Eugénia da Conceição-Heldt

Speaking with a single voice: internal cohesiveness and external effectiveness of the EU in global governance

ABSTRACT Under what conditions does the internal cohesiveness of the European Union (EU) determine its external effectiveness? In a first step, this introduction probes the frequent assumption that the more cohesive the EU presents itself to the world, the more effective it is in achieving its goals. The empirical contributions to this collection, which range from trade to foreign policy, highlight instead three configurations of internal cohesiveness and external effectiveness: internal cohesiveness has a positive impact on external effectiveness; internal cohesiveness has no impact on external effectiveness; and internal cohesiveness has a negative impact on external effectiveness. The international context in which the EU operates, including the bargaining configuration and the policy arena, functions as an intervening variable in these causal links. In a second step, this introduction launches a research agenda aimed at explaining these patterns more systematically and determining the impact of cohesiveness on effectiveness.

Variation in EU member states' preferences and the Commission's discretion in the Doha Round

During the period leading up to the 2005 WTO Hong Kong ministerial meeting and the 2006 Geneva informal meeting, European Union member states became even more strongly opposed to any further concessions on agricultural issues in the Doha Trade Round. Despite this opposition, the European Commission made a further offer which included concessions on agricultural issues. Based on data collected from Agence Europe and interviews with officials from the European Commission and the Council of Ministers, this contribution shows that preference heterogeneity with two camps of nearly equal size, a vague mandate and conflicting messages from principals all give the agent more discretion at the international level.During the period leading up to the 2005 WTO Hong Kong ministerial meeting and the 2006 Geneva informal meeting, European Union member states became even more strongly opposed to any further concessions on agricultural issues in the Doha Trade Round. Despite this opposition, the European Commission made a further offer which included concessions on agricultural issues. Based on data collected from Agence Europe and interviews with officials from the European Commission and the Council of Ministers, this contribution shows that preference heterogeneity with two camps of nearly equal size, a vague mandate and conflicting messages from principals all give the agent more discretion at the international level.

Do Agents “Run Amok”? A Comparison of Agency Slack in the EU and US Trade Policy in the Doha Round

Abstract There has been considerable debate about the delegation of power to international organizations, but few studies compare national public administrations with international organizations. In the meantime, international and national bureaucrats are important actors in world politics since they represent states in the international arena. Sometimes executive agents attempt to bypass control by member states and to overreach their delegated authority (agency slack), while at other times they do not. How and under what conditions do agents engage in slack? To answer this question, the article builds on principal–agent theories by comparing different forms of power delegation at the national and international levels. It argues that the institutional design of delegation contract and oversight mechanisms have an impact on the extent of agency slack. In developing this argument, it compares the delegation of power from the legislature (the US Congress) to a national public administration (the United Stat...Abstract There has been considerable debate about the delegation of power to international organizations, but few studies compare national public administrations with international organizations. In the meantime, international and national bureaucrats are important actors in world politics since they represent states in the international arena. Sometimes executive agents attempt to bypass control by member states and to overreach their delegated authority (agency slack), while at other times they do not. How and under what conditions do agents engage in slack? To answer this question, the article builds on principal–agent theories by comparing different forms of power delegation at the national and international levels. It argues that the institutional design of delegation contract and oversight mechanisms have an impact on the extent of agency slack. In developing this argument, it compares the delegation of power from the legislature (the US Congress) to a national public administration (the United States Trade Representative) and from an intergovernmental organization (the Council of Ministers) to a supranational organization (the European Commission) in the negotiation of international trade agreements. The findings show that agency slack is less likely when the institutional design of the delegation mandate is rule-based and principals have a combination of police-patrol and fire-alarm oversight mechanisms at their disposal to control their agents.

When speaking with a single voice isn't enough: bargaining power (a)symmetry and EU external effectiveness in global trade governance

ABSTRACT Does the European Union (EU) need to be a cohesive actor internally in order to be effective in global trade governance? And is internal cohesiveness a necessary and sufficient condition for the Unions external effectiveness? Even though these questions are central to explaining the EUs effectiveness, only few studies have dealt with it. In this contribution, I argue that internal cohesiveness is not a sufficient condition for EU external effectiveness. The bargaining configuration, determined by bargaining power symmetry or asymmetry, equally conditions effectiveness. This argument is illustrated by two case studies with varying bargaining power. The findings demonstrate, first, that high internal cohesiveness and bargaining power asymmetry can lead to high effectiveness, as in the EU–Mexico negotiations. Second, they show that, under a relationship of bargaining power symmetry, high cohesiveness is not a sufficient condition for external effectiveness to occur, as is evident in the Doha round.ABSTRACTDoes the European Union (EU) need to be a cohesive actor internally in order to be effective in global trade governance? And is internal cohesiveness a necessary and sufficient condition for the Unions external effectiveness? Even though these questions are central to explaining the EUs effectiveness, only few studies have dealt with it. In this contribution, I argue that internal cohesiveness is not a sufficient condition for EU external effectiveness. The bargaining configuration, determined by bargaining power symmetry or asymmetry, equally conditions effectiveness. This argument is illustrated by two case studies with varying bargaining power. The findings demonstrate, first, that high internal cohesiveness and bargaining power asymmetry can lead to high effectiveness, as in the EU–Mexico negotiations. Second, they show that, under a relationship of bargaining power symmetry, high cohesiveness is not a sufficient condition for external effectiveness to occur, as is evident in the Doha round.

Why the European Commission is not the “unexpected winner” of the Euro Crisis: A Comment on Bauer and Becker

Abstract The protracted euro area crisis has led to a resurgence of academic interest in integration theories. In a recent piece in this journal, Bauer and Becker argue that the euro crisis allowed the European Commission to strengthen its role in economic governance, in particular with regard to its implementation powers. Contrary to Bauer and Becker’s claim, I contend that the euro crisis has resulted not in strengthening the Commission. Rather, the Commission is undergoing “subtle disempowerment”, that is, a gradual transfer of decision-making authority and resources from the Commission to the intergovernmental level and to the European Central Bank. I illustrate the Commissions subtle disempowerment along three dimensions: the creation of the intergovernmental European Stability Mechanism; enhanced oversight mechanisms of the Commission via the troika constellation; and the creation of the European System of Financial Supervision, Banking Union and Single Supervisory Mechanism under the aegis of the European Central Bank.AbstractThe protracted euro area crisis has led to a resurgence of academic interest in integration theories. In a recent piece in this journal, Bauer and Becker argue that the euro crisis allowed the European Commission to strengthen its role in economic governance, in particular with regard to its implementation powers. Contrary to Bauer and Becker’s claim, I contend that the euro crisis has resulted not in strengthening the Commission. Rather, the Commission is undergoing “subtle disempowerment”, that is, a gradual transfer of decision-making authority and resources from the Commission to the intergovernmental level and to the European Central Bank. I illustrate the Commissions subtle disempowerment along three dimensions: the creation of the intergovernmental European Stability Mechanism; enhanced oversight mechanisms of the Commission via the troika constellation; and the creation of the European System of Financial Supervision, Banking Union and Single Supervisory Mechanism under the aegis of the E...

Assessing the Impact of Issue Linkage in the Common Fisheries Policy

Although issue linkage is often an important variable in negotiations, it remains an underdeveloped research area in European integration studies. This article attempts to assess the impact of issue linkage on EU bargaining outcomes by applying the Tollison and Willett spatial model of issue linkage to a key bargaining situation in the common fisheries policy: the negotiations on the introduction of the common market organization and structural policy. This article attempts to demonstrate how deals can be completed through issue linkage packages and to identify the conditions that make issue linkage more likely.

The Domestic Sources of Multilateral Trade Negotiations: Explaining Brazil's Negotiating Position in the Doha Round

Under the Cardoso presidency (1995–2002), Brazil adopted a reactive and defensive posture on trade liberalization. However, when Lula da Silva came into power in 2003, Brazil took a more offensive and proactive position on the issue in creating the G-20 and putting forward proposals of its own. How can this shift in the Brazilian negotiating position be explained? The main argument is that under the Lula da Silva administration, Brazils position in the Doha round primarily reflected domestic political constraints on multilateral trade cooperation. Three domestic dynamics shaped the national preference for Brazil: a heterogeneous governing coalition with a high number of veto players, divisions within the Workers’ Party, and the demands of interest groups. This explanation is discussed on the basis of Brazils negotiating position in WTO negotiations from 2003 to 2006.

Two-level games and trade cooperation: What do we now know?

A large body of literature in international relations has attempted to explain the interaction between domestic politics and International Relations in the field of trade policy. This article provides new critical insight into the literature on two-level games published during the last 25 years and their contribution to the study of international trade cooperation. I will outline the relevant two-level games literature to establish what we already know about international bargaining and domestic sources of multilateral trade cooperation. I first examine two major perspectives, the domestic political approach and the systemic (international) perspective by presenting a critical review of the literature. I then identify new avenues for theoretical and empirical research in the field. I suggest that to bridge the present rigid division between Comparative Politics and International Relations we need two-level games studies in the following areas: cross-country comparisons on domestic political processes; actor interactions at different levels; comparison of international bargaining processes; and middle-range theory-building.

The Clash of Negotiations: The Impact of Outside Options on Multilateral Trade Negotiations

Abstract While the number of preferential trade agreements (PTA) has increased rapidly in recent years, the Doha round of multilateral trade negotiations has been deadlocked since 2006. Most PTAs were even concluded after the start of the Doha round. Does the shift to PTAs “marginalize” the multilateral system? And is there a clash between preferential and multilateral trade liberalization? To answer these questions, we build upon negotiation analysis literature, arguing that the proliferation of PTAs draws negotiating capacity away from the multilateral level and thus reduces the incentives to agree on multilateral trade agreements. The willingness of actors to move from their initial bargaining positions and make concessions at the multilateral level depends on their outside options, that is, their best or worst alternatives to a negotiated agreement. The more credible an actor’s argument that he has a good alternative to multilateralism, the greater his bargaining power will be. In order to support the argument we will analyze the negotiation process at the multilateral level and link it to PTAs under negotiation by the EU, US, Brazil, Australia, and India.

Autonomiekonzeptionen internationaler Organisationen im Vergleich

Der viel beschworene Trend des zunehmenden Aufgabentransfers an internationale Organisationen hat dazu geführt, dass diese in der akademischen Debatte (wieder) verstärkt als ‚Organisationen‘ betrachtet werden (Benner et al. 2009; Biermann u. Siebenhüner 2009; Brechin u. Ness 2013; Dingwerth et al. 2009; Liese u. Weinlich 2006). Dass internationale Organisationen in jüngerer Zeit in wachsendem Maße Einfluss auf die multilaterale Politikgestaltung ausüben, wird dabei mit Blick auf die Praxis gar nicht bestritten. Theoretisch interessant sind folglich die Bedingungen, unter denen sie Einfluss eigenständig und autonom ausüben können (Hawkins et al. 2006; Hooghe u. Marks 2014) sowie die Frage, wann und wie Prozesse institutioneller Ermächtigung im Zeitverlauf vonstattengehen (Conceição-Heldt 2013a). Von welcher Perspektive man sich dieser organisationalen Eigenständigkeitsproblematik auch nähert, zu wenig ‚Autonomie‘ wird in der Regel als einer effektiven Aufgabenerfüllung abträglich angesehen, während sich zu viel Autonomie nachteilig auf eine wirksame externe Kontrolle der Aktivitäten einer internationalen Organisation auswirkt. Autonomie, Unabhängigkeit oder Eigenständigkeit internationaler Organisationen sind daher auch mit einer Vielzahl von unterschiedlichen Konzepten belegt, deren Bedeutungsgehalte nicht immer schlüssig voneinander zu trennen sind. An genau dieser Stelle setzt unser Beitrag an. Wir entwickeln zunächst ein Raster, mit dessen Hilfe wir die begriffliche Vielfalt auf dem Gebiet der Analyse der ‚Eigenständigkeit‘ internationaler Organisationen als Organisationen zu ordnen empfehlen. Ein zentraler Vorschlag dabei ist, den Autonomiebegriff ins Zentrum zu rücken und zwischen Ansätzen zu unterscheiden, die delegationsanalytischer, organisationsstruktureller, organisationsumwelttheoretischer und sozialkonstruktivistischer Provenienz sind (Abschnitt 2). Der dritte – umfangreichste – Abschnitt wird sich dann der Darstel-