Federico Crazzolara

Events in security protocols

The events of a security protocol and their causal dependency can play an important role in the analysis of security properties. This insight underlies both strand spaces and the inductive method. But neither of these approaches builds up the events of a protocol in a compositional way, so that there is an informal spring from the protocol to its model. By broadening the models to certain kinds of Petri nets, a restricted form of contextual nets, a compositional event-based semantics is given to an economical, but expressive, language for describing security protocols; so the events and dependency of a wide range of protocols are determined once and for all. The net semantics is formally related to a transition semantics, strand spaces and inductive rules, as well as trace languages and event structures, so unifying a range of approaches, as well as providing conditions under which particular, more limited, models are adequate for the analysis of protocols. The net semantics allows the derivation of general properties and proof principles which are demonstrated in establishing an authentication property, following a diagrammatic style of proof.

Petri nets in cryptographic protocols

A process language for security protocols is presented together with a semantics in terms of sets of events. The denotation of process is a set of events, and as each event specifies a set of pre and postconditions, this denotation can be viewed as a Petri net. By means of an example we illustrate how the Petri-net semantics can be used to prove security properties.

Petri Nets With Persistence

Persistence of information is common in modern computer systems. This paper describes how to extend Petri nets, a traditional model of concurrent and distributed computations, to take account of conditions that are persistent. We found use for this kind of nets in modelling untrustworthy networks on which messages are exchanged according to a security protocol. The paper explains a construction where persistent conditions are unfolded and a basic net is recovered. Conditions are given under which the unfolded net exhibits the same finite behaviours as the original net with persistence.

A framework for the development of protocols

We present the /spl chi/-Spaces framework, a tool designed to support every step of a security protocols life cycle. Its integrated development environment (IDE) eases the task of protocol design, debugging and simulation.

Wireless authentication in /spl chi/-Spaces

The /spl chi/-Spaces framework is a set of tools that support all steps of a protocols life-cycle. The framework implements the simple yet powerful security protocol language (SPL), designed to model security protocols and show their correctness. /spl chi/-Spaces can provide efficient and robust implementations of protocols that are suited for embedding into wireless devices.