Filippo Santoni de Sio

How cognitive enhancement can change our duties

This theoretical paper draws the scientific community’s attention to how pharmacological cognitive enhancement may impact on society and law. Namely, if safe, reliable, and effective techniques to enhance mental performance are eventually developed, then this may under some circumstances impose new duties onto people in high-responsibility professions—e.g., surgeons or pilots—to use such substances to minimize risks of adverse outcomes or to increase the likelihood of good outcomes. By discussing this topic, we also hope to encourage scientists to bring their expertise to bear on this current public debate.

The Indirect Psychological Costs of Cognitive Enhancement

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Killing by Autonomous Vehicles and the Legal Doctrine of Necessity

How should autonomous vehicles (aka self-driving cars) be programmed to behave in the event of an unavoidable accident in which the only choice open is one between causing different damages or losses to different objects or persons? This paper addresses this ethical question starting from the normative principles elaborated in the law to regulate difficult choices in other emergency scenarios. In particular, the paper offers a rational reconstruction of some major principles and norms embedded in the Anglo-American jurisprudence and case law on the “doctrine of necessity”; and assesses which, if any, of these principles and norms can be utilized to find reasonable guidelines for solving the ethical issue of the regulation of the programming of autonomous vehicles in emergency situations. The paper covers the following topics: the distinction between “justification” and “excuse”, the legal prohibition of intentional killing outside self-defence, the incommensurability of goods, and the legal constrains to the use of lethal force set by normative positions: obligations, responsibility, rights, and authority. For each of these principles and constrains the possible application to the programming of autonomous vehicles is discussed. Based on the analysis, some practical suggestions are offered.

When Should We Use Care Robots? The Nature-of-Activities Approach

When should we use care robots? In this paper we endorse the shift from a simple normative approach to care robots ethics to a complex one: we think that one main task of a care robot ethics is that of analysing the different ways in which different care robots may affect the different values at stake in different care practices. We start filling a gap in the literature by showing how the philosophical analysis of the nature of healthcare activities can contribute to (care) robot ethics. We rely on the nature-of-activities approach recently proposed in the debate on human enhancement, and we apply it to the ethics of care robots. The nature-of-activities approach will help us to understand why certain practice-oriented activities in healthcare should arguably be left to humans, but certain (predominantly) goal-directed activities in healthcare can be fulfilled (sometimes even more ethically) with the assistance of a robot. In relation to the latter, we aim to show that even though all healthcare activities can be considered as practice-oriented, when we understand the activity in terms of different legitimate ‘fine-grained’ descriptions, the same activities or at least certain components of them can be seen as clearly goal-directed. Insofar as it allows us to ethically assess specific functionalities of specific robots to be deployed in well-defined circumstances, we hold the nature-of-activities approach to be particularly helpful also from a design perspective, i.e. to realize the Value Sensitive Design approach.

The Necessity of Objective Standards for Moral Enhancement

Addressing skeptical arguments from philosophy and neuroscience, John Shook (2012) claims that it is conceptually coherent to describe certain forms of mental intervention as “moral enhancement,” a...

Digital Twins in Health Care: Ethical Implications of an Emerging Engineering Paradigm

Personalized medicine uses fine grained information on individual persons, to pinpoint deviations from the normal. ‘Digital Twins’ in engineering provide a conceptual framework to analyze these emerging data-driven health care practices, as well as their conceptual and ethical implications for therapy, preventative care and human enhancement. Digital Twins stand for a specific engineering paradigm, where individual physical artifacts are paired with digital models that dynamically reflects the status of those artifacts. When applied to persons, Digital Twins are an emerging technology that builds on in silico representations of an individual that dynamically reflect molecular status, physiological status and life style over time. We use Digital Twins as the hypothesis that one would be in the possession of very detailed bio-physical and lifestyle information of a person over time. This perspective redefines the concept of ‘normality’ or ‘health,’ as a set of patterns that are regular for a particular individual, against the backdrop of patterns observed in the population. This perspective also will impact what is considered therapy and what is enhancement, as can be illustrated with the cases of the ‘asymptomatic ill’ and life extension via anti-aging medicine. These changes are the consequence of how meaning is derived, in case measurement data is available. Moral distinctions namely may be based on patterns found in these data and the meanings that are grafted on these patterns. Ethical and societal implications of Digital Twins are explored. Digital Twins imply a data-driven approach to health care. This approach has the potential to deliver significant societal benefits, and can function as a social equalizer, by allowing for effective equalizing enhancement interventions. It can as well though be a driver for inequality, given the fact that a Digital Twin might not be an accessible technology for everyone, and given the fact that patterns identified across a population of Digital Twins can lead to segmentation and discrimination. This duality calls for governance as this emerging technology matures, including measures that ensure transparency of data usage and derived benefits, and data privacy.

Meaningful Human Control Over Autonomous Systems : A Philosophical Account

Debates on lethal autonomous weapon systems have proliferated in the last five years. Ethical concerns have been voiced about a possible raise in the number of wrongs and crimes in military operations and about the creation of a “responsibility gap” for harms caused by these systems. To address these concerns, the principle of “meaningful human control” has been introduced in the legal-political debate; according to this principle humans not computers and their algorithms should ultimately remain in control of, and thus morally responsible for relevant decisions about (lethal) military operations. However, policy-makers and technical designers lack a detailed theory of what “meaningful human control” exactly means. In this paper we lay the foundation of a philosophical account of meaningful human control, based on the concept of “guidance control” as elaborated in the philosophical debate on free will and moral responsibility. Following the ideals of “Responsible Innovation” and “Value-sensitive Design” our account of meaningful human control is cast in the form of design requirements. We identify two general, necessary conditions to be satisfied for an autonomous system to remain under meaningful human control: first, a “tracking” condition, according to which the system should be able to respond to both the relevant moral reasons of the humans designing and deploying the system and the relevant facts in the environment in which the system operates; second, a “tracing” condition, according to which the system should be designed in such a way as to grant the possibility to always trace back the outcome of its operations to at least one human along the chain of design and operation. As we think that meaningful human control can be one of the central notions in ethics of robotics and AI, in the last part of the paper we start exploring the implications of our account for the design and use of non-military autonomous systems, for instance self-driving cars.

Irresistible Desires as an Excuse

When (if ever) should people be allowed to defend themselves against an accusation by saying that they acted upon an irresistible desire? Of course, the idea of absolving people (at least in part) of responsibility when they act in the presence of strong desires is recurrent in philosophical literature.1 Interestingly, however, in recent decades it has often also appeared in legal and forensic psychiatric literature, especially in discussions of addiction and ‘personality disorders’ involving ‘compulsive’ behaviour such as kleptomania.2 The question of the availability of defences based on ‘loss of control’—to

Pushing the Margins of Responsibility: Lessons from Parks’ Somnambulistic Killing

David Shoemaker has claimed that a binary approach to moral responsibility leaves out something important, namely instances of marginal agency, cases where agents seem to be eligible for some responsibility responses but not others. In this paper we endorse and extend Shoemaker’s approach by presenting and discussing one more case of marginal agency not yet covered by Shoemaker or in the other literature on moral responsibility. Our case is that of Kenneth Parks, a Canadian man who drove a long way to his mother-in-law’s and killed her in a state of somnambulism. We support our claim about Parks’ marginal responsibility in three steps: we first deny that Parks acts involuntarily as traditionally claimed in the legal literature; we then propose to extend Shoemaker’s analysis of marginal responsibility based on quality of will so as to include two other dimensions: the moral status of the agent and the actual causal effects of their actions; finally, we distinguish Parks’ marginal responsibility from four other existing concepts: “tracing” (drunken cases), diminished responsibility (minor mental disorders), causal responsibility (Williams’ unlucky lorry driver), and moral disapproval without responsibility (bad actions by small children, animals, or machines).