Erin C. Westgate

Implicit drinking identity: Drinker+me associations predict college student drinking consistently

Predicting hazardous drinking in college students continues to be a serious priority. Emerging evidence suggests that implicit measures may offer additional insight in predicting unique variance in alcohol outcomes. Implicit drinking identity, in particular, may be a powerful predictor of alcohol use. The current study examined the predictive validity of three alcohol-related associations (e.g., drinking identity, alcohol approach, and alcohol cope) using adaptations of the Implicit Association Test (IAT) in a sample of 243 undergraduates. Confirming previous findings, drinking identity associations were the most consistent predictor of alcohol consumption and alcohol problems. They were the only associations that were unique predictors of alcohol use after controlling for other implicit associations. In comparison, alcohol cope and alcohol approach associations were weak but consistent predictors of alcohol consumption and alcohol problems. Although positively correlated with all drinking outcomes, neither set of associations predicted unique variance in the drinking outcomes when all implicit associations were included in the same model. Collectively, these results extend previous findings that implicit drinking identity may be a powerful tool for predicting alcohol outcomes and a potential target for clinical intervention and prevention efforts.

Short CommunicationImplicit drinking identity: Drinker + me associations predict college student drinking consistently

Predicting hazardous drinking in college students continues to be a serious priority. Emerging evidence suggests that implicit measures may offer additional insight in predicting unique variance in alcohol outcomes. Implicit drinking identity, in particular, may be a powerful predictor of alcohol use. The current study examined the predictive validity of three alcohol-related associations (e.g., drinking identity, alcohol approach, and alcohol cope) using adaptations of the Implicit Association Test (IAT) in a sample of 243 undergraduates. Confirming previous findings, drinking identity associations were the most consistent predictor of alcohol consumption and alcohol problems. They were the only associations that were unique predictors of alcohol use after controlling for other implicit associations. In comparison, alcohol cope and alcohol approach associations were weak but consistent predictors of alcohol consumption and alcohol problems. Although positively correlated with all drinking outcomes, neither set of associations predicted unique variance in the drinking outcomes when all implicit associations were included in the same model. Collectively, these results extend previous findings that implicit drinking identity may be a powerful tool for predicting alcohol outcomes and a potential target for clinical intervention and prevention efforts.

Attempted training of alcohol approach and drinking identity associations in US undergraduate drinkers: null results from two studies

There is preliminary evidence that approach avoid training can shift implicit alcohol associations and improve treatment outcomes. We sought to replicate and extend those findings in US undergraduate social drinkers (Study 1) and at-risk drinkers (Study 2). Three adaptations of the approach avoid task (AAT) were tested. The first adaptation – the approach avoid training – was a replication and targeted implicit alcohol approach associations. The remaining two adaptations – the general identity and personalized identity trainings – targeted implicit drinking identity associations, which are robust predictors of hazardous drinking in US undergraduates. Study 1 included 300 undergraduate social drinkers. They were randomly assigned to real or sham training conditions for one of the three training adaptations, and completed two training sessions, spaced one week apart. Study 2 included 288 undergraduates at risk for alcohol use disorders. The same training procedures were used, but the two training sessions occurred within a single week. Results were not as expected. Across both studies, the approach avoid training yielded no evidence of training effects on implicit alcohol associations or alcohol outcomes. The general identity training also yielded no evidence of training effects on implicit alcohol associations or alcohol outcomes with one exception; individuals who completed real training demonstrated no changes in drinking refusal self-efficacy whereas individuals who completed sham training had reductions in self-efficacy. Finally, across both studies, the personalized identity training yielded no evidence of training effects on implicit alcohol associations or alcohol outcomes. Despite having relatively large samples and using a well-validated training task, study results indicated all three training adaptations were ineffective at this dose in US undergraduates. These findings are important because training studies are costly and labor-intensive. Future research may benefit from focusing on more severe populations, pairing training with other interventions, increasing training dose, and increasing gamification of training tasks.

With a little help for our thoughts: Making it easier to think for pleasure.

Can people enjoy thinking if they set their mind to it? Previous work suggests that many people do not enjoy the deliberate attempt to have pleasurable thoughts. We suggest that deliberately thinking for pleasure requires mental resources that people are either unwilling or unable to devote to the task. If so, then people should enjoy pleasant thoughts that occur unintentionally more than pleasant thoughts that occur intentionally. This hypothesis was confirmed in an experience sampling study (Study 1) in which participants were contacted 4 times a day for 7 days and asked to rate what they had been thinking about. In Studies 2–5 we experimentally manipulated how easy it was for people to engage in pleasurable thought when given the goal of doing so. All participants listed topics they would enjoy thinking about; then some were given a simple “thinking aid” that was designed to make this experience easier. Participants who received the aid found the experience easier and enjoyed it more. The findings suggest that thinking for pleasure is cognitively demanding, but that a simple thinking aid makes it easier and more enjoyable.

Can a Naturally Occurring Pathogen Threat Change Social Attitudes? Evaluations of Gay Men and Lesbians During the 2014 Ebola Epidemic

Previous evidence linking disease threat and social attitudes suggests that a highly salient society-wide pathogen threat should lead to more negative attitudes toward gay men and lesbians. Using a sample of 248,922 Americans recruited via the Project Implicit website, we tested whether implicit attitudes toward gay men and lesbians shifted as a result of the 2014 Ebola virus outbreak. Regression discontinuity analyses, but not t-tests, showed evidence of a small shift in implicit (but not explicit) attitudes at the height of public concern over Ebola. These results could be interpreted as providing partial support for the effects of naturally occurring pathogen threats on social attitudes. Alternatively, given the large size of our sample, the mixed evidence and small effects may reflect a boundary condition for the operation of the behavioral immune system.

Boring Thoughts and Bored Minds: The MAC Model of Boredom and Cognitive Engagement

What is boredom? We review environmental, attentional, and functional theories and present a new model that describes boredom as an affective indicator of unsuccessful attentional engagement in valued goal-congruent activity. According to the Meaning and Attentional Components (MAC) model, boredom is the result of (a) an attentional component, namely mismatches between cognitive demands and available mental resources, and (b) a meaning component, namely mismatches between activities and valued goals (or the absence of valued goals altogether). We present empirical support for four novel predictions made by the model: (a) Deficits in attention and meaning each produce boredom independently of the other; (b) there are different profiles of boredom that result from specific deficits in attention and meaning; (c) boredom results from two types of attentional deficits, understimulation and overstimulation; and (d) the model explains not only when and why people become bored with external activities, but also when and why people become bored with their own thoughts. We discuss further implications of the model, such as when boredom motivates people to seek interesting versus enjoyable activities.

Productive procrastination: Academic procrastination style predicts academic and alcohol outcomes.

Productive procrastination replaces one adaptive behavior with another adaptive-albeit less important-behavior (e.g., organizing notes instead of studying for an exam). We identified adaptive and maladaptive procrastination styles associated with academic and alcohol outcomes in 1106 college undergraduates. Cluster analysis identified five academic procrastination styles-non-procrastinators, academic productive procrastinators, non-academic productive procrastinators, non-academic procrastinators, and classic procrastinators. Procrastination style differentially predicted alcohol-related problems, cravings, risk of alcohol use disorders, and GPA (all ps < .01). Non-procrastination and academic productive procrastination were most adaptive overall; non-academic productive procrastination, non-academic procrastination, and classic procrastination were least adaptive. Productive procrastination differed from other procrastination strategies, and maladaptive procrastination styles may be a useful risk indicator for preventative and intervention efforts.

Would you fund this movie? A reply to Fox et al. (2014)

We thank Fox et al. (2014) for their interest in our research and welcome this opportunity to respond to their commentary. They argue that participants in our studies enjoyed “just thinking” more than we claimed (Wilson et al., 2014). We found some irony in their position, because we began this line of research with a similar hypothesis. As the data came in we were surprised that participants did not enjoy deliberative thought very much, even when we went to some lengths to give them time to prepare and choose their topics (i.e., in our “prompted fantasy” conditions). We are thus in the rather amusing position of explaining why both Fox et al.s interpretation and our initial hypotheses are wrong.