Erika Moreno

Squeaky wheels and unequal policy: Executive authority and education reform in Latin America

The World Bank has been increasingly involved in reforming Latin Americas education systems. However, compliance with World Bank directives varies greatly. Recent scholarship has made significant progress in fashioning an explanation for this variation by focusing on the presence of democracy. This article takes the literature a step further by identifying the mechanism by which democracy matters. Specifically, variations in executive authority are key factors in explaining the adoption of controversial World Bank directives. The authors argue that a governments ability to implement World Bank reforms and overcome popular dissent, if present, is a function of executive authority. They examine executive authority using several measures to test their hypotheses on a 20-year panel of 17 American states from 1980 to 2000. Results indicate that newly democratized governments and strong executives are indeed more successful in passing World Bank reforms.

Policy mandates and re-election among single issue parties

Abstract Recent studies point to dramatic ‘mandate switches’ by elected politicians, while others suggest higher levels of mandate loyalty. Yet, two of the oldest party systems in Latin America, Colombia and Venezuela, have not been extensively examined. Legislative activity across single issue parties is examined to determine whether they are able to stay focused and consistent with the partys policy goals. The analysis identifies the importance of stated policy goals, which are likely to provide long-term electoral benefits, and nomination procedures as important determinants of legislative action among single issue parties. The results shed a new light on parties in Latin America by suggesting that parties are capable of acting in accordance with their stated single-issue platforms.