F. H. Buckley

The Bankruptcy Puzzle

This article offers new evidence on the determinants of U.S. consumer bankruptcy filing rates, which tripled from 1984 to 1991. The run‐up in filing rates does not appear to be a consequence of legal changes since the increase coincided with Bankruptcy Code amendments designed to reduce filing rates by rejecting opportunistic petitions. The run‐up also coincided with a major economic boom and crested with the 1991 recession. However, much of the variation in district filing rates is attributable to differences in social variables, and we suggest that changes in social norms might account for the increased bankruptcy filings. This article is therefore a contribution to social capital explanations of behavior.

No-fault laws and at-fault people

Absent transaction costs, the Coase Theorem suggests that divorce reform would work no change in the frequency of divorce but perhaps would alter the distribution of marital wealth. However, divorce does involve substantial process costs, which no-fault lowered. This paper explores the question of what happened to state divorce rates because of the legal changes wrought by the family law revolution that began in the 1970s, isolating the effect of the legal variable from other demographic and social factors that might also explain the variation in divorce rates across states and across time.

The Market for Deadbeats

This article outlines three explanations for why states seek migrants and tests them by reference to 1985-90 interstate migration flows. On race-for-the-top theories, states compete for value-increasing migrants by offering them healthy economies and efficient laws. On vote-seeking theories, states compete for clienteles of voters, with some states seeking to attract and some to deter welfare- or tax-loving migrants. On deadbeat theories, states compete for high human capital debtors by offering them a fresh start from out-of-state creditors. Our findings support vote-seeking and deadbeat theories.

The fall and rise of freedom of contract

CONTENTS 1 Free Bargaining and Formalism - Contracts Small and Contracts Large: Contract Law through the Lens of Laissez-Faire Richard A Epstein, University of Chicago The Decline of Formality in Contract law Eric A Posner, University of Chicago External Critiques of Laissez-Faire Contract Values Michael J Trebilock, University of Toronto In Defense of the Old Order Timothy J Murtis, George Mason University The Limits of Freedom of Contract in the Age of Laissez-Faire Constitutionalism Gregory S Alexander, Cornell Law School 2 Bargaining Around Tort Law - Courts and the Tort-Contract Boundary in Product Liability Paul H Rubin, Emory University Commodifying Liability Robert Cooter, University of California 3 Contracting for Land Use Law - Zoning by Private Contract Robert h Nelson, University of Maryland Dealing with the NIMBY Problem William A Fischel, Dartmouth College Devolutionary Proposals and Contractarian Principles Steven J Eagle, George Mason University The (Limited) Ability of Urban Neighbours to Contract for the Provision of Local Public Goods Robert C Ellickson, Yale Law School 4 Free Bargaining in Family Law - A Contract Theory of marriage Elizabeth Scott & Robert Scott, University of Virginia Contracting around No-Fault Divorce Margaret F Brinig, George Mason University Marriage as a Signal Michael J Trebilcock, University of Toronto Family Law and Social Norms Eric A Posner, University of Chicago 5 Bargaining around Bankruptcy Reorganization Law - Contracting for Bankruptcy Systems Alan Schwartz, Yale Law School Free Contracting in Bankruptcy F H Buckley,George Mason University Free Contracting in Bankruptcy at Home and Abroad Robert k Rasmussen, Vanderbilt Univesity 6 Choosing Law by Contract - Contract and Jurisdictional Freedom Bruce H Kobayshi & Larry E Ribstein, George Mason University A Comment of Contract and jurisdictional Freedom Michael Klausner, Stanford University Corporate Law as the Paradigm for Contractual Choice of Law Roberta Romano, Yale Law School Choice of Law as a Pre-Commitment Device Geoffrey P Miller, New York University

The price of virtue

This article offers new evidence on the determinants of U.S. unwed birth rates from 1981 to 1990. We show that illegitimacy rates are positively and significantly correlated with payments under the Aid to Families with Dependent Children program over a period in which real AFDC payments declined. We attribute this result to a decline in the social sanctions for illegitimacy. Because social sanctions declined, so did the cost of deviance, as well as the price for which unwed women sold their virtue.

Welfare Magnets: The Race for the Top

Strong arguments may be made for the devolution of welfare responsibilities to the states. Given state misincentives, however, the federal government might reasonably prescribe spending ceilings, to prevent state overspending on welfare. Arguments for federally-prescribed minimum payouts are less persuasive. The most promising such argument claims that, absent a federal floor, states will cut benefits in a race to the bottom to prevent becoming a magnet for welfare-seeking migrants. This articles econometric study of the determinants of AFDC payouts finds no evidence that states react in this way. In any event, such problems might less intrusively be addressed through two-tier residency requirements.

The Uneasy Case for the Flat Tax

Social contract theories assume thatbecause personal security and private property are at risk ina state of nature, citizens will agree to grant Leviathan a monopolyof violence. But what is to prevent Leviathan from turning onhis citizens once they have lain down their arms? The socialcontract leaves citizens worse off unless Leviathan can fetterhimself, as constitutional democracies seek to do. Self-bindingfetters are hard to find. We suggest that schemes of progressivetaxation, in which marginal tax rates increase with taxable income,may be useful incentives to realign Leviathans incentives withthose of his citizens. Income taxes give Leviathan an equityclaim in his states economy, and progressive taxes give hima greater residual interest in upside payoffs. Leviathan willthen demand higher side payments from interest groups beforehe imposes value-destroying regulations.

The revival of sociological jurisprudence

Abstract This article uses the example of bankruptcy law to show the limits of efficiency theories and to argue for a revival of sociological jurisprudence.