on taxes. If few taxpayers evade taxes, public goods will not disappear or be reduced significantly; however, if a considerable number of taxpayers evade, the provision of public goods is not guaranteed and ultimately everyone will suffer from a suboptimal choice. The tax system represents a social dilemma with individual interests being in conflict with collective interests: two or more people are interdependent on obtaining outcomes; if few people try to maximise their own outcomes, defection is the rational choice. However, if a large number or all people maximise their outcome, the effect is that, sooner or later, everyone gets less than if they had chosen to cooperate (Dawes, 1980; Messick and Brewer, 1983; Mero, 1996; Stroebe and Frey, 1982; Van Lange et al . 1992). In other words, the tax system represents an n-player social dilemma, often referred to as tragedy of the commons (Hardin, 1968), with defection as each taxpayers rational strategy, independent of how other taxpayers decide to behave. If single taxpayers choose to pay their full share of taxes, they will be worse off because they support the free-riding, parasitic others (Torgler, 2003d).