Felix Noth

How do insured deposits affect bank risk? Evidence from the 2008 emergency economic stabilization act

This paper tests whether an increase in insured deposits causes banks to become more risky. We use variation introduced by the U.S. Emergency Economic Stabilization Act in October 2008, which increased the deposit insurance coverage from

Did TARP Distort Competition Among Sound Unsupported Banks

100,000 to

How Do Banks React to Catastrophic Events? Evidence from Hurricane Katrina

250,000 per depositor and bank. For some banks, the amount of insured deposits increased significantly; for others, it was a minor change. Our analysis shows that the more affected banks increase their investments in risky commercial real estate loans and become more risky relative to unaffected banks following the change. This effect is most distinct for affected banks that are low capitalized.

How Do Banks React to Increased Asset Risks? Evidence from Hurricane Katrina

This study investigates if the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) distorted price competition in U.S. banking. Political indicators reveal bailout expectations after 2009, manifested as beliefs about the predicted probability of receiving equity support relative to failing during the TARP disbursement period. In addition, the TARP affected the competitive conduct of unsupported banks after the program stopped in the fourth quarter of 2009. Loan rates were higher, and the risk premium required by depositors was lower for banks with higher bailout expectations. The interest margins of unsupported banks increased in the immediate aftermath of the TARP disbursement but not after 2010. No effects emerged for loan or deposit growth, which suggests that protected banks did not increase their market shares at the expense of less protected banks.

Decision-Making Power in Foreign Subsidiaries and its Effect on Financial Constraints: An Analysis for Selected European Transition Economies on the Basis of the IWH FDI Micro Database 2013

This paper explores how banks adjust their risk-based capital ratios and asset allocations following an exogenous shock to their asset quality caused by Hurricane Katrina in 2005. We find that independent banks based in the disaster areas increase their risk-based capital ratios after the hurricane, while those part of a bank holding company do not. The effect on independent banks mainly comes from the subgroup of high-capitalized banks. These banks increase their holdings in government securities and reduce loans to non-financial firms. Hence, banks that become more stable achieve this at the cost of reduced lending.

Did TARP distort competition among sound banks

The instability of banks during the recent financial crisis underlines the importance of understanding how banks determine their capital ratios. This paper conducts the first empirical assessment on how banks adjust their capital ratios following an exogenous shock to their asset risks. The existing literature, which uses non-experimental identification, faces the difficulty that banks typically determine capital ratios and asset risks simultaneously. Using Hurricane Katrina as a natural experiment, we find that banks in the disaster areas increase their risk-based capital ratios after the hurricane. This finding shows that banks act precautious by themselves irrespective of regulatory requirements. However, when we examine low-capitalized and high-capitalized banks separately, we find that results are driven by high-capitalized banks. In addition, high-capitalized banks increase their risk-based capital ratios by decreasing loans and not by increasing capital.

Banking Competition and Real Sector Stability: Does the Risk Shifting Channel Exist?

This article analyzes whether the distribution of decision-making power between the headquarters and foreign subsidiaries of multinational enterprises (MNEs) affects the foreign affiliates’ financial constraints. The findings show that not much decision-making power has as yet been moved from headquarters to foreign subsidiaries in European post-transition economies. The high concentration of decision-making power within the MNE’s subsidiary points toward higher financial constraints. However, a nonlinear effect is found, which suggests that financial constraints within the subsidiary only increase with more decision-making power when the power granted to the subsidiary is at a low level. For subsidiaries that already have autonomy in decision-making, granting more power in this regard has no effect on financial constraints.

Natural disaster and bank stability: Evidence from the U.S. financial system

This study investigates if the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) distorted price competition in U.S. banking. Political indicators reveal bailout expectations after 2009, manifested as beliefs about the predicted probability of receiving equity support relative to failing during the TARP disbursement period. In addition, the TARP affected the competitive conduct of unsupported banks after the program stopped in the fourth quarter of 2009. Loan rates were higher, and the risk premium required by depositors was lower for banks with higher bailout expectations. The interest margins of unsupported banks increased in the immediate aftermath of the TARP disbursement but not after 2010. No effects emerged for loan or deposit growth, which suggests that protected banks did not increase their market shares at the expense of less protected banks.

Bank-specific shocks and house price growth in the U.S

Recent theoretical literature in the field of banking competition and bank risk stresses the importance of interactions between banks and firms and suggests that banking competition impacts firm stability. But empirical evidence whether banking competition increases or decreases stability of firms in the real sector is scarce. This paper investigates the effect of banking competition on firm stability for a sample of small- and medium-size enterprises (SMEs) in Germany between 1996-2006. Results show that less banking competition is beneficial for firm stability. This rejects recent suggestions from the banking literature that banks may exploit their competitiveness and increase incentives for firms to undertake more risk. Thereby, this paper suggests the often cited charter value paradigm in banking to be right.

Bank risk proxies and the crisis of 2007/09: a comparison

We document that natural disasters significantly weaken the stability of banks with business activities in affected regions. This is reflected, among others, in higher probabilities of default and foreclosure ratios. The effects are economically relevant and suggest that insurance payments and public aid programs do not sufficiently protect bank borrowers against financial difficulties. We also find that the adverse effects dissolve after some years if no further disasters occur in the meantime.