Eyal Biyalogorsky

Stuck in the Past: Why Managers Persist with New Product Failures

In this research, the authors examine the phenomenon of escalation bias in the context of managing new product introductions. In particular, they identify three general paths—Decision Involvement Inertia, Decision Involvement Distortion, and Belief Inertia Distortion—that can lead managers to escalate their commitments. The authors test the relative strength of these paths in driving observed escalation behavior. The results show that involvement with the initial decision, a key construct in numerous explanations for escalation behavior (e.g., agency theory, self-justification), is not a necessary condition to induce commitment to a losing course of action (i.e., escalation bias). Rather, the authors find that the driving force behind escalation behavior is improper use of initial positive beliefs in the face of negative new information. This insight has implications for the groundwork necessary for organizations to design systems, policies, and procedures to help them avoid the trap of escalation bias that is often associated with major strategic decisions.

Setting Referral Fees in Affiliate Marketing

Affiliate programs offer affiliates referral fees in return for directing potential customers into a merchants Web site. Affiliates are commonly paid based on the number of leads converted by the merchant into customers (pay-per-conversion) or based on the number of leads referred to the merchant (pay-per-lead). Given the prevalence of both, interesting questions for research are as follows: Why do both formats prevail? Under what conditions is one format preferred over the other? The authors find that pay-per-lead is more profitable when a merchant negotiates a separate deal with an affiliate. In this case, pay-per-conversion is not optimal for the affiliation alliance because it leads to suboptimal pricing by the merchant. In contrast, pay-per-lead is less profitable than pay-per-conversion for a merchant that works with a large number of affiliates all under the same terms because it is susceptible to bogus referrals that cannot be converted into customers.

The Economics of Service Upgrades

Many service providers offer different service classes (e.g., first class, second class). Because the capacity of each class is set in advance, providers may end up with unfilled first-class capacity at the time of service delivery. When this happens, providers often upgrade some of their customers from a lower service class to a higher one. One way in which service providers manage upgrades is by selling, in advance, tickets that entitle the holder to an upgrade if space becomes available in a higher service class. This article investigates the circumstances under which upgradeable tickets are profitable, how to price them, and how many to issue. Upgradeable tickets increase the provider’s profits when the probability of obtaining full price for first-class service is sufficiently high. With upgradeable tickets, more of the available capacity can be reserved for potential customers who are willing to pay a high price for high-end service.

Ownership coordination in a channel: Incentives, returns, and negotiations

In many industries firms have to make quantity decisions before knowing the exact state of demand. In such cases, channel members have to decide which firm will own the units until demand uncertainty is resolved. The decision about who should retain ownership depends on the balance of benefit and risk to each member. Ownership, after all, is costly. Whichever member owns the units accepts the risk of loss if more units are produced than can be sold. But ownership also grants firms the flexibility to respond to demand once it becomes known by adjusting price. In this study, we analyze ownership decisions in distribution channels and how those decisions are affected by demand uncertainty. We model demand based on micromodeling of consumer utility functions and capture demand uncertainty related to market size and price sensitivity. This study shows that as long as the degree of uncertainty about market size is intermediate, the retailer and the manufacturer both benefit when the manufacturer maintains ownership of the units. But when there is substantial uncertainty about market size, the retailer and the channel are better off if the retailer takes ownership but the manufacturer still prefers to maintain ownership. Thus, there is potential for channel conflict regarding ownership under high levels of uncertainty. We show that, using product returns, the manufacturer can achieve the same outcome under retailer ownership as under manufacturer ownership. This provides an additional new rationale for the prevalence of product returns. The first-best outcome (from the perspective of total channel profit), however, is under retailer ownership without product returns when uncertainty is high (i.e., product returns reduce the total channel profit). Negotiations between the manufacturer and the retailer can lead to the first-best outcome but only under quite restrictive constraints that include direct side payments by the retailer to the manufacturer and the retailer being pessimistic about its outside option (when an agreement cannot be reached) during the negotiation.

Complementary Goods: Creating, Capturing, and Competing for Value

This paper studies the strategic interaction between firms producing strictly complementary products. With strict complements, a consumer derives positive utility only when both products are used together. We show that value-capture and value-creation problems arise when such products are developed and sold by separate firms “nonintegrated” producers. Although the firms tend to price higher for given quality levels, their provision of quality is so low that, in equilibrium, prices are set well below what an integrated monopolist would choose. When one firm can mandate a royalty fee from the complementor producer as often occurs in arrangements between hardware and software makers, we find that the value-capture problem is mitigated to some extent and consumer surplus rises. However, because royalty fees greatly reduce the incentives of the firm paying them to invest in quality, the arrangement exacerbates the value-creation problem and leads to even lower total quality. Surprisingly, this result can reverse with competition. Specifically, when the firm charging the royalty fee faces a vertically differentiated competitor, the value-creation problem is greatly reduced---opening the door for the possibility of a Pareto-improving outcome in which all firms and consumers benefit. It is worth noting that this outcome cannot be achieved by giving firms the option of introducing a line of product variants; competition serves as a necessary “commitment” ingredient.

Shaping Consumer Demand through the Use of Contingent Pricing

In this chapter I assert that revenue management techniques like contingent pricing are not merely an optimal response by firms to exogenous conditions of uncertain demand that is spread over time but that sometimes one of the aims of those techniques is to shape consumer demand in such a way as to create the conditions necessary for successful employment of intertemporal price discrimination. In this view, the interaction between a firm’s policies and the strategic response of consumers to those policies leads to consumer arrival processes that are the basis of many revenue management techniques. I consider a model with strategic consumers who can decide when to show up in the market and reveal demand. Using the example of contingent pricing, I investigate how consumers’ awareness of the use of contingent pricing affects their decisions regarding when to show up in the market and how, in turn, consumers’ responses should affect the firm’s use of contingent pricing. I identify the conditions under which it is optimal for the firm to use contingent pricing to induce consumers to arrive at different times in the market. Implications for the design and use of contingent pricing and for public policy are explored.