Félix J. López-Iturriaga

Ownership Structure, Sharing of Control and Legal Framework: international evidence

We analyse the relation between capital structure, ownership structure, and corporate value for a sample of 1,216 firms from 15 European countries. Our results stress two different conflicts of interest and show the differential role played by the mechanisms of corporate control depending on the legal and institutional environment. In common law countries, as a consequence of the relationships between managers and shareholders, capital structure and managerial ownership are the most effective mechanisms of control. In civil law countries, however, as a consequence of the conflicts between majority and minority shareholders, the ownership concentration and the sharing of control within the firm become crucial. In this scenario, the second reference shareholder plays a critical role in contesting the control of the dominant largest shareholder in order to reduce the extraction of private benefits and improve the firms performance. Copyright (c) 2007 The Authors; Journal compilation (c) 2007 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

Capital structure and institutional setting: a decompositional and international analysis

The legal and institutional setting is more and more influential in firms’ financial decisions. Our article analyses firms’ capital structure in an international framework in order to assess the different level of debt use across countries and to identify both common and differential explanatory factors. Although the level of financial leverage is quite different, the factors that have traditionally driven capital structure decisions have much in common in all the legal and institutional settings. The performance and size of the firm, the assets tangibility and the growth opportunities have a relevant but differential effect across the different institutional systems. Consequently, our results suggest that the legal and institutional system of each country does not only affect firms’ capital structure but also creates the conditions to explain a differential effect of the common determinants of firms’ financial choices.

Ownership Structure, Corporate Value and Firm Investment: A Simultaneous Equations Analysis of Spanish Companies

This paper is concerned with the set of mutualrelationships between firm valuation andinvestment, and with the possible endogeneityof ownership structure. In order to deal withthem properly, we aim to test the mutual impactof investment, corporate value and ownership bybroadening the usual framework with asimultaneous equations approach. Using a sampleof 140 Spanish listed companies for the1991–1997 period, we have found that,consistent with previous research, thealignment and entrenchment hypotheses seem tobe confirmed by the estimation of aone-equation model. However, when analyzed bymeans of a system of simultaneous equations inwhich a set of mutual relationships isintroduced, quite different results wereobtained. Although valuation and investment offirms are determined by managerial ownership,we have found that ownership structure may alsobe influenced both by investment and value.Consequently, it is not completely right toinfer that ownership structure determines firmvalue unidirectionally; however the benchmarkshould be broadened so as to take an explicitaccount of the mutual links between firm value,investment and ownership.

Configurations of Capacity for Change in Entrepreneurial Threshold Firms: Imprinting and Strategic Choice Perspectives

Imprinting theory suggests that founding conditions are ‘stamped’ on organizations, and these imprinted routines often resist change. In contrast, strategic choice theory suggests that the firm can overcome organizational inertia and deliberately choose its future. Both theories offer dramatically different explanations behind an organizations capacity for change. IPO firms provide a unique context for exploring how imprinting forces interact with strategic choice factors to address organizational capacity for change as a firm moves from private to public firm status. Juxtaposing imprinting and strategic choice perspectives, we employ fuzzy set analysis to examine the multi-level determinants of organizational capacity for change. Our cross-national data reveal three effective configurations of organizational capacity for change within IPOs, and two ineffective configurations. Our results suggest that the antecedents of organizational capacity for change in entrepreneurial threshold firms are non-linear, interdependent, and equifinal.

Does the influence of institutional investors depend on the institutional framework? An international analysis

This article analyses the effect of institutional ownership in alleviating or exacerbating the conflicts of interests among stakeholders in different legal and institutional frameworks. This analysis is carried out based on two characteristics: the concentration of power of institutional ownership and the identification of the main types of institutional investors. In common law countries, consistent with the convergence and entrenchment hypotheses, we find a U-shape relation between ownership structure and firm performance. In civil law countries, consistent with the collusion and contest theories, we find an inverted U-shape relation. We also find that when institutional investors are classified as pressure resistant and pressure sensitive according to the strength of their ties with managers, pressure-resistant investors, who operate more independently, are the most capable of improving the value of the firm.

Financial Constraints for Innovation in Brazil

ABSTRACT This paper analyzes the presence of financial constraints for investment in innovation in Brazil. Dynamic investment models are estimated for a panel dataset of 206 Brazilian non-financial firms in the period 1995–2006. Results show that innovation of Brazilian firms is subject to financial constraints in line with previous international evidence. Innovation of Brazilian firms is adversely affected by leverage and also depends on internally generated funds. The models presented incorporate relevant firm characteristics for financial constraints. Our findings suggest the need for further advances at micro- and macroeconomic levels in Brazil to mitigate the observed financial constraints.

Corporate Social Responsibility and Large Shareholders: An Analysis of European Multinational Enterprises

Abstract This paper is the analysis of the corporate social responsibility (CSR) activities of European multinational firms, focusing on the ability of large shareholders to delineate CSR policy. It bases on this analysis on the Dow Jones Sustainability STOXX Index as a measure of a firms concern for labor conditions, environmental issues, and other aspects of sustainability. Using data from 1,248 firms from five major European Union countries (United Kingdom, Germany, France, Italy, and Spain) for 2000–2004, it finds that institutional investors and other reference shareholders, relative to their ability to contest the largest shareholder, act as a pressure mechanism to improve the firms commitment to socially responsible actions. In addition, it provides evidence that firms with a multinational dimension show increased concern for CSR.

Institutional Directors and Board Compensation: Spanish Evidence

We address the influence of directors who represent institutional investors in three aspects of board compensation policies: level of compensation, composition, and performance sensitivity. We differentiate pressure-sensitive directors (i.e., with business links) and pressure-resistant directors (i.e., without business links). Our results show that pressure-resistant directors decrease total board compensation and its fixed proportion, whereas they increase the variable proportion of total remuneration and the pay-for-performance sensitivity. By contrast, pressure-sensitive directors offer the opposite results. These findings are consistent with the view that institutional investors are not a homogeneous group and that pressure-resistant directors fulfill a more thorough monitoring role.

Nonfinancial Companies as Large Shareholders Alleviate Financial Constraints of Brazilian Firm

We analyze whether financial constraints of Brazilian firms are alleviated by ownership structure. More specifically, we study whether the presence of nonfinancial firms as shareholders of Brazilian firm mitigates financial constraints. We find that the presence of nonfinancial firms as significant shareholders reduces financial constraints, probably because such blockholders are able to reduce asymmetric information problems that are at the origin of financial constraints. This result indicates that the changes in the corporate ownership of the Brazilian firms, achieved within the countrys structural changes, have been positive for firm investment and have contributed to the development of Brazil.

Diversification and control in emerging markets: the case of Chilean firms

We analyze the effect of two types of corporate diversification (business diversification and ownership diversification) on the market value of the Chilean firms. For a sample of 83 nonfinancial firms listed on the Santiago Stock Market from 2005 to 2013, we find a discount for both business and ownership diversification, which is consistent with that reported for other economic or institutional settings. Second, we find that the business diversification discount is related to the ownership structure and is due to the excess of the largest shareholders’ control rights. Third, we find that the ownership diversification discount becomes a premium when the ownership diversification enables the control of the affiliated firms. This effect can be explained by the improvement of internal capital markets that allows overcoming the limitations of Chilean external capital markets.