Ernst-Ludwig von Thadden

Blocks, liquidity and corporate control

The paper develops a simple model of corporate ownership structure in which costs and benefits of ownership concentration are analyzed. The model compares the liquidity benefits obtained through dispersed corporate ownership with the benefits from efficient management control achieved by some degree of ownership concentration. The paper reexamines the free-rider problem in corporate control in the presence of liquidity trading, derives predictions for the trade and pricing of blocks, and provides criteria for the optimal choice of ownership structure. Copyright The American Finance Association 1998.

Short-Term versus Long-Term Interests: Capital Structure with Multiple Investors

We study the problem of financial contracting and renegotiation between a firm and outside investors when the firm cannot commit to future payouts, but assets can be contracted upon. We show that a capital structure with multiple investors specializing in short-term and long-term claims is superior to a structure with only one type of claim, because this hardens the incentives for the entrepreneur to renegotiate the contract ex post. Depending on the parameters, the optimal capital structure also differentiates between state-independent and state-dependent longterm claims, which can be interpreted as long-term debt and equity.

Asymmetric information, bank lending and implicit contracts: the winner's curse

The purpose of this note is to point out an error in a widely cited paper by Sharpe (1990) on long-term bank-firm relationships and to provide a correct analysis of the problem. The model studies repeated lending under asymmetric information which leads to winners-curse type distortions of competition. Contrary to the claims in Sharpe (1990), this game only has an equilibriuim in mixed strategies, which features a partial informational lock-in by firms and random termination of lending relationships.

The Changing Corporate Governance Paradigm: Implications for Transition and Developing Countries

The rapidly growing literature studying the relationship between legal origin, investor protection, and finance has stimulated an important debate in academic circles. It has also generated a number of applied research projects and strong policy statements. This paper discusses the implications, in particular for developing and transition countries, from this literature. We conclude that its focus on the plight of small investors is too narrow when applied to these countries. We argue that this group is unlikely to play an important role in most developing and transition countries. External investors may still be crucial, but they are more likely to come in as strategic investors or creditors. The paper also proposes a broader paradigm including other stakeholders and mechanisms of governance in order to better understand the problems facing these countries and generate policy implications that compensate for the weaknesses of capital markets.

How Does Liquidity Affect Government Bond Yields

The paper explores the determinants of yield differentials between sovereign bonds, using Euro area data. There is a common trend in yield differentials, which is correlated with a measure of aggregate risk. In contrast, liquidity differentials display sizeable heterogeneity and no common factor. We propose a simple model with endogenous liquidity demand, where a bonds liquidity premium depends both on its transaction cost and on investment opportunities. The model predicts that yield differentials should increase in both liquidity and risk, with an interaction term of the opposite sign. Testing these predictions on daily data, we find that the aggregate risk factor is consistently priced, liquidity differentials are priced for a subset of countries, and their interaction with the risk factor is in line with the models prediction and crucial to detect their effect.

The Political Economy of Corporate Control and Labor Rents

In a democracy, a political majority can influence both the corporate governance structure and the return to human and financial capital. We argue that when financial wealth is sufficiently concentrated, there is political support for high labor rents and a strong governance role for banks or large investors. The model is consistent with the “great reversal” phenomenon in the first half of the twentieth century. We offer evidence that in several financially developed countries a financially weakened middle class became concerned about labor income risk associated with free markets and supported a more corporatist financial system.

Liquidity creation through banks and markets: Multiple insurance and limited market access

The paper surveys theories of the intertemporal allocation of funds through demand deposits and anonymous markets, first separately and then in an integrated model. It reviews some work on the role of market frictions and asset characteristics, and suggests that the interplay between these two is crucial in explaining the observed coexistence of demand deposits and anonymous markets.

Strategic transparency and informed trading : will capital market integration force convergence of corporate governance?

Dominant investors can influence the publicly available information about firms by affecting the cost of information collection. Under strategic competition, transparency results in higher variability of profits and output. Thus, lenders prefer less transparency, since this protects firms when in a weak competitive position, while equity holders prefer more. Market interaction creates strategic complementarity in gathering information on competing firms, thus entry by transparent competitors will improve price informativeness. Moreover, as the return to information gathering increases with liquidity, increasing global trading may undermine the ability of bank control to keep firms opaque.

Valutation, Liquidity and Risk in Government Bond Markets

We explore the determinants of yield differentials between sovereign bonds in the Euro area. There is a common trend in yield differentials, which is correlated with a measure of the international risk factor. In contrast, liquidity differentials display sizeable heterogeneity and no common factor. We present a model that predicts that yield differentials should increase in both liquidity and risk, with an interaction term whose magnitude and sign depends on the size of the liquidity differential with respect to the reference country. Testing these predictions on daily data, we find that the international risk factor is consistently priced, while liquidity differentials are priced only for a subset of countries and their interaction with the risk factor is crucial to detect their effect.

Incentives for Unaware Agents

The paper introduces the problem of unawareness into Principal-Agent theory and discusses optimal incentive contracts when the agent may be unaware of her action space. Depending on the agents default behavior, it can be optimal for the principal to propose an incomplete contract (that keeps the agent unaware) or a complete contract. The key tradeoff is that of enlarging the agents choice set versus adding costly incentive constraints. If agents differ in their unawareness, optimal contracts show a self-reinforcing pattern: if there are few unaware agents in the economy optimal contracts promote awareness, if unawareness is wide-spread optimal contracts shroud the contracting environment, thus keeping the agent unaware.