Esther Romero

Cognitive metaphor theory revisited

Abstract This paper provides a framework which, being compatible with Lakoff and Johnsons theory (1980), allows a description of metaphoric verbal utterances. The development of this theoretical expansion is encouraged by Lakoff and Johnsons distinction between nonliteral and literal metaphoric expressions, and by the fact that they do not provide an explanation of the nonliteral metaphoric use of expressions as distinct from the literal metaphoric one. They simply say that metaphoric expressions are nonliteral when they are parts that are not used in our normal metaphoric concepts. This suggestion is included in our model, in which a metaphoric utterance is identified when the speaker perceives both a contextual abnormality and a conceptual contrast, and it is interpreted using, among other things, a pragmatic process of mapping to derive subpropositional metaphoric provisional meanings. This explanation of the metaphoric mechanism allows an explanation of the utterances in which nonliteral metaphoric expressions intervene without having to resort to a previous literal interpretation of these utterances.

Anomaly in novel metaphor and experimental tests

Abstract In this article, we assess some of the empirical work available in relation to anomaly in novel metaphor. This revision allows us to argue that the results of reaction time experiments do not provide, as many theorists have argued (Gibbs and Gerrig 1989; Keysar and Glucksberg 1992), evidence against any version of anomaly; at most they can be used against anomaly as categorial falsity. In addition, we assess the argument against anomaly based on the results of reaction time experiments to show that it is unsound. Thus, we show that contextual abnormality, a sub-propositional version of anomaly (Romero and Soria 1997/1998), cannot be rejected as one of the necessary identification conditions of novel metaphor. Furthermore, contextual abnormality is supported by the results of recent empirical studies on metaphor processing designed by neuropsychologists to test hypotheses related specifically with anomaly in novel metaphor (Tatter et al. 2002; Ahrens et al. 2007).

Introduction: Explicit Communication and Relevance Theory Pragmatics

This volume of papers has its origin in a workshop on ‘Explicit Communication’ held in Granada, Spain, in early June 2006. The invited speaker was Robyn Carston, and the other participants gave presentations that focused on one aspect or another of her work on explicit communication and comprehension, in particular as presented in her 2002 book Thoughts and Utterances but also in a series of papers, both preceding and following the book. In the relevance-theoretic (RT) framework, within which Carston’s work on pragmatics is set, explicit communication concerns those propositions that are communicatively intended by the speaker and are derived by the hearer through a combination of linguistic decoding and pragmatic inference. These are known as the ‘explicatures’ of the utterance and are distinct from those propositions, known as ‘implicatures’, which are implicitly communicated and derived wholly by inferential pragmatic processes. Together, the explicatures and implicatures of an utterance make up the speaker’s meaning or communicated content.

RELEVANCE THEORY AND METAPHOR

In this article we show the evolution of the view of metaphor in relevance theory and challenge its deflationary account of metaphor, defended from its inception, as loosening in a continuum. In current relevance theory, loose uses not only convey implicatures but also explicatures in which ad hoc concepts appear (CARSTON, 2002, 2010a; SPERBER; WILSON, 2008). These, in the case of metaphor, cause the emergent property issue which, according to them, is solved taking into account that a loose use may be included in a loose use (WILSON; CARSTON, 2008). In addition, the most creative cases have to be explained considering an interpretation route different from ad hoc concept construction (CARSTON, 2010b). These moves generate new problems and thus we argue that metaphorical interpretation can be better explained resorting to metaphorical ad hoc concepts that result from a partial mapping from one conceptual domain into another (ROMERO; SORIA, 2005).

Phrasal Pragmatics in Robyn Carston’s Programme

In this chapter, we argue that phrasal pragmatics is needed in Robyn Carston’s programme on explicit communication. The accurate understanding of this proposal requires attention drawing to the linguistic unit phrase and its contribution to conceptual material — a conceptual material that may have a complex nature, as Carston explicitly says: There are atomic concepts and there are complex concepts; atomic concepts are simple unstructured entities and complex concepts are structured strings of atomic concepts. […] If a complex concept (i.e. a structured conceptual string) is linguistically encoded, the linguistic form involved is standardly a phrase and the concept is determined (at least in part) compositionally. (Carston 2002: 321)

Teoría de la relevancia y metáfora

In this article we show the evolution of the view of metaphor in relevance theory and challenge its deflationary account of metaphor, defended from its inception, as loosening in a continuum. In current relevance theory, loose uses not only convey implicatures but also explicatures in which ad hoc concepts appear (CARSTON, 2002, 2010a; SPERBER; WILSON, 2008). These, in the case of metaphor, cause the emergent property issue which, according to them, is solved taking into account that a loose use may be included in a loose use (WILSON; CARSTON, 2008). In addition, the most creative cases have to be explained considering an interpretation route different from ad hoc concept construction (CARSTON, 2010b). These moves generate new problems and thus we argue that metaphorical interpretation can be better explained resorting to metaphorical ad hoc concepts that result from a partial mapping from one conceptual domain into another (ROMERO; SORIA, 2005).

Teoria da relevância e Metáfora

In this article we show the evolution of the view of metaphor in relevance theory and challenge its deflationary account of metaphor, defended from its inception, as loosening in a continuum. In current relevance theory, loose uses not only convey implicatures but also explicatures in which ad hoc concepts appear (CARSTON, 2002, 2010a; SPERBER; WILSON, 2008). These, in the case of metaphor, cause the emergent property issue which, according to them, is solved taking into account that a loose use may be included in a loose use (WILSON; CARSTON, 2008). In addition, the most creative cases have to be explained considering an interpretation route different from ad hoc concept construction (CARSTON, 2010b). These moves generate new problems and thus we argue that metaphorical interpretation can be better explained resorting to metaphorical ad hoc concepts that result from a partial mapping from one conceptual domain into another (ROMERO; SORIA, 2005).