Erwin Dekker

Exemplary Goods: Exemplars as Judgment Devices

textabstractIn this article the notion of exemplars is developed to study valuation processes. It argues that exemplary goods are an important ‘judgment device’ on markets of singular goods, which has so far been ignored in the literature. The article draws on Hannah Arendt’s theory of exemplars, as well as literature from the philosophy of science and psychology to construct the new concept. Exemplars are particular goods that become focal points in markets that facilitate the mutual coordination of consumers and producers. From these exemplars norms of quality emerge which are otherwise hard or impossible to explicate. These exemplars and the norms of quality which emerge from them help shape the expectations of both producers and consumers with regard to new goods that are introduced to the market. Two illustrative cases, on classic literature and hip-hop music, are presented to demonstrate the relevance of the concept.

By Unanimous Decision? A Second Look At Consensus In The Film Industry

This article reports analyses of the verdicts of various film organizations that annually present awards to motion pictures and investigates whether they award/nominate the same movies in a given year. This research disputes previous findings that reported a high level of agreement between those juries, by the means of reliability analysis and the Cronbachs alpha composite. Arguments were raised for why these earlier findings were flawed and why the use of Cronbachs alpha is problematic. Different aspects of consensus are discussed, after which a new measure (β) is introduced. This is followed by a detailed comparison between particular juries with regard to the percentage share of their decisions that award the most successful (chosen by multiple other juries as well) and the least successful (uniquely awarded) films. This measure shows how often a singular jury decides in line with the others and how much does it stray from the consensus. The article also broadens the theoretical discussions about the reasons for (not) expecting a consensus to arise between various expert juries. It argues that by adopting a cultural economic perspective we become aware of various reasons, most importantly competition between the award events and the juries tend towards a lower level of consensus.

Corporatism and Civil Society

This paper develops an alternative view of corporatism. The dominant view of corporatism, as espoused by Edmund Phelps in his recent book Mass Flourishing, views corporatism as an advanced form of state capture. The alternative view developed here instead argues that corporatist institutional arrangements are aimed at curbing special interests. Corporatist institutional arrangement seek to achieve this, not by insulating the state from special interest groups as traditional models of interest groups often implicitly try to do. Instead these institutional arrangements are aimed at channeling the interest of powerful (encompassing) interest groups toward the common good, or rather away from harm and domination. Through a historical case-study of the school struggle in the Netherlands this paper demonstrates that corporatism is closer to private-interest self-governance, than state capture. Although corporatism has been associated with episodes in which the state mobilizes civil society for its own goals, the perspective developed here emphasizes that 2 we can learn from current and historical corporatist institutional arrangements, which have been able to limit state power. Building on recent work by Levy in his Rationalism, Pluralism and Freedom which distinguishes between rationalist liberalism and pluralist liberalism, we argue that the view developed here is closer to the pluralist tradition of liberalism which emphasizes the constructive role of civil society and its role in limiting state power. The standard account on the other hand is suspicious of social power and hence of interest groups, and is closer in line with what Levy calls rationalist or individualist liberalism.

Emergent Orders of Worth: Must We Agree on More than a Price?

Market exchanges are widely believed to rely on an overlap of interest, this paper argues that many market exchanges actually rely on a broader agreement between buyer and seller. The broader agreement includes the moral justification of the exchange and the associated norms of propriety. To arrive at this broader agreement markets rely on systems of non-price coordination. These non-price coordination systems, or orders of worth as we call them, can be thought of as emergent orders just like the price system is an emergent order; they are sources of justification that can be drawn upon to warrant the worth of diverse artifacts and the legitimacy of trading them. We show that Adam Smith’s theory of sympathy offers conceptual means for analyzing the emergence of such orders. To make sense of the emergence and functioning on these orders we draw on Smiths organon and link it with contemporary work in economic sociology by Luc Boltanski and Laurent Thevenot. We demonstrate how our theoretical framework can further our understanding of justifying exchanges of contested goods with two illustrative cases: contemporary art and surrogate motherhood.

Exemplary Qualities: Market Coordination and the Valuation of Singular Products

In this article the notion of exemplary validity is developed to study the coordination of markets for singular cultural goods. Exemplars are unique goods that become focal points in markets by which market coordination occurs in markets for singular goods. From these exemplars norms of quality emerge which are otherwise hard or impossible to explicate. It is hard to explicate what makes a good basketball player in the abstract but we can refer to the qualities of exemplary players such Michael Jordan, or to a Dostoyevski in literature. These exemplars and the norms of quality which emerge from them help shape the expectations of both producers and consumers with regard to new goods that are introduced on the market. A theoretical economic framework is developed by which exemplars can be identified and analyzed, and through which we can study how the valuation of unique goods occurs on markets. It is demonstrated with two case-studies (of novels and hip-hop albums) how market coordination via quality takes place, and how it influences market outcomes. It is argued that market coordination via quality is more important in markets for unique goods than market coordination via price and quantity.

From Austria to Australia: Mark Blaug and cultural economics

The first question is of particular interest because Mark Blaug played a formative role in the economics of the arts and culture. He pioneered what he called the ‘economics of the arts’ in the 1970s, and he kept contributing to what came to be called ‘cultural economics’ ever since. Over more than four decades, he played an important role in establishing cultural economics as a recognized discipline in applied economics – even though he was not too fond of this term himself. A noteworthy constant in Mark Blaug’s writing is that it reflects a genuine interest in what many others have written. Similar to his work on the history of economic thought or the economics of education, for example, he kept taking stock of the literature on cultural economics, pointing out achievements, gaps and desirable extensions, which provide a useful point of orientation and inspiration for anyone concerned with cultural economics.

Economics made fun, and made fun of: How ‘Fun’ redefines the Domain and Identity of the Economics Profession

This paper compares two aspects of the use of ‘fun’ within the economics profession. It analyzes the way in which a recently emerged genre of economics-made-fun uses fun and surprising insights to reach new audiences. And it also analyzes the way in which humor is used within and from outside the economics profession to criticize certain practices and characteristics of economists. It argues that the economics-made-fun genre, ‘Freakonomics’ being the prime example, not only redefines the domain of economics, as is widely acknowledged, but also changes the identity of economists. In a similar way, humor is used by both insiders and outsiders to (re)define the appropriate identity and domain of economists. It draws on recent work in the history of science which distinguishes between various professional identities of scientists, such as the quirky genius and the intuitive and playful amateur. We argue that Levitt and other authors within this new genre redefine the identity of economists toward this latter type. On the other hand, humor is often used by critics of this economistic outlook on life to show the limitations of this perspective and to delineate its appropriate domain.

Two Types of Ecological Rationality: Or How to Best Combine Psychology and Economics

This paper argues that there are two rival meanings of the concept of ecological rationality, which are often believed to be closely related if not similar. The first type is ecological rationality (ER1) as used in the work of Gerd Gigerenzer, which refers to the use of cognitive strategies, heuristics in particular, in real-world decisions. The second type is ecological rationality (ER2) as used in the work of Vernon Smith, which refers to cognitive systems consisting of multiple individuals, institutions, and social norms. The two authors have positively referred to each other’s use of the term, but we demonstrate in this paper that their respective uses originate in different psychological (or cognitive) approaches; Brunswikian functionalism and distributed cognition respectively. The former is primarily interested in pragmatic achievement in particular real-world tasks by individuals, whereas the latter is primarily interested in learning, feedback and selection facilitated by the institutional environment. By uncovering the different psychological underpinnings we are able to analyze the methodological differences between the two types of ecological rationality, the different way in which central concepts are employed, and the difference in resulting experimental practices. We also provide a comparison of both uses of ecological rationality with the cognitivist psychology underpinning mainstream behavioral economics. Furthermore we show that the reintroduction of psychology into economics has not coincided with a serious consideration of which psychological approach is best fitted for the social sciences, and economics in particular. Our paper does not suggest the superiority of one type of approach, but does show what choices and stakes are involved in making that choice.

Governing Markets as Knowledge Commons: Introduction

This is a preliminary draft of an introductory chapter to an edited volume titled Governing Markets as Knowledge Commons: The New Entrepreneurial History of Shared Social Infrastructures. We lay down a theoretical framework for the analysis of the production, reproduction, and transformation of intellectual and legal infrastructures that enable market interactions using the Governing Knowledge Commons research program. A distinctive contribution of this volume is conceptualizing these market-supporting knowledge structures as shared goods. There are four building blocks around which the edited volume revolves: First, markets are cultural, they depend on various kinds of knowledge some of which are governed as commons; markets coincide with a form of culture that we call civilization. Secondly, civilization relies on shared goods which are – unlike physical commons – produced and reproduced by contributions and sharing. The more one uses a shared good, the more there is of it. Thirdly, the knowledge that constitutes our civilization includes various kinds of intellectual and legal infrastructures. These infrastructures are a part of a capital structure: they are economic inputs. Finally, entrepreneurs sustain and marginally change the shared intellectual and legal infrastructures by abiding by them as well as through slight evasions, and justifications.

Lachmann and Shackle: On the Joint Production of Interpretation Instruments

In this chapter, we present fragments of previously unpublished correspondence between Ludwig Lachmann and G. L. S. Shackle on the nature of institutions. This correspondence allows us to rationally reconstruct a theory of institutions, which extends Lachmann’s theoretical work. Shackle pointed out to Lachmann that institutions might be inputs into economic activities and that they themselves may be reproduced and transformed by these activities. Lachmann in turn contended that institutions consist of “instruments of interpretation.�? We develop the concept of “instruments of interpretation�? as a subset of institutions. These instruments are mental models and cognitive tools which are (1) inputs complementary to capital goods (2) jointly produced, reproduced, and transformed through economic activity. We suggest that in contrast to privately produced capital goods, parts of the institutional infrastructure are produced jointly as shared goods because the use of certain institutional elements is non-exclusive and non-subtractable; these elements – instruments of interpretation – are produced and reproduced by sharing and contributions through a process of joint production. This chapter explicitly connects two different but essential themes in Lachmann’s work: capital, and institutions. By combining these two strands of Lachmann’s work, we are able to demonstrate that there is a cross-complementarity between institutional orders and capital structures. This connection in turn provides a thicker understanding of the workings of markets.