Fabrizio Panebianco

Socialization networks and the transmission of interethnic attitudes

This paper examines the dynamics of interethnic attitudes in a framework of intergenerational transmission of continuous cultural traits, where children are exposed to parental (vertical) and non-parental (oblique) socializations. Under very general conditions over oblique socialization, vertical socialization ensures convergence, while the structure of oblique socialization determines the steady state class. In particular, the presence of specific socialization schemes, namely, ethnocentrism, emulation, and reciprocity, produces different outcomes in terms of integration or attitude ranking. Further, the model is applied to the US case by examining the observed ranking of attitudes and obtaining predictions on the possible attitude patterns.

Civility vs. incivility in online social interactions: an evolutionary approach

Evidence is growing that forms of incivility–e.g. aggressive and disrespectful behaviors, harassment, hate speech and outrageous claims–are spreading in the population of social networking sites’ (SNS) users. Online social networks such as Facebook allow users to regularly interact with known and unknown others, who can behave either politely or rudely. This leads individuals not only to learn and adopt successful strategies for using the site, but also to condition their own behavior on that of others. Using a mean field approach, we define anevolutionary game framework to analyse the dynamics of civil and uncivil ways of interaction in online social networks and their consequences for collective welfare. Agents can choose to interact with others–politely or rudely–in SNS, or to opt out from online social networks to protect themselves from incivility. We find that, when the initial share of the population of polite users reaches a critical level, civility becomes generalized if its payoff increases more than that of incivility with the spreading of politeness in online interactions. Otherwise, the spreading of self-protective behaviors to cope with online incivility can lead the economyto non-socially optimal stationary states. JEL Codes: C61, C73, D85, O33, Z13. PsycINFO Codes: 2240, 2750.

'Driving While Black': A Theory for Interethnic Integration and Evolution of Prejudice

This paper studies the evolution of interethnic attitudes, the integration or segregation dynamics of ethnic minorities and the conditions for the rising of ethnic-based social hierarchies. By means of a cultural evolution framework, a dynamics of interethnic attitudes is provided and conditions for their convergence derived. Steady states implying a constant role of racism and no role for racism are identified. Deriving sufficient conditions for convergence, we find that the way in which Oblique Socialization Schemes (the way children react to out-of-family stimuli when forming their cultural values) are defined and modelled becomes crucial for the structure of the derived long run equilibria. In particular, we find that Steady States implying an Ethnic-based social ranking or full integration of ethnicities may be reached depending on whether or not agents use Reciprocity and/or Ethnocentrism in their interethnic attitudes formation schemes. Allowing different groups for asymmetric use of reciprocity and Ethnocentrism, we explain why different ethnic minorities may show different integration patterns, and what are the different roles (Cultural bridge, cultural hub) an ethnic group may play in the integration process. Moreover, in this way, we explain why attitudes of some groups towards others converge to the same values, while other groups seems to be excluded from this process. At last, we provide the first steps for the endogeneization of socialization structures.

Paternalism, homophily and cultural transmission in random networks

We study cultural diffusion in a random network where the transition probabilities are determined by a cultural transmission technology with endogenous vertical transmission rates (a la Bisin and Verdier, 2001). We present a two-way epidemic model in which both the infection and the recovery rates are endogenous and depend on the topology of the network. We characterize two balancing conditions satisfied by the network degree distribution and the vertical transmission rate distribution to ensure the sustainability of long run cultural heterogeneity. We discuss the effects of cultural homophily and paternalistic motivations for cultural transmission on the persistence of steady state cultural diversity.

Games on Networks: Direct Complements and Indirect Substitutes

We study linear quadratic games played on a network where strategies are complements between neighbors and substitutes between agents at distance-two. We provide micro-founded problems where this pattern of interaction is due to a local congestion effect. Equilibrium behavior systematically differs from a model of peer effects only. First, the ranking of equilibrium actions may not follow that of network centralities, with large behavior prevailing at the periphery of the network. Second, network density affects aggregate behavior in a non-monotonic way. Third, segregating agents according to their preferences has a non-monotonic effect on the polarization of behavior. We relate these patterns to evidence from smoking networks, industrial districts and ethnically fragmented societies. We conclude by discussing the implications for the identification of peer effects.

Convergence of Cultural Traits with Time-Varying Self-Confidence in the Panebianco (2014) Model--A Corrigendum

We highlight that convergence in repeated averaging models commonly used to study cultural traits or opinion dynamics is not equivalent to convergence in Markov chain settings if transition matrices are time-varying. We then establish a new proof for the convergence of cultural traits in the model of Panebianco (2014) correcting the existing proof. The new proof provides novel insights on the long-run outcomes for inessential individuals. We close with a discussion of conditions for convergence in repeated averaging models with time-varying transition matrices.

Peer effects and local congestion in networks

We study linear quadratic games played on a network. Agents face peer effects with distance-one neighbors, and strategic substitution with distance-two neighbors (local congestion). For this class of games, we show that an interior equilibrium exists both in the high and in the low regions of the largest eigenvalue, but may not exist in the intermediate region. In the low region, equilibrium is proportional to a weighted version of Bonacich centrality, where weights are themselves centrality measures for the network. Local congestion has the effect of decreasing equilibrium behavior, potentially affecting the ranking of equilibrium actions. When strategic interaction extends beyond distance-two, equilibrium is characterized by a “nested” Bonacich centrality measure, and existence properties depend on the sign of strategic interaction at the furthest distance. We support the assumption of local congestion by presenting empirical evidence from a secondary school Dutch dataset.

A Model of Agents Persuasion and Types Competition in a Cultural Evolution Framework

This paper analyses the evolution of types in a society with an evolutionary game framework in which types evolve not only depending on how much they are fit but also on how much they are able to persuade others about their fitness during a cultural competition process. This creates a kind of payoffs redistribution so that it is possible to reach equilibria not feasible under standard dynamics. We first provide necessary conditions for a generic matrix and generic class of cultural competition mechanisms in order to observe polimorphic equilibria, proposing that the set of parameters such that a stable polimorphic equilibrium exists under cultural competition is a subset of the set of parameters for this to be possible under the standard case. Then, necessary and sufficient conditions for polimorphic equilibrium stability are provided in the case of specific competition rules at each competition level. We then analyse the prisoner’s dilemma framework finding that, even in this case, stable and unstable polimorphic equilibria may arise, depending on the specific parametrization and level of cultural competition among types. We then show that while a little competition among cultural types helps to maintain types heterogeneity in the long run, this effect is non monotone in the level of competition of the society.