Farrah Ahmed

The Autonomy Rationale for Religious Freedom

Courts and scholars across jurisdictions increasingly identify personal autonomy as the primary rationale for the right to religious freedom. But there are tensions between autonomy on one hand, and religious belief, practice and proselytism on the other. This paper will focus on two tensions which have unappreciated implications for religious freedom jurisprudence, particularly that of the ECHR. The first tension stems from the resistance of some religious beliefs to revision. The second stems from the manipulative nature of some modes of religious proselytism. This paper argues that, given these tensions, the protection currently offered to religious beliefs, practices and proselytism by the right to religious freedom cannot be justified by reference to the value of autonomy. This finding has significant implications for the justification of the right to religious freedom.

The Value of Faith as a Justification for the Protection of Religious Freedom: a Critique of a New Fideistic Account

Abstract Commentators on religious freedom disagree on the rationale for its protection. This question of why we protect religious freedom is important because it influences the manner and scope of the protection of religious freedom by the state. The legal philosopher Timothy Macklem argues, in line with some fideistic approaches to the study of religion, that the value of ‘faith’– of belief without reason to believe – justifies the protection of religious freedom. This paper offers a critique of Macklems account. It argues that this account is inconsistent with a correct view of the nature of reasons, that it overestimates the circumstances in which faith is valuable, that it fails adequately to consider the connections between faith and false beliefs, and that its conclusions imply a much weaker protection of religious freedom than is common in liberal states. This paper also indicates aspects of faith that are valuable, beyond those discussed by Macklem. It is hoped that it will contribute to the debate on the value of faith as well as the broader debate on the justification of religious freedom.