Erick Duchesne

Revisiting Structural Variables of Trade Negotiations: The Case of the Canada-EU Agreement

This paper offers a conceptual analysis of the negotiation of the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) between Canada and the European Union. It argues that traditional accounts of the structure of trade negotiations must be tailored for their novel nature, especially their wider scope on various regulatory issues and the relative economic weight symmetry of trading partners. To build our argument, we revisit traditional structural factors; such as economic interdependence, non-agreement alternatives (NAA), institutional constraints, outcome valuations, and domestic support. We conclude that current and future bilateral trade negotiations will likely last longer, deadlocks will likely become more frequent, and that variations in scope will likely increase.

Democratic Norms Remain Stronger than Ethnic Ties: Defending “Foreign Interventions and Secessionist Movements”

Abstract. This article is a response to Stephen Saidemans criticism of our research findings on third state intervention in secessionist crises, which was published in this journal in 2005. Here we defend our methodology and the validity of our results. We also explain why, in our view, Saidemans criticisms and the alternative research design that he offers are seriously questionable. More specifically, our reply focuses on his problematic case selection and on his measurement of ethnic ties, which is methodologically inconsistent and biased. Resume. Cet article constitue une reponse a la critique de Stephen Saideman concernant nos resultats de recherche, paru dans cette revue en 2005, sur les interventions des Etats tiers dans les crises secessionnistes. Nous defendons ici notre methode et la validite de nos resultats. Nous expliquons aussi pourquoi, selon nous, il est possible de remettre en question les critiques et le devis de recherche de Saideman. Plus precisement, notre reponse se concentre sur sa selection de cas douteuse et sa mesure des liens ethniques, puisque nous jugeons celle-ci methodologiquement incorrecte et biaisee.

Strategic Interaction and Trade Policymaking: Formal Analysis and Simulation

This paper introduces a simple game-theoretic model and a Monte Carlo simulation of trade negotiations with the aim of identifying the nature of the selection bias that may threaten valid inference from empirical tests relying on data from trade disputes. Insights from the formal model are used to critically engage recent empirical analyses. This model is applied more specifically to the American use of Section 301 as an instrument to prise open foreign markets. The results of the game-theoretical model and the Monte Carlo simulation demonstrate that, despite significant statistical results, models of trade negotiations might potentially suffer from misspecification due to non-random selection effects.

Regional trade and economic negotiations: Introduction

Abstract This special issue investigates the new landscape of regional trade and economic negotiations. Contributors to this issue propose innovative theories and models to tackle an increasingly intricate web of trade-related issues that confront modern-day negotiators. In particular, they explore the structure, process and regional-international nexus of international trade and economic negotiations.