Federico Zuolo

What's the Point of Self-consciousness? A Critique of Singer's Arguments against Killing (Human or Non-human) Self-conscious Animals

Singer has argued against the permissibility of killing people (and certain animals) on the grounds of the distinction between conscious and self-conscious animals. Unlike conscious animals, which can be replaced without a loss of overall welfare, there can be no substitution for self-conscious animals. In this paper, I show that Singer’s argument is untenable, both in the case of the preference-based account of utilitarianism and of objective hedonism, to which he has recently turned. In the first case, Singer cannot theoretically exclude that a self-conscious being’s stronger preferences may only be satisfied by killing another self-conscious being. In the second case, he fails to demonstrate that the rules of ordinary morality, demanding that killing be strictly forbidden, could not frequently be overruled by the principles of esoteric morality. In both cases, his theory cannot solve the classical utilitarian problem of prohibiting the killing of people in secret.

On justice and other values: G.A. Cohen's political philosophy and the problem of trade-offs

Abstract How ought political philosophers to deal with cases where justice needs to be balanced against other values? For instance, how should they fix the rate at which justice can be compromised for the sake of efficiency? In this paper we take on G.A. Cohens treatment of this problem, usually defined as the problem of trade-off values, comparing and contrasting his position with other philosophical solutions to trade-offs, such as monism or J. Rawlss constructivism. We argue that Cohens political view falls short in providing a principled way to handle trade-offs.

Toleration and Informal Groups. How Does the Formal Dimension Affect Groups’ Capacity to Tolerate?

The ‘agents’ of toleration can be divided into three categories: public institutions, groups and individuals. If it is mostly accepted that both public institutions and individuals are capable of toleration, it is not clear that such a capacity can be attributed to groups, although in daily discourse we seem ready to say that a certain social group is (in)tolerant. This article aims to address this issue by investigating the relationship between collective agency and social groups. Formal groups (e.g. corporations) have internal rules and collectively recognized decision-making procedures that constitute a collective behaviour. However, it is not clear if and in what sense such a capacity is also upheld by informal groups. This article discusses some competing criteria to define informal groups and proposes the shared convictions criterion. In conclusion, this criterion is applied to toleration-related issues, so as to reconcile our ordinary understanding of groups’ toleration with a more technical analysis.

Equality, its Basis and Moral Status: Challenging the Principle of Equal Consideration of Interests

Abstract The principle of equal consideration of interests (ECOI) is a very popular principle in animal ethics. Peter Singer employs it to ground equal treatment and solve the problem of the basis of equality, namely the problem of why we should grant equal treatment despite the variability of people’s features. In this paper, I challenge Singer’s argument because ECOI does not provide plausible grounds to presume that the interests of diverse individuals are actually equal. Analyzing the case of pain and the interest in not suffering in particular, I contend that there are some insurmountable epistemic and axiological problems in accounting for the equality of interests. Besides criticizing ECOI as a basis of equality, I argue that we need to rely on an equality of moral status. I conclude by providing some considerations on the relation between equality and the principle of proportionality.

Salute pubblica e responsabilità parentale: l'esenzione dall'obbligo di vaccinazione

In this article I analyze the plausibility of applying the rule and exemption approach to the case of exemption from compulsory vaccinations. Building on Italian and international cases, I discuss how exemptions have been admitted within current legal systems. Drawing on these cases, in this article I analyze the acceptability of different normative grounds for exemptions: fear of damages to childrens health, naturalistic life-style, autonomy in childrens care, religious beliefs. Besides arguing that only some of these arguments can actually ground an exemption, I show how, unlike other cases of exemptions from the law, in the case of compulsory vaccinations the admissibility of exemptions cannot be justified a priori and depends on the lack of risks for public health.

On the ambiguity of democracy in Plato's statesman

In this paper I shall analyse in what sense in Plato’s Statesman the democracy is “rehabilitated”, with respect to Gorgias’ and Republic’s harsh critiques, insofar as the most preferable alternative in unlawful imperfect constitutions. The value of this “rehabilitation” is, though, undermined by Plato’s unwavering claim that democracy is the rule of the uneducated and ignorant people. This ambiguity can be solved only by understanding in what sense Plato may hold that imperfect constitutions imitate the perfect one ruled by the true political science. Imperfect but law abiding constitutions imitate the perfect one in virtue of their capacity to pursue the unity of the polis. Unlawful regimes, instead, can be ranked only in terms of their capacity to follow the methodological criteria of unity, stability and swiftness of ruling. Democracy’s scattered authority, alternating representatives and slow decision making system limit the possibility of pursuing bad policies. Lacking a paradeigma such as that of the Republic, I shall argue that the notion of imitation is to be understood in non specifically Platonic terms, that is not as the pursuit of an ideal norm, but rather as a methodological approximation.

Il progresso morale in Kant. Impossibilità ontologica e necessità pratica

This article examines the notion of moral progress in Kants moral system. Moral progress is required (and it is recognized as a duty of virtue in the Metaphysics of Morals) insofar as it is a consequence of the assumption that human beings are responsible for their moral characters. Nevertheless, moral progress is metaphysically impossible, since individual Gesinnung is placed in a noumenical dimension, which, by definition, is independent of both time and empirical conditions. This leads Kant to conclude, in his Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason, that there can be no actual improvement in ones character. In light of this I argue that the problems with moral progress may help us shed new light on some paradoxes of Kantian morals that have not been solved by his later reformulation.