Fang-Yi Chiou

A Unified Theory of U.S. Lawmaking: Preferences, Institutions, and Party Discipline

We develop a unified theory of lawmaking that integrates preferences, institutional features, and imperfect party discipline. This model both parsimoniously subsumes numerous extant models and allows for examination of heretofore unexplored equilibria behavior. To demonstrate this, we pinpoint what effects the kinds of changes that reformers often focus on—strengthening parties and loosening the filibuster rule—might have on the equilibrium gridlock interval and generate a number of nonintuitive results. We also find that our unified models empirical implications are consistent with the gridlock pattern found in the data. We conclude that this model is theoretically important and empirically relevant.

Preferences, Parties, and Legislative Productivity

Chiou and Rothenberg (2003) utilized models of legislative productivity, synthesizing parties and preferences by deriving and measuring different equilibrium gridlock intervals, finding that such models outperformed alternatives depending on preferences alone. However, their temporal scope is limited to post-World War II. Generalizing theoretical models—notably recognizing the 1917 enactment of Rule 22 creating the Senate filibuster rule—and expanding historical scope empirically will produce results, inspiring greater confidence and better ability to distinguish whether partisan features matter. Hence, the authors generalize and test models using data extending to the late 19th century. Results indicate that a model combining preferences with party unity better explains outcomes than does a preference-based model, a model where parties control the agenda but cannot discipline members, or a model where the president rules his legislative party. In addition, findings are consistent with the inference that Rule 22 did not change the filibuster rule guiding the Senate substantially.

Executive appointments: Duration, ideology, and hierarchy

While contemporary scholars generally view the Senate’s nominee approval role as impacting bureaucratic capacities and the president’s ability to realize campaign pledges, empiricists and theorists focus on different elements of bargaining. Since empiricists typically study confirmation delays, and theorists normally analyze equilibrium nomination preferences, theory and data rarely inform one another. We remedy this by specifying an executive appointment model jointly incorporating delays and appointee ideologies. Besides predicting appointees’ equilibrium ideologies, and contrary to past claims about the relationship between ideology and duration, this theory details how ideological differences between the president and his opposition do not straightforwardly induce longer delays; rather, effects are conditioned by factors such as the office’s policy importance and divided government. Additionally, different pathways for parties to impact appointee ideology and duration are flexibly incorporated. Empirically, theoretical hypotheses receive support and evidence of parties impacting Senate trade-offs between delay and policy outcomes and successfully pressuring key members over high-stakes appointments are uncovered.