Fabrice Lumineau

An Empirical Investigation of Interorganizational Opportunism and Contracting Mechanisms

This study investigates contracting mechanisms in situations of opportunistic disputes between organizations. The authors specifically explore the relationships between the formal versus informal nature of opportunism and the formal versus informal nature of contractual governance. They use a unique data set of 102 buyer–supplier disputes to explore in depth different types of opportunism – that is, strong form versus weak form opportunism – and different types of contracting mechanisms – that is, the controlling and coordinating functions of formal contracts and the cooperative and competitive sides of relational contracts. The authors’ detailed empirical analysis suggests distinct relationships between the different contracting mechanisms, the different types of opportunism, and the level of legal fees necessary to deal with the dispute. From these findings the authors derive implications for research on the role of contractual mechanisms in dealing with interorganizational opportunism.

An Organizational Learning Perspective on the Contracting Process

The contracting process is a crucial step in alliance development and its success. However, the existing literature reveals surprisingly little investigation into how organizational learning relates to the process of contract making. The authors therefore conducted an in-depth longitudinal study of the alliance contracting process in the animated film industry. First, the study’s findings suggest that during the contracting process, firms can learn about the way to deal with the contracting process, about themselves and their partner, and about the transaction features. Second, the case analysis indicates a combination of experiential, vicarious and inferential learning mechanisms. Combining these insights into the objects and the mechanisms of learning during the contracting process, the authors discuss how contracting and learning processes are related and analyse the role of the contracting process in supporting organizational learning. The findings show that the drafting of contractual clauses fosters learning and, in turn, this learning triggers new contractual negotiations. Hence the authors suggest that the alignment between transaction features and the choice of contractual governance results from learning during the contracting process. They then propose avenues for future research.

How Contracts Influence Trust and Distrust

Despite the scholarly interest in contracts and trust governing interorganizational relationships, an understanding of how contracts influence trust remains limited by the way in which the interaction between the two constructs is conceptualized. By bringing together recent advances in the literature on interorganizational governance, I consider (a) the controlling and the coordinating dimensions of formal contracts, (b) trust and distrust as two distinct constructs, and (c) both the calculative and noncalculative aspects behind the development of trust and distrust. Drawing upon information-processing theory, I develop a series of propositions about how each contractual dimension influences the development of trust and distrust by inducing specific information-processing and decision-making mechanisms. My theoretical analysis leads me to discuss the trade-offs inherent in governance choices, and I discuss the implications of my propositions for the literature on interorganizational governance mechanisms.

Inter-organizational conflicts: Research overview, challenges, and opportunities

While inter-personal conflicts have attracted much attention from scholars and practitioners over the last two decades, our understanding of inter-organizational conflicts remains limited. This paper critically assesses current literature on inter-organizational conflicts. We first discuss the specific features of conflicts at the inter-organizational level. Second, we provide an overview of both qualitative and quantitative research conducted in the field. Third, we make suggestions for future research on inter-organizational conflicts. We specifically suggest opportunities to develop theoretical bridges with other streams of literature and to build multi-level models of conflict management. We then discuss important empirical issues associated with doing research on conflicts between organizations and provide recommendations to overcome these challenges.

How Coordination Trajectories Influence the Performance of Interorganizational Project Networks

This study examines how the joint use of integrators and contracts either enables or hampers coordination and, in turn, the performance of interorganizational project networks. Using extensive qualitative analyses and sociometric techniques, we investigated coordination among organizations during seven small- and medium-sized building projects. Our longitudinal study reveals how integrators develop connecting functions that, together with contracts’ steering functions, largely drive coordination dynamics. Further data analyses provide insight into how coordination hinges on the prevalence of connecting or steering, which may more or less fit with coordination needs in various project phases. Given these findings, we theorize the contingent nature of the interplay between the use of integrators and contracts throughout projects. Our findings are integrated into a process model of how coordination trajectories lead to different performance levels of interorganizational project networks. Our study has theore...

The Double-Edged Effect of Contracts on Alliance Performance

Despite substantial scholarly interest in the role of contracts in alliances, few studies have analyzed the mechanisms and conditions relevant to their influence on alliance performance. In this paper, we build on the information-processing view of the firm to study contracts as framing devices. We suggest that the effects of contracts depend on the types of provisions included and differentiate between the consequences of control and coordination provisions. Specifically, control provisions will increase the level of conflict between alliance partners, whereas coordination provisions will decrease such conflict. Conflict, in turn, reduces alliance performance, suggesting a mediated relationship between alliance contracts and performance. We also contribute to a better understanding of contextual influences on the consequences of contracts and investigate the interactions of each contractual function with both internal and external uncertainties. Key informant survey data on 171 alliances largely support our conceptual model.

The Supportive Factors of Firms’ Collusive Behavior: Empirical Evidence from Cartels in the European Union

While cartels can be highly detrimental to society and create important economic and social costs for different stakeholders, the literature on organization studies has focused very little on cartels to date. In particular, we still do not know much about firms’ reasons for taking part in cartels. In this study, we build on the rational choice perspective in organizational misconduct to investigate the conditions supporting firms’ collusive behavior. We organize our theoretical arguments around the factors related to motivation and opportunity. Using a sample of cartels in the European Union, our empirical analysis gives evidence for our main arguments: the propensity to participate to a cartel is supported not only by the characteristics of the firm, but also by internal factors interacting with the attributes of the environment in which the firm is embedded. Implications for firms and policy makers are discussed.

A meta-analysis of the exchange hazards–interfirm governance relationship: An informal institutions perspective

The existing literature is ambiguous on how exchange hazards influence interfirm governance. Drawing on institutional theory, this study revisits this relationship by examining the moderating effects of national culture. By meta-analyzing 167 articles involving 38,183 interfirm relationships in 35 countries, we found support for the moderating effects of three facets of national culture: collectivism, power distance, and uncertainty avoidance. We discuss the implications of the findings for theory and practice.RésuméLa littérature existante est ambiguë sur la manière dont les risques de l’échange influencent la gouvernance inter-firmes. Fondée sur la théorie institutionnelle, cette étude revisite cette relation en examinant les effets modérateurs de la culture nationale. En conduisant une méta-analyse de 167 articles impliquant 38.183 relations inter-firmes dans 35 pays, nous avons vérifié les effets modérateurs de trois facettes de la culture nationale : le collectivisme, la distance hiérarchique et le contrôle de l’incertitude. Nous discutons les implications de nos résultats pour la théorie et la pratique.ResumenLa literatura existente es ambigua en cómo los riesgos cambiarios influencia la gobernanza entre las empresas de la empresa. Con base en la teoría institucional, este estudio revisita esta relación examinando los efectos moderadores de la cultura nacional. Mediante el meta-análisis de 167 artículos que involucran 38.183 relaciones entre las empresas en 35 países, encontramos apoyo por los efectos moderadores de tres facetas de la cultura nacional: el colectivismo, la distancia de poder, y la evasión de la incertidumbre. Discutimos las implicaciones de los hallazgos para la teoría y la practica.ResumoA literatura existente é ambígua sobre como os riscos de intercâmbio influenciam a governança entre firmas. Com base na teoria institucional, este estudo revisita essa relação examinando os efeitos moderadores da cultura nacional. Ao meta-analisar 167 artigos envolvendo 38.183 relações entre firmas em 35 países, encontramos suporte para os efeitos moderadores de três facetas da cultura nacional: coletivismo, distância de poder e evitação de incerteza. Discutimos as implicações das descobertas para a teoria e a prática.概要现有的文献对交换风险如何影响企业治理是模糊的。本研究借鉴制度理论, 通过考察国家文化的调节作用来重新审视这一关系。我们通过对35个国家涉及38183个企业间关系的167篇文章进行统合分析, 发现对国家文化三个方面调节作用的支持: 集体主义、权力距离和不确定性回避。我们讨论这些研究发现对理论和实践的启示。

Trust development across levels of analysis: An embedded-agency perspective

ABSTRACT This article advances a cross-level model of trust development. Drawing upon an embedded-agency perspective from institutional theory, we combine a top-down with a bottom-up approach, reflecting the inherent duality of trust in organisational settings. Specifically, we elaborate a reciprocal process that illustrates how organisational structures influence individuals’ trust and, at the same time, how individuals’ trust manifests in organisational structures. We discuss the theoretical implications of our cross-level model for the trust literature and propose important avenues for future research.