Florian Bieber

Building Impossible States? State-Building Strategies and EU Membership in the Western Balkans

SINCE THE EARLY 2000S THE EU HAS EMERGED AS THE PRIMARY ACTOR in state building in the Western Balkans. Based on a dual strategy of state building and European integration, the EU has sought to replace other international organisations in the post-conflict reconstruction of the Western Balkans. The record of this experience has been mixed. This essay will discuss the dual approach of the EU and examine its application to Bosnia & Hercegovina (Bosna i Hercegovina, BiH), Serbia and Montenegro, and Kosovo. It argues that the EU’s approach has relied strongly on the effect of conditionality as a tool of state building; however, as the case studies will demonstrate, the conditionality approach has been largely ineffective in regard to state building, in part due to the lack of commitment of political elites to EU integration and the persistence of status issues on the policy agenda. The essay will seek to examine the causes of this failure and what this means for future EU-driven state building in the Western Balkans and in other post-conflict regions. Since the early 1990s, different international actors have promoted the reform and creation of states as a solution to the conflicts that erupted on the territory of the former Yugoslavia. In fact, one of the first of many failed peace plans was the ‘Arrangements for a general settlement’ proposed by the EC mediator for Yugoslavia, Lord Carrington in September 1991, which sought to create an association of independent republics (UN Secretary General 1991, pp. 29–45). Numerous subsequent proposals have been drafted for Croatia (Z4 plan), BiH (Cutileiro Plan, Vance–Owen Plan, Owen–Stoltenberg Plan, Contact Group plan), Kosovo (Rambouillet) and Macedonia (Ohrid Framework Agreement) (Bieber 2012). Some failed at the negotiation stage, while others have been implemented with varying degrees of success. A key feature of these plans has been the establishment of a particular form of state to accommodate competing claims: a minimalist state. Together with ending hostility, the structure of post-war governance has rightfully been the key concern of international mediators, but also of parties to the conflict. As the conflicts were rooted in disputes over governance and ethnic dominance, negotiating the shape and

From Dayton to Brussels: The Impact of EU and NATO Conditionality on State Building in Bosnia & Hercegovina

ALTHOUGH BOSNIA & HERCEGOVINA (Bosna i Hercegovina, BiH) has experienced more than 15 years of state building since the signing of the Dayton Peace Accords in 1995, its post-war stabilisation has been backsliding in recent years. As the title of this essay suggests, the process of moving from the post-conflict environment of the Dayton Peace Accords to a state ready for membership in Euro-Atlantic institutions is far from complete. In this context, we examine two arguments. First, we posit that the existing literature on conditionality, that is the process by which a non-member state takes on board the norms and practices of an institution to become a member, is not applicable to post-conflict societies. In order to examine this question, first of all we identify what we mean by ‘conventional’ conditionality. This is the literature that exists in the field, and is by and large based on the case studies of the EU enlargements to Central and Eastern Europe. Our focus in this essay is to identify processes of conditionality in the existing literature. In general, we find two interrelated processes of rationalisation and socialisation. In both processes the target state engages with the norms of the institution which lays down the conditions of accession as a member. This process leads to transformation of the target state. Usually the recipients of the institution’s norms in the target state are the existing elites, politicians and localand state-level civil servants. Rationalisation refers to the cost–benefit analysis of the elites in the target state, who see that acquiring these norms will benefit their own political goals. Socialisation refers to the internalisation of the institution’s norms by local elites; in a way the external norms become ‘their’ norms. In both processes there is an engagement by local elites with the existing norms. There is even an argumentative/discursive stage in which external norms are debated in contrast to local norms. Finally, the external norms are ‘grafted’ onto existing local norms and what results is local ‘ownership’ of these norms. Secondly, we argue that due to their technocratic ownership of a given sector, different international institutions, in this case the EU and NATO, can have different impacts on the state-building process. In this sense we are looking at the different merits of different institutions as imposers of conditionality. Therefore we argue that EUROPE-ASIA STUDIES Vol. 63, No. 10, December 2011, 1911–1937

Power-sharing revisited: lessons learned in the Balkans

In this article, the authors discuss the use of power-sharing instruments in the Western Balkans. While the comparison will focus on the use of power-sharing in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia, there will be occasional references to Kosovo, the third country in the region that displays elements of power-sharing. We argue that the region has been a laboratory of power-sharing instruments, with rather mixed results. While in all three cases, power-sharing was part of a larger strategy of peacebuilding, and was, therefore, successful in ending violent conflict and supporting peaceful conflict resolution, the introduction of power-sharing has also had some negative side effects. We will discuss, in particular, the consequences of complicated political systems, veto rights, as well as far-reaching ethno-territorial autonomy. Furthermore, the article will asses the risk of blockages arising from complex political arrangements and resulting international mediation. A particular focus of the article will be to distinguish between federalism in Bosnia and Herzegovina and alternative forms of autonomy (both territorial and non-territorial) in Macedonia and Kosovo. Rather than suggesting that power-sharing as such has failed in the region, we submit that the experience in the region suggests that: (a) there are no viable alternatives to power-sharing in the selected countries; (b) that different types of power-sharing need to be considered; and (c) that potential membership in the European Union continues to be the only incentive for the efficient implementation and application of power-sharing in the cases discussed.

Bosnia‐Herzegovina: Slow Progress towards a Functional State

Bosnia-Herzegovina has made great advances in the transformation process since the end of the 1992–1995 war. Much of the infrastructure has been rebuilt, and half of all refugees and displaced persons have returned to their pre-war homes. Political and ethnic violence is scarce and does not threaten to destabilize the country. BosniaHerzegovina has held regular democratic elections since 1996, and governments at the state level and the two entities, the Croat-dominated Federation (FBiH) and the Serb Republic (RS) have changed. Originally weak and ineffective in the years immediately following the war, the state government has become functional, even though it remains weaker than that of other comparable countries. Despite these successes, Bosnia’s transformation has been slow and continues to be riddled with difficulties. In 2004, Gross Domestic Product (GDP) still amounted to only 60 per cent of the pre-war level and unemployment stood at 40 per cent. When the informal sector is factored in, the unemployment rate is lower, yet nonetheless high. Foreign direct investments have been increasing in recent years and reached US

The Serbia-Kosovo Agreements: An EU Success Story?

660 million in 2004. However, confidence in the economy remains low, as evidenced by the fact that by mid-2003 only approximately 30 per cent of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (FBiH) and 7 per cent of the Republika Srpska (RS)’s large strategic companies have been sold (Bosnia and Herzegovina Council of Ministers 2004; Toma[ s car on]

Constrained Democracy: The Consolidation of Democracy in Yugoslav Successor States

The agreements between Serbia and Kosovo—mediated by the EU since 2011—constitute a major step toward the normalization of relations between the two countries following Kosovo’s declaration of independence in 2008. They are also a test case for EU mediation and its ability to utilize the prospect of accession to address protracted conflicts. This article argues that the EU used creative ambiguity, as well direct pressure, in facilitating a number of agreements between Serbia and Kosovo. While this approach has yielded concrete results, it also bears risks, as the process was top-down and, also, left considerable room for divergent and conflicting interpretations of key provisions. This article will trace the negotiations and identify the particular features of the process.

Situational Nationalism: Nation-building in the Balkans, Subversive Institutions and the Montenegrin Paradox

The development of democracy in the successor states of Yugoslavia illustrates the whole range of differences among these states: from Slovenia which is considered most advanced and consolidated, over Croatia which is on its way to become a consolidated democratic state, to Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia which are seen as still very fragile zones for democracy to take roots in. While scholars refer to these latter cases as to failed or unconsolidated democracies, this article argues against the common theoretical framework and calls for the use of different theoretical and methodological tools to measure the (un)success of these states. For this purpose this article discusses the main (internal) features and weaknesses of these democracies and points at a number of external factors and internal objective circumstances, which (unintentionally) hinder the process of democratization.

LESS DIVERSITY - MORE INTEGRATION: INTERETHNIC RELATIONS IN THE CONTEMPORARY BALKANS 1

Abstract The history of Montenegrin nation-building goes against the expectations of many institutionalist theories of nationalism, which generally hold that national institutions increase collective sentiments of national identity. Although during the period of socialist Yugoslavia, Montenegro had an institutional endowment similar to that of other republics—including a constitution, parliament, government, flag, republican borders, and academy of arts and sciences—the proportion of self-identified Montenegrins actually declined from 91% at the start of the socialist period to 44.5% in the most recent census. This occurred despite the fact that Yugoslav elites built up Montenegros national institutions over these decades; it also runs against the expectations of many institutionalist theories of nationalism that predict constant—or even heightened—national consciousness as a groups institutional endowment increases. Municipal-level census data in Montenegro are examined over time to show that neither national institutions nor elite efforts to mobilize upon them succeeded in generating a robust Montenegrin identity. The evidence here provides preliminary support for a theory of ‘situational nationalism’, according to which the fate of national projects depends on the wider identity environment. Despite elite efforts to build nations along certain lines, people choose their identities in the context of an ever-changing field of political and identity conflicts at the international and domestic levels in a fluctuating ‘marketplace of ideas’. It is concluded that identity conflicts in the wider neighborhood place significant constraints on the success of any given nation-building project.

Undermining democratic transition: the case of the 1990 founding elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina

Summary: This article surveys the state of diversity in Southeastern Europe by examining the nature of interethnic relations and diversity, minority rights protection and political participation of minorities. During the past decade, state repression and hostility towards minorities have largely made way to including minorities in government and introducing comprehensive minority rights protection laws. These improvements at the level of policy are often not matched in terms of general interethnic relations. Majority-minority relations remain burdened by the 1990s and Southeastern Europe is considerably more homogenous than it was in 1989. As a consequence, legal and policy changes are often the consequence of international and in particular EU pressure rather than domestic processes.

Conclusion: Rethinking Europeanisation

In retrospect, with nearly 20 years of uneasy peace and three and a half years of war behind us, the outcome of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s first election appears nearly inevitable – the resounding victory of ethnonationalist parties. However, hindsight makes sense of this election that paved the way to war some 17 months later. The victory of three political parties representing each of the three nations of Bosnia and Herzegovina and offering little programmatic detail beyond protecting national interests was not inevitable to voters at the time and neither did this outcome invariably mean war. This special section looks back at these first post-communist multiparty elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina in November/December 1990. These founding elections were crucial as they led to an overwhelming victory for the three ethnonationalist parties – the Party of Democratic Action (Stranka demokratske akcije, SDA), the Croat Democratic Community (Hrvatska demokratska stranka, HDZ) and the Serb Democratic Party (Srpska demokratska stranka, SDS) that were key political actors throughout the war and have remained so ever since. Today, these three are not the only parties claiming to represent the interests of the three constituent people of Bosnia and Herzegovina and in some cases they have been displaced by their competitors. However, the principle of voting along ethnonationalist lines has dominated the country’s politics in all its elections since 1990. There are two ways of looking at these elections. Taken in a larger historical context, including the Yugoslav multiparty elections during the interwar period and the Bosnian Landtag, the assembly within Austria–Hungary in 1910, a majority of voters have repeatedly chosen parties that appealed to one particular national group. In 1910, the four parties were the Serb National Organization, the Muslim National Organization, the Croat National Community and the Croat Catholic Community. During the interwar years, Muslims tended to vote for the Yugoslav Muslim Organisation, Serbs for the National Radical Party and Croats for the Croatian (Republican) Peasants Party (Arnautović 1996, 25–8). Thus, the elections in 1990 could be seen as simply a repetition of these earlier results where Bosnians and Herzegovinians chose ethnonationalist parties. The exceptions to this rule were the