Erol Akçay

Cheaters must prosper: reconciling theoretical and empirical perspectives on cheating in mutualism

Cheating is a focal concept in the study of mutualism, with the majority of researchers considering cheating to be both prevalent and highly damaging. However, current definitions of cheating do not reliably capture the evolutionary threat that has been a central motivation for the study of cheating. We describe the development of the cheating concept and distill a relative-fitness-based definition of cheating that encapsulates the evolutionary threat posed by cheating, i.e. that cheaters will spread and erode the benefits of mutualism. We then describe experiments required to conclude that cheating is occurring and to quantify fitness conflict more generally. Next, we discuss how our definition and methods can generate comparability and integration of theory and experiments, which are currently divided by their respective prioritisations of fitness consequences and traits. To evaluate the current empirical evidence for cheating, we review the literature on several of the best-studied mutualisms. We find that although there are numerous observations of low-quality partners, there is currently very little support from fitness data that any of these meet our criteria to be considered cheaters. Finally, we highlight future directions for research on conflict in mutualisms, including novel research avenues opened by a relative-fitness-based definition of cheating.

Negotiation, Sanctions, and Context Dependency in the Legume-Rhizobium Mutualism

Two important questions about mutualisms are how the fitness costs and benefits to the mutualist partners are determined and how these mechanisms affect the evolutionary dynamics of the mutualism. We tackle these questions with a model of the legume-rhizobium symbiosis that regards the mutualism outcome as a result of biochemical negotiations between the plant and its nodules. We explore the fitness consequences of this mechanism to the plant and rhizobia and obtain four main results. First, negotiations permit the plant to differentially reward more-cooperative rhizobia—a phenomenon termed “plant sanctions”—but only when more-cooperative rhizobia also provide the plant with good outside options during negotiations with other nodules. Second, negotiations may result in seemingly paradoxical cases where the plant is worse off when it has a “choice” between two strains of rhizobia than when infected by either strain alone. Third, even when sanctions are effective, they are by themselves not sufficient to maintain cooperative rhizobia in a population: less cooperative strains always have an advantage at the population level. Finally, partner fidelity feedback, together with genetic correlations between a rhizobium strain’s cooperativeness and the outside options it provides, can maintain cooperative rhizobia. Our results show how joint control over the outcome of a mutualism through the proximate mechanism of negotiation can affect the evolutionary dynamics of interspecific cooperation.

PATHWAYS TO SOCIAL EVOLUTION: RECIPROCITY, RELATEDNESS, AND SYNERGY

Many organisms live in populations structured by space and by class, exhibit plastic responses to their social partners, and are subject to nonadditive ecological and fitness effects. Social evolution theory has long recognized that all of these factors can lead to different selection pressures but has only recently attempted to synthesize how these factors interact. Using models for both discrete and continuous phenotypes, we show that analyzing these factors in a consistent framework reveals that they interact with one another in ways previously overlooked. Specifically, behavioral responses (reciprocity), genetic relatedness, and synergy interact in nontrivial ways that cannot be easily captured by simple summary indices of assortment. We demonstrate the importance of these interactions by showing how they have been neglected in previous synthetic models of social behavior both within and between species. These interactions also affect the level of behavioral responses that can evolve in the long run; proximate biological mechanisms are evolutionarily stable when they generate enough responsiveness relative to the level of responsiveness that exactly balances the ecological costs and benefits. Given the richness of social behavior across taxa, these interactions should be a boon for empirical research as they are likely crucial for describing the complex relationship linking ecology, demography, and social behavior.

Behavioral Responses in Structured Populations Pave the Way to Group Optimality

An unresolved controversy regarding social behaviors is exemplified when natural selection might lead to behaviors that maximize fitness at the social-group level but are costly at the individual level. Except for the special case of groups of clones, we do not have a general understanding of how and when group-optimal behaviors evolve, especially when the behaviors in question are flexible. To address this question, we develop a general model that integrates behavioral plasticity in social interactions with the action of natural selection in structured populations. We find that group-optimal behaviors can evolve, even without clonal groups, if individuals exhibit appropriate behavioral responses to each other’s actions. The evolution of such behavioral responses, in turn, is predicated on the nature of the proximate behavioral mechanisms. We model a particular class of proximate mechanisms, prosocial preferences, and find that such preferences evolve to sustain maximum group benefit under certain levels of relatedness and certain ecological conditions. Thus, our model demonstrates the fundamental interplay between behavioral responses and relatedness in determining the course of social evolution. We also highlight the crucial role of proximate mechanisms such as prosocial preferences in the evolution of behavioral responses and in facilitating evolutionary transitions in individuality.

Water Stress Strengthens Mutualism Among Ants, Trees, and Scale Insects

When water is scarce, trees invest in the moderate carbon cost of supporting defensive ants to avoid the potentially high carbon cost of extremities being eaten.

The evolution of payoff matrices: providing incentives to cooperate.

Most of the work in evolutionary game theory starts with a model of a social situation that gives rise to a particular payoff matrix and analyses how behaviour evolves through natural selection. Here, we invert this approach and ask, given a model of how individuals behave, how the payoff matrix will evolve through natural selection. In particular, we ask whether a prisoners dilemma game is stable against invasions by mutant genotypes that alter the payoffs. To answer this question, we develop a two-tiered framework with goal-oriented dynamics at the behavioural time scale and a diploid population genetic model at the evolutionary time scale. Our results are two-fold: first, we show that the prisoners dilemma is subject to invasions by mutants that provide incentives for cooperation to their partners, and that the resulting game is a coordination game similar to the hawk–dove game. Second, we find that for a large class of mutants and symmetric games, a stable genetic polymorphism will exist in the locus determining the payoff matrix, resulting in a complex pattern of behavioural diversity in the population. Our results highlight the importance of considering the evolution of payoff matrices to understand the evolution of animal social systems.

Social inheritance can explain the structure of animal social networks

The social network structure of animal populations has major implications for survival, reproductive success, sexual selection and pathogen transmission of individuals. But as of yet, no general theory of social network structure exists that can explain the diversity of social networks observed in nature, and serve as a null model for detecting species and population-specific factors. Here we propose a simple and generally applicable model of social network structure. We consider the emergence of network structure as a result of social inheritance, in which newborns are likely to bond with maternal contacts, and via forming bonds randomly. We compare model output with data from several species, showing that it can generate networks with properties such as those observed in real social systems. Our model demonstrates that important observed properties of social networks, including heritability of network position or assortative associations, can be understood as consequences of social inheritance.

Group Size and Social Conflict in Complex Societies

Conflicts of interest over resources or reproduction among individuals in a social group have long been considered to result in automatic and universal costs to group living. However, exploring how social conflict varies with group size has produced mixed empirical results. Here we develop a model that generates alternative predictions for how social conflict should vary with group size depending on the type of benefits gained from being in a social group. We show that a positive relationship between social conflict and group size is favored when groups form primarily for the benefits of sociality but not when groups form mainly for accessing group-defended resources. Thus, increased social conflict in animal societies should not be viewed as an automatic cost of larger social groups. Instead, studying the relationship between social conflict and the types of grouping benefits will be crucial for understanding the evolution of complex societies.

Turkey's rich natural heritage under assault.

We read with sad agreement the editorial “Turkey and science academies” (30 September, p. [1801][1]), in which B. Alberts discusses the restructuring of Turkeys Academy of Sciences (TUBA) in order to give the government direct control over it. In addition to destroying TUBAs identity as an

Invasion fitness, inclusive fitness, and reproductive numbers in heterogeneous populations.

How should fitness be measured to determine which phenotype or “strategy” is uninvadable when evolution occurs in a group‐structured population subject to local demographic and environmental heterogeneity? Several fitness measures, such as basic reproductive number, lifetime dispersal success of a local lineage, or inclusive fitness have been proposed to address this question, but the relationships between them and their generality remains unclear. Here, we ascertain uninvadability (all mutant strategies always go extinct) in terms of the asymptotic per capita number of mutant copies produced by a mutant lineage arising as a single copy in a resident population (“invasion fitness”). We show that from invasion fitness uninvadability is equivalently characterized by at least three conceptually distinct fitness measures: (i) lineage fitness, giving the average individual fitness of a randomly sampled mutant lineage member; (ii) inclusive fitness, giving a reproductive value weighted average of the direct fitness costs and relatedness weighted indirect fitness benefits accruing to a randomly sampled mutant lineage member; and (iii) basic reproductive number (and variations thereof) giving lifetime success of a lineage in a single group, and which is an invasion fitness proxy. Our analysis connects approaches that have been deemed different, generalizes the exact version of inclusive fitness to class‐structured populations, and provides a biological interpretation of natural selection on a mutant allele under arbitrary strength of selection.