Erin Cooley

Reducing Implicit Racial Preferences: II. Intervention Effectiveness Across Time

Implicit preferences are malleable, but does that change last? We tested 9 interventions (8 real and 1 sham) to reduce implicit racial preferences over time. In 2 studies with a total of 6,321 participants, all 9 interventions immediately reduced implicit preferences. However, none were effective after a delay of several hours to several days. We also found that these interventions did not change explicit racial preferences and were not reliably moderated by motivations to respond without prejudice. Short-term malleability in implicit preferences does not necessarily lead to long-term change, raising new questions about the flexibility and stability of implicit preferences. (PsycINFO Database Record

Intention Invention and the Affect Misattribution Procedure Reply to Bar-Anan and Nosek (2012)

A recent study of the affect misattribution procedure (AMP) found that participants who retrospectively reported that they intentionally rated the primes showed larger effect sizes and higher reliability. The study concluded that the AMP’s validity depends on intentionally rating the primes. We evaluated this conclusion in three experiments. First, larger effect sizes and higher reliability were associated with (incoherent) retrospective reports of both (a) intentionally rating the primes and (b) being unintentionally influenced by the primes. A second experiment manipulated intentions to rate the primes versus targets and found that this manipulation produced systematically different effects. Experiment 3 found that giving participants an option to “pass” when they felt they were influenced by primes did not reduce priming. Experimental manipulations, rather than retrospective self-reports, suggested that participants make post hoc confabulations to explain their responses. There was no evidence that validity in the AMP depends on intentionally rating primes.

The Relationship Between Mental Representations of Welfare Recipients and Attitudes Toward Welfare

Scholars have argued that opposition to welfare is, in part, driven by stereotypes of African Americans. This argument assumes that when individuals think about welfare, they spontaneously think about Black recipients. We investigated people’s mental representations of welfare recipients. In Studies 1 and 2, we used a perceptual task to visually estimate participants’ mental representations of welfare recipients. Compared with the average non-welfare-recipient image, the average welfare-recipient image was perceived (by a separate sample) as more African American and more representative of stereotypes associated with welfare recipients and African Americans. In Study 3, participants were asked to determine whether they supported giving welfare benefits to the people pictured in the average welfare-recipient and non-welfare-recipient images generated in Study 2. Participants were less supportive of giving welfare benefits to the person shown in the welfare-recipient image than to the person shown in the non-welfare-recipient image. The results suggest that mental images of welfare recipients may bias attitudes toward welfare policies.

Who Owns Implicit Attitudes? Testing a Metacognitive Perspective:

Metacognitive inferences about ownership for one’s implicit attitudes have the power to turn implicit bias into explicit prejudice. In Study 1, participants were assigned to construe their implicit attitudes toward gay men as belonging to themselves (owned) or as unrelated to the self (disowned). Construing one’s implicit responses as owned led to greater implicit-explicit attitude correspondence. In Study 2, we measured ownership for implicit attitudes as well as self-esteem. We predicted that ownership inferences would dictate explicit attitudes to the degree that people had positive views of the self. Indeed, higher ownership for implicit bias was associated with greater implicit-explicit attitude correspondence, and this effect was driven by participants high in self-esteem. Finally, in Study 3, we manipulated inferences of ownership and measured self-esteem. Metacognitions of ownership affected implicit-explicit attitude correspondence but only among those with relatively high self-esteem. We conclude that subjective inferences about implicit bias affect explicit prejudice.

Implicit Bias and the Illusion of Conscious Ill Will

Implicit bias is defined, in part, by a lack of intent. Yet the implicit attitudes literature has made little contact with research on the experience of conscious will, which suggests that the feeling of conscious intent is an inference rather than a direct report of how actions are caused. We tested the hypothesis that inferences about one’s intentions shape whether an automatically activated attitude is endorsed explicitly. In a first study, individuals who perceived their attitudes toward gay men to be intended showed stronger implicit–explicit correspondence. In a second study, we manipulated perceptions of intent. Inferences that implicit bias was intended caused participants to express those biases on an explicit measure. A third study replicated the experimental effects and found that metacognitions of intent were especially influential among individuals who were motivated to be unprejudiced. Results suggest that metacognitive inferences about intent can shape whether automatically activated bias becomes explicitly endorsed prejudice.

Using Groups to Measure Intergroup Prejudice

Implicit measures of racial attitudes often assess reactions to images of individuals to infer attitudes toward an entire social category. However, an increasing amount of research indicates that responses to individuals are highly dependent on context and idiosyncratic features of individual exemplars. Thus, using images of individuals to assess beliefs about a whole social category may not be ideal. Across three time points, we predicted that using images of groups would mitigate the influence of idiosyncratic features of individual targets and, thus, provide a better measurement tool to assess beliefs about a category to which all group members belong. Results revealed that an implicit measure that presented images of Black and White groups had greater construct validity, test–retest reliability, and predictive validity as compared with an implicit measure that presented the same exemplars individually. We conclude that groups provide a window into existing beliefs about social categories.

The paradox of group mind: “People in a group” have more mind than “a group of people”.

Three studies examine how subtle shifts in framing can alter the mind perception of groups. Study 1 finds that people generally perceive groups to have less mind than individuals. However, Study 2 demonstrates that changing the framing of a group from “a group of people” to “people in a group,” substantially increases mind perception—leading to comparable levels of mind between groups and individuals. Study 3 reveals that this change in framing influences people’s sympathy for groups, an effect mediated by mind perception. We conclude that minor linguistic shifts can have big effects on how groups are perceived—with implications for mind perception and sympathy for mass suffering.

Black Groups Accentuate Hypodescent by Activating Threats to the Racial Hierarchy

One reason White people categorize Black–White Biracial people as Black (called hypodescent) is to maintain the existing racial hierarchy. By creating a strict definition of who can be White, the selectivity, and thus status, of White people increases. Given that racial hierarchies are about the relative status of groups, we test whether perceiving Black groups increases hypodescent by activating fears about shifts in the racial hierarchy (i.e., a majority/minority shift). Indeed, White people rated (Study 1) and stereotyped (Study 4) Black–White Biracial people as more Black in Black groups (but not White groups; Study 2) than when alone. Critically, this pattern was driven by White people relatively high in fear of a majority/minority shift (Study 3a) or those experimentally led to feel this threat (Study 3b). We conclude that Black groups increase hypodescent by activating fears about shifts in the racial hierarchy, posing consequences for racial stereotyping.

The Fluid Perception of Racial Identity: The Role of Friendship Groups

Scholars view racial identity as a fluid social construction that can shift with time and context. But outside of academia, do people intuitively see racial identity as fluid or fixed? Four studies reveal that people see racial identity as varying flexibly with the social context—in particular, assimilating to the race of one’s friends. Participants perceived the same Black–White Biracial men as identifying as more Black (Study 1) and wanting to be perceived as more stereotypically Black (i.e., athletic; Study 3c) when with Black friends than when alone. Conversely, Biracial men were perceived as identifying as more White (Study 2) and wanting to be perceived as more stereotypically White (i.e., competent and well-spoken; Studies 3a, 3b) when with White friends. Fluid inferences of racial identity also extended to Monoracial people (Studies 4a, 4b). We conclude that people perceive others’ racial identity as shifting with the social context—eliciting distinct biases.

The Mixed Outcomes of Taking Ownership for Implicit Racial Biases

One potential strategy for prejudice reduction is encouraging people to acknowledge, and take ownership for, their implicit biases. Across two studies, we explore how taking ownership for implicit racial bias affects the subsequent expression of overt bias. Participants first completed an implicit measure of their attitudes toward Black people. Then we either led participants to think of their implicit bias as their own or as stemming from external factors. Results revealed that taking ownership for high implicit racial bias had diverging effects on subsequent warmth toward Black people (Study 1) and donations to a Black nonprofit (Study 2) based on people’s internal motivations to respond without prejudice (Internal Motivation Scale [IMS]). Critically, among those low in IMS, owning high implicit bias backfired, leading to greater overt prejudice and smaller donations. We conclude that taking ownership of implicit bias has mixed outcomes—at times amplifying the expression of explicit prejudice.