Erin L. Beatty

Effects of perspective and belief on analytic reasoning in a scientific reasoning task

The purpose of these studies was to test the hypothesis that changing perspectives from ones own to anothers promotes the engagement of analytic processing and, in turn, reduces the impact of beliefs. In two experiments participants evaluated research vignettes containing belief-consistent and belief-inconsistent conclusions, and indicated whether the data supported a correlation between two variables. Consistent with our hypothesis, the tendency to endorse correlations consistent with prior belief was reduced when participants evaluated the data from the researchers perspective relative to their own. We also administered the Actively Open Minded Thinking (AOT) scale (Stanovich & West, 2007, 2008), which did not predict belief effects on our task. We did however observe that the AOT was reliably associated with different response strategies: high AOT scorers were more inclined to choose ambiguous response options, such as “no conclusion is warranted”, whereas low scorers evinced a preference for more determinate options (e.g., there is no relationship between the two variables). We interpret our findings in the context of dual process theories of reasoning and from a Bayesian perspective.

Transfer of training from one working memory task to another: behavioural and neural evidence.

N-back working memory (WM) tasks necessitate the maintenance and updating of dynamic rehearsal sets during performance. The delayed matching-to-sample (dMTS) task is another WM task, which in turn involves the encoding, maintenance, and retrieval of stimulus representations in sequential order. Because both n-back and dMTS engage WM function, we hypothesized that compared to a control task not taxing WM, training on the n-back task would be associated with better performance on dMTS by virtue of training a shared mental capacity. We tested this hypothesis by randomly assigning subjects (N = 43) to train on either the n-back (including 2-back and 3-back levels) or an active control task. Following training, dMTS was administered in the fMRI scanner. The n-back group performed marginally better than the active control group on dMTS. In addition, although the n-back group improved more on the less difficult 2-back level than the more difficult 3-back level across training sessions, it was improvement on the 3-back level that accounted for 21% of the variance in dMTS performance. For the control group, improvement in training across sessions was unrelated to dMTS performance. At the neural level, greater activation in the left inferior frontal gyrus, right posterior parietal cortex, and the cerebellum distinguished the n-back group from the control group in the maintenance phase of dMTS. Degree of improvement on the 3-back level across training sessions was correlated with activation in right lateral prefrontal and motor cortices in the maintenance phase of dMTS. Our results suggest that although n-back training is more likely to improve performance in easier blocks, it is improvement in more difficult blocks that is predictive of performance on a target task drawing on WM. In addition, the extent to which training on a task can transfer to another task is likely due to the engagement of shared cognitive capacities and underlying neural substrates—in this case WM.

The prospects of working memory training for improving deductive reasoning

Cognitive (brain) training has been a major focus of study in recent years. In applied settings, the excitement regarding this research programme emanates from its prospects for far transfer—defined as observing performance benefits in outcome measures that are contextually, structurally or superficially dissimilar to the trained task (Perkins and Salomon, 1994). By and large, researchers have focused on training working memory (WM). This is not surprising, given the ubiquity of WM requirements for thinking (Baddeley, 2003). Currently, much evidence suggests that adaptive training on WM tasks can increase WM skills. In contrast, consistent evidence regarding far transfer is lacking (see Melby-Lervag and Hulme, 2013), although there is evidence to suggest that when the training modality is visuospatial, the likelihood of transfer and the long-term stability of its benefits are enhanced (Melby-Lervag and Hulme, 2013; Stephenson and Halpern, 2013). Theoretically, there is reason to suspect that interventions that increase WM skills and/or capacity could improve deductive reasoning. This prediction stems from the observation that individual differences in WM capacity predict deductive reasoning performance on conflict problems where the believability of conclusions conflicts with logical validity (e.g., Newstead et al., 2004). Conflict problems require WM resources because their correct solution depends on the suppression of the heuristic system (System I) in favor of responding in accordance with the analytic system (System II). Evidence for this interpretation was provided by De Neys (2006), who presented participants with conflict and non-conflict syllogisms while also burdening their executive resources with a secondary task. Specifically, the between-subjects manipulation of WM load consisted of presenting a 3 × 3 matrix prior to each syllogism, wherein the matrix was filled with a complex four-dot pattern (high load) or with three dots on a horizontal line (low load)1. After making a validity judgment, participants reproduced the matrix pattern. This experimental design required them to maintain the matrix pattern in WM while reasoning. Whereas the high load condition impaired performance on conflict problems, there was no effect of load on non-conflict problems. This demonstrates that overcoming belief-logic conflict is limited by WM capacity. WM training could also lead to improvement in deductive reasoning via its effect on fluid intelligence—typically measured using matrix reasoning tasks. Specifically, much evidence suggests that general cognitive ability and deductive reasoning are positively correlated (Stanovich and West, 2000). In addition, a recent meta-analysis demonstrated that training specifically on the n-back family of WM tasks leads to a small but positive effect on fluid intelligence (Au et al., 2014). Therefore, theoretically, increases in fluid intelligence could mediate the link between n-back training and deductive reasoning, offering an indirect route for improving the latter (Figure ​(Figure11). Figure 1 Two possible routes for improving deductive reasoning by working memory training. The solid arrow depicts a direct effect. The dashed arrows depict an indirect effect. Recently, Aries et al. (2014) investigated the combined effect of reasoning strategy and WM training on school performance. The participants for Experiment 1 were enrolled in lower-level Higher Secondary Education history classes. During the 6-week intervention period, participants in the control condition were taught using a “conservative” method that involved the introduction of new subjects in new paragraphs, and the answering of reasoning questions from the textbook. In contrast, for participants in the experimental condition the same material was embedded within two WM training tasks: n-back and the Odd One Out. This approach ensured that training was contextualized within the subject matter of the history class. For example, on each trial of the Odd One Out four historical words or pictures were presented successively on the screen, three of which were related (e.g., were drawn from agrarian civilizations) whereas the fourth was not (i.e., was a depiction of hunter-gatherer civilization). The participant had to maintain all four stimuli in WM to select the odd one out. In the n-back task, nouns (e.g., farming) and pictures (e.g., hieroglyphics) drawn from the content of the history class were used as stimuli. In addition, the experimenters trained reasoning strategies using a modification of the IMPROVE method (see Mevarech and Kramarski, 2003). This intervention is designed to teach the structure of reasoning, and works by testing understanding of the problems, highlighting similarities between problems, applying strategies for solving problems, and prompting reflection on the reasoning process. Compared to the control condition, students in the experimental condition exhibited significant gains in performance on reasoning questions in official school tests that necessitate inference making—a difference that remained significant 16 weeks after the termination of training. Subsequently, participants in Experiment 2 who were enrolled in higher-level Higher Secondary Education history classes received either WM or reasoning strategy training. On its own, reasoning strategy but not WM training improved school test performance. The results of Aries et al. (2014) suggest that for students of relatively lower ability, the combination of WM and reasoning strategy training can be a successful recipe for improving reasoning. This is likely because whereas the former enhances WM skills, the latter facilitates the acquisition of the cognitive tools for logic. For students of higher ability there might be less room for improving WM (i.e., a ceiling effect), such that learning the structure of reasoning becomes a relatively more important factor for improving performance. Although the results of the two experiments are not directly comparable because of differences in the composition of the samples and intervention strategies, they do suggest that differences in baseline ability must be taken into account while assessing transfer effects (see Jaeggi et al., 2014). In conclusion, it appears useful to pursue the possibility that WM training could benefit deductive reasoning directly by increasing WM skills, or indirectly by increasing fluid intelligence. Critically, Aries et al.s successful intervention consisted of embedding WM training with domain-relevant material. It has yet to be demonstrated whether a domain-general intervention to train WM will exhibit a similar transfer profile in the context of deductive reasoning. In addition, the extent to which successful transfer to deductive reasoning will require supplementing WM training with strategy training remains an open question.

Neuroanatomical correlates of categorizing emotional valence.

Categorization is fundamental to cognition, and evidence suggests that categorizing emotional stimuli holds a privileged position in human information processing. According to theories on embodied emotion, the subjective emotional feeling elicited by a stimulus plays a causal role in its categorization. Using functional MRI, we tested the hypothesis that categorizing emotional stimuli in terms of valence would activate structures involved in valence-specific experience of emotion. On each trial, two pictures from the International Affective Picture System were presented successively. Upon viewing the second picture, participants categorized it as belonging to the same valence category as or a different valence category from the first picture. Categorization activated an exclusively left-lateralized set of regions implicated in taxonomic categorization (i.e. judging whether two items are of the same kind) including the middle temporal gyrus and precuneus, as well as the posterior cingulate cortex. Critically, for negative pictures categorization activated structures that underlie the experience of negative emotions (anterior insula, left orbitofrontal cortex), whereas for positive pictures categorization activated structures that underlie the experience of positive emotions (dorsomedial and ventromedial prefrontal cortex). Consistent with predictions derived from theories on embodied emotion, these results suggest that experience of emotion contributes to categorizing emotional valence.

One-way traffic: The inferior frontal gyrus controls brain activation in the middle temporal gyrus and inferior parietal lobule during divergent thinking

ABSTRACT Contrary to earlier approaches that focused on the contributions of isolated brain regions to the emergence of creativity, there is now growing consensus that creative thought emerges from the interaction of multiple brain regions, often embedded within larger brain networks. Specifically, recent evidence from studies of divergent thinking suggests that kernel ideas emerge in posterior brain regions residing within the semantic system and/or the default mode network (DMN), and that the prefrontal cortex (PFC) regions within the executive control network (ECN) constrain those ideas for generating outputs that meet task demands. However, despite knowing that regions within these networks exhibit interaction, to date the direction of the relationship has not been tested directly. By applying Dynamic Causal Modeling (DCM) to fMRI data collected during a divergent thinking task, we tested the hypothesis that the PFC exerts unidirectional control over the middle temporal gyrus (MTG) and the inferior parietal lobule (IPL), vs. the hypothesis that these two sets of regions exert bidirectional control over each other (in the form of feedback loops). The data were consistent with the former model by demonstrating that the right inferior frontal gyrus (IFG) exerts unidirectional control over MTG and IPL, although the evidence was somewhat stronger in the case of the MTG than the IPL. Our findings highlight potential causal pathways that could underlie the neural bases of divergent thinking. HighlightsIFG controls brain activation in MTG during divergent thinking.IFG also controls brain activation in MTG during recall from memory.IFGs control over MTG activation appears to be task‐invariant.IFG exerts weaker control over IPL during divergent thinking.IFG and IPL exert bidirectional control over one another during recall from memory.

The reflective mind: Examining individual differences in susceptibility to base rate neglect with fMRI

Performance on heuristics and bias tasks has been shown to be susceptible to bias. In turn, susceptibility to bias varies as a function of individual differences in cognitive abilities (e.g., intelligence) and thinking styles (e.g., propensity for reflection). Using a classic task (i.e., lawyer–engineer problem), we conducted two experiments to examine the differential contributions of cognitive abilities versus thinking styles to performance. The results of Experiment 1 demonstrated that the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT)—a well-established measure of reflective thinking—predicted performance on conflict problems (where base rates and intuition point in opposite directions), whereas STM predicted performance on nonconflict problems. Experiment 2 conducted in the fMRI scanner replicated this behavioral dissociation and enabled us to probe their neural correlates. As predicted, conflict problems were associated with greater activation in the ACC—a key region for conflict detection—even in cases when participants responded stereotypically. In participants with higher CRT scores, conflict problems were associated with greater activation in the posterior cingulate cortex (PCC), and activation in PCC covaried in relation to CRT scores during conflict problems. Also, CRT scores predicted activation in PCC in conflict problems (over and above nonconflict problems). Our results suggest that individual differences in reflective thinking as measured by CRT are related to brain activation in PCC—a region involved in regulating attention between external and internal foci. We discuss the implications of our findings in terms of PCCs possible involvement in switching from intuitive to analytic mode of thought.

Topographical memory for newly-learned maps is differentially affected by route-based versus landmark-based learning: A functional MRI study

Humans rely on topographical memory to encode information about spatial aspects of environments. However, even though people adopt different strategies when learning new maps, little is known about the impact of those strategies on topographical memory, and their neural correlates. To examine that issue, we presented participants with 40 unfamiliar maps, each of which displayed one major route and three landmarks. Half were instructed to memorize the maps by focusing on the route, whereas the other half memorized the maps by focusing on the landmarks. One day later, the participants were tested on their ability to distinguish previously studied ‘old’ maps from completely unfamiliar ‘new’ maps under conditions of high and low working memory load in the functional MRI scanner. Viewing old versus new maps was associated with relatively greater activation in a distributed set of regions including bilateral inferior temporal gyrus – an important region for recognizing visual objects. Critically, whereas the performance of participants who had followed a route-based strategy dropped to chance level under high working memory load, participants who had followed a landmark-based strategy performed at above chance levels under both high and low working memory load – reflected by relatively greater activation in the left inferior parietal lobule (i.e. rostral part of the supramarginal gyrus known as area PFt). Our findings suggest that landmark-based learning may buffer against the effects of working memory load during recognition, and that this effect is represented by the greater involvement of a brain region implicated in both topographical and working memory.

Structural Correlates of Openness and Intellect: Implications for the contribution of personality to creativity

Openness/Intellect (i.e., openness to experience) is the Big Five personality factor most consistently associated with individual differences in creativity. Recent psychometric evidence has demonstrated that this factor consists of two distinct aspects—Intellect and Openness. Whereas Intellect reflects perceived intelligence and intellectual engagement, Openness reflects engagement with fantasy, perception, and aesthetics. We investigated the extent to which Openness and Intellect are associated with variations in brain structure as measured by cortical thickness, area, and volume (N = 185). Our results demonstrated that Openness was correlated inversely with cortical thickness and volume in left middle frontal gyrus (BA 6), middle temporal gyrus (MTG, BA 21), and superior temporal gyrus (BA 41), and exclusively with cortical thickness in left inferior parietal lobule (BA 40), right inferior frontal gyrus (IFG, BA 45), and MTG (BA 37). When age and sex were statistically controlled for, the inverse correlations between Openness and cortical thickness remained statistically significant for all regions except left MTG, whereas the correlations involving cortical volume remained statistically significant only for left middle frontal gyrus. There was no statistically significant correlation between Openness and cortical area, and no statistically significant correlation between Intellect and cortical thickness, area, or volume. Our results demonstrate that individual differences in Openness are correlated with variation in brain structure—particularly as indexed by cortical thickness. Given the involvement of the above regions in processes related to memory and cognitive control, we discuss the implications of our findings for the possible contribution of personality to creative cognition.

Mental Health Services Use Intentions Among Canadian Military Recruits

Identifying the factors associated with mental health services use (MHSU) is an important step in developing strategies to improve services access and delivery. The aims of the present study were to (a) identify personality and individual difference characteristics associated with MHSU intentions within the framework of the Theory of Planned Behavior (TPB) and (b) explore complex relationships that might exist between these characteristics and determinants of MHSU intentions identified in TPB, including attitudes, subjective norms, and perceived behavioral control. Data for 244 Canadian Armed Forces recruits who completed a MHSU questionnaire following mental health training were linked to personality data collected earlier. Multivariate analyses showed that the relationship between agreeableness and MHSU intentions was mediated by instrumental attitudes and subjective norms. The relationship between hardiness and MHSU intentions was mediated by subjective norms and self-efficacy. Findings suggest it may be worthwhile to consider mental health education initiatives to improve MHSU.

Cognitive brain training, video games, and creativity

Abstract There is now general consensus that creativity is a componential trait, manifest as a function of the contribution of relevant capacities. Therefore, theoretically, one should expect to observe gains in creativity when those specific capacities are enhanced via training. Video games represent a potential method for enhancing specific capacities related to creativity. Indeed, a recent meta-analysis has demonstrated that engagement in video games leads to enhancements in motor skills, auditory processing, spatial imagery, and visual processing, but not executive functions. Here we begin by conducting a selective review of the literature on cognitive brain training for improving working memory, and extract relevant insights for assessing the utility of video games for enhancing creativity. We end by making the case that the concept of domain specificity is key for determining the utility of video games for improving creativity.