Filipa Sa

The U.S. Current Account and the Dollar

There are two main forces behind the large US current account deficits. First, an increase in the US demand for foreign goods. Second, an increase in the foreign demand for US assets. Both forces have contributed to steadily increasing current account deficits since the mid-1990s. This increase has been accompanied by a real dollar appreciation until late 2001, and a real depreciation since. The depreciation has accelerated recently, raising the questions of whether and how much more is to come, and if so, against which currencies, the euro, the yen, or the renminbi. Our purpose in this paper is to explore these issues. Our theoretical contribution is to develop a simple portfolio model of exchange rate and current account determination, and to use it to interpret the past and explore alternative scenarios for the future. Our practical conclusions are that substantially more depreciation is to come, surely against the yen and the renminbi, and probably against the euro.

International Investors, the U.S. Current Account, and the Dollar

Two main forces lie behind the large U.S. current account deficits: an increase in U.S. demand for foreign goods and an increase in foreign demand for U.S. assets. Both have contributed to steadily increasing current account deficits since the mid-1990s, accompanied by a real dollar appreciation until late 2001 and a real depreciation since, which accelerated in late 2004. This paper explores whether and how much more depreciation is to come, and against which currencies: the euro, the yen, or the renminbi. The paper develops a simple model of exchange rate and current account determination based on imperfect substitutability in both goods and asset markets and uses that model to interpret the past and explore alternative future scenarios. The paper concludes that substantially more depreciation is to come, surely against the yen and the renminbi, and probably against the euro.

The Geographical Composition of National External Balance Sheets: 1980-2005

This paper constructs a data set on stocks of bilateral external assets and liabilities for a group of 18 countries, including developed and emerging economies. The data set covers the years 1980 to 2005 and distinguishes between four asset classes: foreign direct investment, portfolio equity, debt, and foreign exchange reserves. A number of stylised facts emerge from it. There has been a remarkable increase in interconnectivity over the past two decades. Financial links have become larger and more frequent and countries have become more open. The global financial network is centered around a small number of nodes, which have many and large links. In addition, the network exhibits ‘small-world’ properties, such as high clustering and low average path length. The combination of high interconnectivity, a small number of hubs, and ‘small-world’ properties makes for a robust-yet-fragile system, in which disturbances to the key hubs would be rapidly and widely transmitted. The global financial network is centered around the United States and the United Kingdom, which have large links and are connected to most other countries. This contrasts with the global trade network, which is arranged in three clusters: a European cluster (centered on Germany), an Asian cluster (centered on China), and an American cluster (centered on the United States).

Low Interest Rates and Housing Booms: The Role of Capital Inflows, Monetary Policy and Financial Innovation

A number of OECD countries experienced an environment of low interest rates and a rapid increase in housing market activity during the last decade. Previous work suggests three potential explanations for these events: expansionary monetary policy, capital inflows due to a global savings glut and excessive financial innovation combined with inappropriately lax financial regulation. In this study we examine the effects of these three factors on the housing market. We estimate a panel VAR for a sample of OECD countries and identify monetary policy and capital inflows shocks using sign restrictions. To explore how these effects change with the structure of the mortgage market and the degree of securitisation, we augment the VAR to let the coefficients vary with mortgage market characteristics. Our results suggest that both types of shocks have a significant and positive effect on real house prices, real credit to the private sector and real residential investment. The responses of housing variables to both types of shocks are stronger in countries with more developed mortgage markets, roughly doubling the responses to a monetary policy shock. The amplification effect of mortgage-backed securitisation is particularly strong for capital inflows shocks, increasing the response of real house prices, residential investment and real credit by a factor of two, three and five, respectively.

Immigration and House Prices in the UK

This article studies the effect of immigration on house prices in the UK. It finds that immigration has a negative effect on house prices and presents evidence that this negative effect is due to the mobility response of the native population. Natives respond to immigration by moving to different areas and those who leave are at the top of the wage distribution. This generates a negative income effect on housing demand and pushes down house prices. The negative effect of immigration on house prices is driven by local areas where immigrants have lower education.

Monetary policy, capital inflows and the housing boom

A range of hypotheses have been put forward to explain the boom in house prices that occurred in the United States from the mid-1990s to 2007. This paper considers the relative importance of two of these hypotheses. First, global imbalances increased liquidity in the US financial system, driving down long-term real interest rates. Second, the Federal Reserve kept interest rates low in the first half of the 2000s. Both factors reduced the cost of borrowing and may have encouraged the boom in house prices. This paper develops an empirical framework to separate the relative contributions of these two factors to the US housing market. The results suggest that capital inflows to the United States played a bigger role in generating the increase in house prices than monetary policy loosening. Using VAR methods, we find that compared to monetary policy, the effect of a capital inflows shock on US house prices and residential investment is about twice as large and substantially more persistent. Results from variance decompositions suggest that, at a forecast horizon of 20 quarters, capital flows shocks explain 15% of the variation in real house prices, while monetary policy shocks explain only 5%. In a simple counterfactual exercise, we find that if the ratio of the current account deficit to GDP had remained constant since the end of 1998, real house prices by the end of 2007 would have been 13% lower. Similar exercises with constant policy rates and the path of policy rates implied by the Taylor rule deliver smaller effects.

Shifts in Portfolio Preferences of International Investors: An Application to Sovereign Wealth Funds

Reversals in capital inflows can have severe economic consequences. This paper develops a dynamic general equilibrium model to analyze the effect on interest rates, asset prices, investment, consumption, output, the exchange rate and the current account of a shift in portfolio preferences of foreign investors. The model has two countries and two asset classes (equities and bonds). It is characterized by imperfect substitutability between assets and allows for endogenous adjustment in interest rates and asset prices. Therefore, it accounts for capital gains arising from equity price movements, in addition to valuation effects caused by changes in the exchange rate. To illustrate the mechanics of the model, we calibrate it to analyse the consequences of an increase in the importance of sovereign wealth funds (SWFs). Specifically, we ask what would happen if ‘excess’ reserves held by emerging markets were transferred from central banks to SWFs. We look separately at two diversification paths: one in which SWFs keep the same allocation across bonds and equities as central banks, but move away from dollar assets (path 1); and another in which they choose the same currency composition as central banks, but shift from US bonds to US equities (path 2). In path 1, the dollar depreciates and US net debt falls on impact and increases in the long run. In path 2, the dollar depreciates and US net debt increases in the long run. In both cases, there is a reduction in the ‘exorbitant privilege’, i.e., the excess return the United States receives on its assets over what it pays on its liabilities. The model is applicable to other episodes in which foreign investors change the composition of their portfolios.