Eros Corazza

Who Is I

Whilst it may seem strange to ask to whom “I” refers, we show that there are occasionswhen it is not always obvious. In demonstratingthis we challenge Kaplans assumptionthat the utterer, agent and referent of “I” arealways the same person.We begin by presenting what weregard to be the received view about indexicalreference popularized by David Kaplan in hisinfluential 1972 “Demonstratives” before goingon, in section 2, to discuss Sidellesanswering machine paradox which may be thoughtto threaten this view, and his deferredutterance method of resolving this puzzle. Insection 3 we introduce a novel version of theanswering machine paradox which suggests that,in certain cases, Kaplans identification ofutterer, agent and referent of “I” breaks down.In the fourth section we go on to consider arecent revision of Kaplans picture by Predelliwhich appeals to the intentions of the utterer,before arguing that this picture is committedto unacceptable consequences and, therefore,should be avoided if possible. Finally, insection 5, we present a new revision ofKaplans account which retains much of thespirit of his original proposal whilst offeringa intuitively acceptable way to explain all ofthe apparently problematic data. In doing so,we also show how this picture is able toexplain the scenario which motivated Predellisaccount without appealing to speakerintentions.

On epithets qua attributive anaphors

A multiple-proposition theory is proposed, according to which a single utterance can express several distinct propositions. An utterance of “Jon, the idiot, missed the train” expresses the official proposition THAT J ON MISSED THE TRAIN and the background proposition THAT J ON IS AN IDIOT . It is argued that only the official proposition affects the truth-value of the utterance, while the background proposition(s) may be treated similarly to pragmatic presuppositions. The multiple-proposition theory helps us to defend the thesis that, in an utterance such as “Jon 1 promised to come but the idiot 1 missed the train”, the epithet the idiot must be understood as an attributive anaphor, for it inherits its value from Jon and attributes to Jon the property of being an idiot. It is argued that epithets in such constructions should be viewed in a way similar to quasi-indicators, insofar as the latter are also attributive anaphors. The quasi-indicator she herself in “Jane 1 believes that she ( herself ) 1 is rich” inherits its value from Jane and attributes an I -thought to Jane. In focusing on the similarities and differences between epithets and quasi-indicators, we can explain some alleged difficulties, difficulties which suggest that epithets cannot be anaphoric (e.g. “*Jon 1 claimed/said/thinks/ … that the bastard 1 was honest”). It is shown that the ungrammaticality of sentences like these rests on the fact that the epithet is embedded in what should be a de se attribution (e.g. “Jon 1 claimed/said/thinks that he ( himself ) 1 was honest”) while its nature is to contribute to the expression of a de re attribution. This helps us to understand the ungrammaticality of “*Jane 1 said/thinks/promised/ … that the idiot 1 will come” vs. the grammaticality of “Jane 1 said/thinks/promised/ … that she ( herself ) 1 will come” on the one hand, and, on the other hand, the ungrammaticality of “Jon 1 ran over a man who was trying to give him (* himself ) 1 directions” vs. the grammaticality of “Jon 1 ran over a man who was trying to give the idiot 1 directions”.

Complex demonstratives qua singular terms

In a recent book, Jeffrey King (King 2001) argues that complexdemonstratives, i.e., noun phrases of the form `this/that F’, are not singular terms. As such,they are not devices of direct reference contributing the referent to the proposition expressed.In this essay I challenge Kings position and show how a direct reference view can handle the datahe proposes in favor of the quantificational account. I argue that when a complex demonstrativecannot be interpreted as a singular term, it is best understood as a case of deferredreference – in which case it should be viewed as an anaphora inheriting its value from a quantifiedterm – or as an emphatic description.

Essential Indexicals and Quasi‐Indicators

In this paper I shall focus on Casta˜ neda’s notion of quasi-indicators and I shall defend the following theses: • Essential indexicals (‘I’, ‘here’ and ‘now’) are intrinsically perspectival mechanisms of reference and, as such, they are not reducible to any other mechanism of reference. • Quasi-indicators (e.g. expressions like ‘she (herself )’ exist in natural language and cannot be explained away as merely reflexive pronouns. • Quasi-indicators are the only mechanism that allows the attribution of an indexical reference. As such they must appear in oratio obliqua constructions. • When linked to a referring NP, quasi-indicators, like anaphors, inherit their reference from the antecedent to which they are linked (and thus coindexed with). When linked to a quantified expression, quasi-indicators work like (quasiindexical) bound variables. • Quasi-indicators must be understood along the lines of logophoric pronouns (from ‘logos’ meaning discourse and ‘phoros’ meaning bearing or transporting). As such, they are best explained using such notions as perspective and point of view.

Situated minimalism versus free enrichment

In this paper, we put forward a position we call “situationalism” (or “situated minimalism”), which is a middle-ground view between minimalism and contextualism in recent philosophy of language. We focus on the notion of free enrichment, which first arose within contextualism as underlying the claim that what is said is typically enriched relative to the logical form of the uttered sentence. However, minimalism also acknowledges some process of pragmatic intrusion in its claim that what is thought and communicated is typically enriched relative to what is said. We show that situationalism dispenses with free enrichment both at the level of what is said (proposition expressed) and of what is thought (mental level). According to situationalism, an alleged underdetermined utterance can, pace minimalism, be true in one situation while false in another, and two people using the same alleged underdetermined sentence can be characterized, pace contextualism, as having said the same thing.

She and Herself

In this paper I discuss the attribution of ‘I’-thoughts, i.e., so-called de se attributions. In doing so, I will focus on Castaneda’s notion of quasi-indicators. Following Castaneda, I assume that the quasi-indicator ‘s/he (him/herself)’, ‘s/he*’ for short, is the only mechanism which enables the attributer, in indirect speech, to capture the attributee’s ‘I’-thought, i.e., the thought the latter would express in the first person using ‘I’. The conclusion I’ll reach is that a quasi-indicator is both anaphoric and attributive: quasi-indicators are a kind of attributive anaphor.

Some Notes on Points of View

I’ll argue that the notion of viewpoint plays central stage in our understanding and interpretation of many utterances. I’ll claim that such a notion is best characterized on the background of indexical reference; yet it cannot be reduced to it. I’ll thus show how points of view can be unarticulated (roughly, unmentioned) and yet play an important role in our linguistic practice inasmuch as the understanding of some utterances rests on the grasping of the point of view associated with them. Finally, I’ll mention how the notion of viewpoint (as an unarticulated linguistic phenomenon) plays an essential role in the understanding and interpretation of utterances containing anaphoric reflexive pronouns.

She*: Pragmatically Imparted or Semantically Encoded?

More than twenty years ago, in a series of illuminating, thought provoking, and, by now, classical papers, Hector-Neri Castaneda introduced to the philosophical forum the distinction between indicators and quasi-indicators, i.e., between indexicals such as ‘I’, ‘now’, and the like, and expressions such as’ she herself’, ‘then’, and the like. The latter are devices employed in an oratio obliqua construction to attribute a use (maybe only implicit) of the former.