Facundo Albornoz

Foreign Investment and Expropriation Under Oligarchy and Democracy

We study the incentives to expropriate foreign capital under democracy and oligarchy. We model a two-sector small open economy where foreign investment triggers Stolper–Samuelson effects through reducing exporting costs. The incentives to expropriate depend on the distributional effects associated to the investment. How investment affects the incomes of the different groups in society depends on the sectors where these investments are undertaken and on structural features of the economy such as factor intensity, factor substitutability, and price and output elasticities. We characterize the equilibria of the expropriation game and show that if investment is undertaken in the sector that uses labor less intensively then democratic expropriations are more likely to take place. We test this prediction and provide strong evidence of its validity.

Knowledge circulation in vertically integrated production networks: Cases of the Argentine automotive and iron and steel industries

Summary The goal of this article is two-fold: on the one hand, we develop a methodology that is able to quantify the knowledge circulation inside a Vertically Integrated Production Network (PNW). On the other hand, we will apply such methodology to a set 150 Argentine firms supplying either the automotive or the iron and steel industries. Both industries are different in commercial results as well as in their participation in international markets. We investigate whether or not differences in networking are significant to the understanding of different performances. We find that the PNW organised by the steel firms allows for a better knowledge circulation. We also find that the Linkage Style within the PNW is significant for explaining techno-productive capabilities. Such relevance of the knowledge circuit and the way the PNW incentives it constitute an essential point that contributes with the comprehension of the different performances between both PNW.

Motivation, Resources and the Organization of the School System

This paper studies a model where student effort and talent interact with parental and teachers’ investments, as well as with school system resources. The model is rich, yet sufficiently stylized to provide novel implications. It can show, for example, that an improvement in parental outside options will reduce parental and school effort, which are partially compensated through school resources. In this way, by incorporating the behavioral responses of parents, teachers, and policymakers, the paper provides a rationale for the existing ambiguous empirical evidence on the effect of school resources. The paper also provides a novel microfoundation for peer effects, with empirical implications for welfare and different education policies. (JEL: I20, I21, I28, J24)

The Golden Hello and Political Transitions

In this paper we analyze the role of the IMF and the World Bank in triggering changes in the political regime, i.e., democracy and autocracy. We develop a theoretical model which predicts that anticipation of financial flows from international financial institutions may trigger political regime changes which would not take place otherwise. We test the implications of our model empirically and find support both for the role of perfectly foreseen IMF and World Bank programs and of the history of previous World Bank programs. The magnitude of this effects is quite substantial.

Political Regimes and Economic Growth in Latin America

Living in a democratic society has been internationally recognized as a basic human right. While most of the literature tries to identify the effect of democracy on economic prosperity, little work has been done to understand the determinants of economic growth under democracy. This paper examines whether the determinants of economic growth in Latin America are sensitive to political institutions. We find two stark differences between democratic and autocratic growth: (1) democratic government consumption is significantly positive for economic growth. The opposite is true for autocratic government consumption. (2) The impact of human capital is only significant under democracies.

An Economic Theory of Political Institutions: Foreign Intervention and Overseas Investments

The recent literature on endogenous political institutions highlights domestic economic factors, such as recessions, economic growth and inequality, as key determinants of political transitions. We argue that international capital flows and the possibility that foreign governments, in order to protect specific economic interests, might seek influence on the regime choice in other countries are important, yet overlooked, additional determinants of political institutions. Building on Acemoglu and Robinson (2001), we develop a theory of political transitions in economies with access to international capital markets and show that the possibility of foreign intervention significantly affects regime dynamics and the set of sustainable political regimes

Investment and Expropriation under Oligarchy and Democracy in a Heckscher-Ohlin World

We study the incentives to expropriate foreign capital under democracy and obligarchy. We model a two-sector small open economy where foreign investment triggers Stolper-Samuelson effects through reducing exporting costs. We show how incentives to expropriate depend on the distributional effects of the investment and how these affect the interests of the group in power. How investment affects the incomes of the different groups in society depends on the sectors where these investments are undertaken and the structural features of the economy such as factor intensity. We characterize expropriation equilibria and show that if investment is undertaken in the sector that uses labor less intensively, democracies are generally more prone to expropriate. This result provides one possible rationalization for the wave of expropriation equilibria and show that if investment is undertaken in the sector that uses labor less intensively, democracies are generally more prone to expropriate. This result provides one possible rationalization for the wave of expropriations in Latin America under governments with a broad popular base during the 20th Century.

Regional Integration, Subsidy Competition and the Relocation Choice of MNCs

Abstract Regional integration makes relocation a more attractive option for Multinational Corporations (MNC), influencing in turn the provision of investment incentives by member countries. We examine in this context the effects of subsidy competition. To do so, we model the strategic interaction between two governments offering subsidies to a MNC facing different location alternatives, which involve relocation and plant closure. Our welfare analysis shows that the combination of regional integration and subsidy competition may lead to suboptimally high levels of subsidization. We also discuss how the desirability of harmonizing subsidies (by banning them), and the net gains from integration crucially depend on technological differences, ownership, and on corporate tax rates. For instance, a simple agreement on avoiding subsidies generally raises welfare if the MNC belongs to an extra-regional country. This is not the case for a regional MNC. Lastly, we find that the gain from regional subsidy coordination increases with integration.

Microeconomic adjustments during an export boom: Argentina, 2003-11

This paper examines Argentine exports at the firm level between 2003 and 2011, a period of exceptional and sustained export growth. While at the product level, the pattern of specialisation barely changed, exporters exhibit new dynamics in international markets: firms not only expanded sales abroad by increasing their exports in existing markets, but also by entering into new destinations and adding new products. That is, new export strategies allowed exporters achieve greater resistance to the variations in the macroeconomic environment. We find that the importance of the different export margins changes overtime: while the currency is depreciated, the intensive margin explains most of export growth, whereas the subextensive and extensive margins become the main source of export growth once the currency appreciates. We also uncover a strong complementarity between import and export growth.

Trade Protection and Industrial Structure

Abstract In a small open economy with heterogeneous firms, in which tariffs determine the mass of active firms, the gains from trade liberalization depend positively on the level of firm vertical heterogeneity (quality heterogeneity) and negatively on transportation costs. The benefits from temporary protection depend on the quality gap: for a given mass of backward firms, the relative gains from protection increase with their quality and decrease with the quality of advanced firms; for given production quality levels, the relative advantage of protection increases with the mass of backward firms.