F. Rosen

Individual Sacrifice and the Greatest Happiness: Bentham on Utility and Rights

This article considers Benthams response to the criticism of utilitarianism that it allows for and may even require the sacrifice of some members of society in order to increase overall happiness. It begins with the contrast between the principle of utility and the contrasting principle of sympathy and antipathy to show that Bentham regarded the main achievement of his principle as overcoming the subjectivity he found in all other philosophical theories. This subjectivism, especially prevalent in theories of rights, might well lead to the sacrifice of the individual. The principle of utility was presented as an ‘objective’ theory that avoided the difficulties of other moral and political theories. The article also considers the importance of universally applicable ends, such as security and equality, as part of the principle of utility, and especially Benthams view of maximizing pleasure as being a distributive rather than an aggregative idea. The article concludes by criticizing H. L. A. Harts interpretation of the role of equality and rights in Bentham and John Stuart Mill, and argues that Mills doctrine of moral rights builds on foundations originally established by Bentham, foundations which would preclude the sacrifice of individuals.

Utilitarianism and the Punishment of the Innocent: The Origins of a False Doctrine

This paper examines the commonplace assertion that utilitarianism allows for and even, at times, requires the punishment of the innocent. It traces the origins of this doctrine to the writings of the British Idealists and the subsequent development of what is called the post-utilitarian paradigm which posits various justifications for punishment such as retribution, deterrence and reform, finds all of them inadequate, and then, with the addition of other ideas, reconciles them. The idea of deterrence is falsely depicted as the utilitarian contribution to the theory of punishment, while deterrence in fact is one of several elements in the utilitarian theory. The mistake comes from ignoring the pain-pleasure dimension of Benthamite utilitarianism and from regarding the principle of utility itself as the sole criterion of action in a ‘top-down’ fashion.

Epicureanism and Utilitarianism: A Reply to Professor Lyons

I am grateful to Professor Lyons for his comments on several aspects of Classical Utilitarianism from Hume to Mill and to the Review Editor of Utilitas for inviting me to reply. I hope that Professor Lyons will not object to my first pointing out to the reader that the book consists mainly of a series of substantial chapters on philosophers who have not always been regarded as utilitarian thinkers, such as Hume, Smith (three chapters) and HelvA©tius, or have been interpreted as utilitarians in different, if not opposing, ways, such as Paley, Bentham and J. S. Mill. A main feature of the book (besides its interdisciplinary character) is to show that what links their approaches to utility is the presence of Epicureanism in their writings, and I attempt to uncover a more coherent tradition employing the idea of utility than scholars have hitherto believed existed.

Nationalism and early British liberal thought

Abstract This study in British political thought explores the mainly negative reaction to Greek nationalism in the 1820s by the first generation to refer to itself as liberal in the modern ideological sense. It challenges Elie Kedouries explanation for the hostility to modern nationalism in Britain in terms of a Whig theory of nationality. It also criticizes the recent work of David Miller for misreading the context of J. S. Mills apparent acceptance of nationalism within liberalism. It is argued that liberalism and nationalism emerged in Britain as mutually hostile doctrines, and that the historical reasons for the hostility are numerous and complex.