Ferenc Kiefer

Speech Act Theory and Pragmatics

Semantic Structure and Illocutionary Force.- Perlocutions.- Pragmatic Entailment and Questions.- Surface Compositionality and the Semantics of Mood.- Yes-No Questions as Wh-Questions.- Syntactic Meanings.- Situational Context and Illocutionary Force.- Semantics and Pragmatics of Sentence Connectives in Natural Language.- Some Remarks on Explicit Performatives, Indirect Speech Acts, Locutionary Meaning and Truth-Value.- The Background of Meaning.- Towards a Pragmatically Based Theory of Meaning.- Illocutionary Logic and Self-Defeating Speech Acts.- Telling the Facts.- Methodological Remarks on Speech Act Theory.- Index of Names.- Index of Subjects.

Remarks on Definitions in Natural Language

At first glance the problem of definitions in natural language seems to be a more or less marginal question. This is, however, far from being true. While discussing definitions we shall be forced to touch upon some fairly intricate and central problems of linguistic theory. Though even the formal properties of definitional sentences are far from being clear, the more difficult problems arise with respect to their semantic interpretation, their role in introducing new terms into a given language, and their relation to non-definitional generic sentences. Questions of this type may shed new light on certain properties of lexical readings and lexical systems of natural languages in general and on the relation between analytic and empirical generic sentences based on these properties in particular. We cannot answer these questions within the limits of the present article. We only intend to explore some hitherto poorly considered problems of linguistic theory and to stipulate some concepts that might be useful for further and more detailed investigations.

Yes-No Questions as Wh-Questions

In this paper I am going to discuss some types of yes-no questions which — under normal circumstances — cannot be answered equally well by a plain ‘yes’ or a plain ‘no’. My account of these questions will principally be based on the theory of indirect speech acts and the theory of conversation.

From Thought Experiments to Real Experiments in Pragmatics

The puzzle of thought experiments is a hot topic in the philosophy of science. The chapter raises the puzzle with respect to pragmatics as follows: How is it possible that thought experiments in pragmatics yield new experiential information about communication, although they are carried out entirely in one’s head? The chapter shows, first, that the structure of thought experiments in pragmatics consists of a series of plausible inferences. Second, the function of thought experiments is to serve as the initial step in the process of plausible argumentation as well as to test the plausibility of rival hypotheses. Third, while on the one hand, thought experiments and real experiments may be continuous, on the other hand, the former may be also indispensable components of the latter. Fourth, these properties provide a solution to the puzzle of thought experiments in pragmatics. The key idea of the solution is that thought experiments in pragmatics cannot generate new experiential information; rather, during the process of plausible argumentation they contribute to the retrospective re-evaluation of experiential information already given.

ADJECTIVES AND PRESUPPOSITIONS

This article discusses some presuppositional properties of adjectives in comparative constructions. On the basis of the presuppositional analysis of such constructions a classification of adjectives will be proposed. The classification obtained will be supported by further evidence from the Polish comparative. In addition to the semantic aspects of adjectives some pragmatic aspects, too, will be taken into consideration. Finally, it will be suggested that the presuppositional properties of the comparative can be derived from the semantic representation of adjectives.

Questions and Attitudes

In this paper I am going to discuss certain semantic and pragmatic aspects of questions. It will be assumed that the semantics of questions need not take into account speech situations and that, in contradistinction to semantics, the pragmatics of questions can only be accounted for by taking into consideration speech situations (involving at least two aspects: the interactional setting and the knowledge of the speaker/hearer). I shall mainly be concerned with the problem of how knowledge, more precisely, knowledge about the answer, is involved in the pragmatic interpretation of questions. I am going to stipulate that the various types of questions (information question, rhetorical question, didactic question, examination question, etc.) can best be accounted for by postulating a common semantic structure for all questions — apart from the differences in propositional content — and let pragmatics do the rest. The main difference between the various question types will be analyzed in terms of differences in cognitive attitudes which, in turn, are based to a large extent on some particular features of knowledge. In the second part of my paper I am going to show that there is an interesting relationship between the cognitive attitudes of questions and the predicate types of the matrix sentences of embedded questions. In addition, I shall try to answer the question of what kind of predicates can occur in these matrix sentences and how they are organized.

Greetings as language games

Abstract Part of the Hungarian greeting system is described using the notion of a language game. By determining the kind of information used in a given greeting exchange, both analysts and participants are able to determine which is the game in question, and whether the game is the same for all participants.

Eight Decades of General Linguistics

Eight Decades of General Linguistics offers the lectures of outstanding scholars including Otto Jesperson, Louis Hjelmslev, Andre Martinet, Uriel Weinreich, Noam Chomsky and others held during the eighteen conferences organized by the Permanent International Committee of Linguists.

Aspectual Constraints on Noun Incorporation in Hungarian

This paper summarizes and expands on some earlier findings concerning noun incorporation in Hungarian. An incorporated construction comes about by juxtaposing a bare noun and a verb. The bare noun occupies a preverbal position. Incorporated constructions share some features with compounds: these constitute a single phonological unit, they easily get lexicalized, the bare noun is non-referential and non-modifiable. It will be argued that the eventuality designated by the incorporated construction has to be perceived as a recognizable unitary concept. Furthermore, it will be shown that the construction interacts with the aspectual properties of the verb in interesting ways: while activity and process verbs do admit the construction, it is normally blocked in the case of statives and accomplishment and achievement verbs.

Indirect and Direct Reports in Hungarian

The paper describes the specific features of indirect and direct reports in Hungarian. One of these features is the use of a proximal and/or distal demonstrative in the reporting clause, another one is the obligatory or optional use of a complementizer to introduce the reported clause. Relatively free word order is yet another feature of Hungarian which affects the way in which the original utterance is presented. It will be shown that there is a close relationship between these features and the information structure of indirect reports. Finally, − given the fact that in Hungarian a great variety of verbs can be used as reporting verbs – it will also be examined under what conditions can a verb of sound emission (or even any other verb) function as a reporting verb. Finally, since the verb of saying meaning and transitivity seem to be interrelated, a brief section will be devoted to the role of transitivity as well.