Florian Szücs

An Empirical Assessment of the 2004 EU Merger Policy Reform

Based on a database of 326 merger cases scrutinized by the European Commission between 1990 and 2007, we evaluate the economic impact of the change in European merger legislation in 2004. We ?rst propose a general framework to assess merger policy effectiveness, which is based on standard oligopoly theory and makes use of stockmarket reactions as an external assessment of the merger and the merger control decision. We then focus on four different dimensions of effectiveness: 1) legal certainty; 2) frequency and determinants of type I and type II errors; 3) rent-reversion achieved by different merger policy tools; and 4) deterrence of anti-competitive mergers. To infer the economic impact of the merger policy reform, we compare the results of our four tests before and after its introduction. Our results suggest that the policy reform seems to have been only a modest improvement of European merger policy.

M&A and R&D - Asymmetric Effects on Acquirers and Targets?

We evaluate the impact of M&A activity on the growth of R&D spending and R&D intensity of 265 acquiring firms and 133 merger targets between 1990 and 2009. We use different matching techniques to construct separate control groups for acquirers and targets and use appropriate difference-in-di fference estimation methods to single out the causal e ffect of mergers on R&D growth and intensity. We find that target firms substantially decrease their R&D eff orts after a merger, while the R&D intensity of acquirers drops due to a sharp increase in sales.

Merger Externalities in Oligopolistic Markets

We evaluate the external effects of 183 large mergers at the market level by assessing the impact on the main competitors of the merging firms. Using synthetic control groups and difference in difference estimation, we find that the return on assets of rival firms increases significantly after a merger. The size of the effect varies strongly with market characteristics and the intensity of competition.

The economic impact of the enforcement of competition policies on the functioning of EU energy markets

This study was prepared by ICF Consulting Services in association with DIW Berlin at the request of DG COMP. The objective was to examine whether EU competition policy enforcement has led to stronger competition in European gas and electricity markets and hence to better market outcomes at both the wholesale and retail level. The study includes a descriptive analysis of energy market functioning, an econometric analysis of the impact of competition policy enforcement at the sector level and two case studies using quantitative ex-post evaluation methods.

Does State Antitrust Enforcement Drive Establishment Exit

Previous work has shown that state-level antitrust enforcement activity may have impacts on entry and relocation behavior by U.S. firms. Significant state-level antitrust activity may be an indicator of a perceived adverse business environment and it is found to deter establishment entry, particularly for larger firms in the retail and wholesale sectors. An obvious question is whether establishment exit is affected in a symmetric way, or whether sunk costs of market entry may lead to a smaller impact in terms of the exit decisions. We first combine US Census establishment exit panel data with data for 1998-2006 on US state-level antitrust activity and other measures of state-level business activities that may affect establishment exit. We also consider establishment exit across different broad industry types -- manufacturing, retail and wholesale -- and several firm size categories. Local business cycle factors seem to be the primary driver of exit, though there is some evidence of political and antitrust determinants as well. In another approach, we examine firm-level exit decisions and the extent to which these respond to state antitrust enforcement, with some indication of antitrust enforcement effects here as well, especially in the wholesale and retail sectors.

The Impact of Competition Policy Enforcement on the Functioning of EU Energy Markets

We investigate the impact of competition policy enforcement on the functioning of European energy markets, and how sectoral regulation influences these outcomes. For this purpose, we compile a new dataset on the European Commission’s (EC) and EU member states’ competition policy decisions, and combine it with firm- and sector-level data. We find that EC merger policy has a positive and robust impact on (i) the level of competition; (ii) investment; and (iii) productivity. This impact, however, only shows up in low-regulated sectors. Other competition policy decisions – EC state aid and anti-trust interventions; as well as all individual Member State policy variables – do not have a uniform effect on energy markets’ functioning. Our findings are consistent with the idea that the EC’s merger policy actions have been used to overcome significant obstacles to a well-functioning EU energy sector and may well have shaped the overall development of gas and electricity markets in Europe.

Abuse of Dominance and Antitrust Enforcement in the German Electricity Market

In 2008, the European Commission investigated E.ON, a large and vertically integrated electricity company, for the alleged abuse of a joint dominant position by strategically withholding generation capacity. The case was settled after E.ON agreed to divest 5,000 MW generation capacity as well as its extra-high voltage network. We analyze the effect of these divestitures on German wholesale electricity prices. Our identification strategy is based on the observation that energy suppliers have more market power during peak periods when demand is high. Therefore, a decrease in market power should lead to convergence between peak and off-peak prices. Using daily electricity prices for the 2006-2012 period and controlling for cost and demand drivers, we find economically and statistically significant convergence effects after the implementation of the Commission’s decision. Furthermore, the price reductions appear to be mostly due to the divestiture of gas and coal plants, which is consistent with merit-order considerations. Placebo regressions support a causal interpretation of our results.

The Triggers and Clustering Properties of Merger Waves

We study the degree of agglomeration of acquisition activity within clusters of temporal, geographic and industrial proximity based on almost 600,000 individual transactions. The findings indicate that significant clustering occurs in time and across industries, while the results on geographic clustering are mixed. This supports the view that merger waves are mostly driven by neoclassical motives.This paper studies the triggers and the agglomeration of M&A activity within clusters constituted by time, market and industry. Based on almost 500,000 individual transactions, we find that industry factors play a significant role in triggering activity and that M&A agglomerates strongly across related industries. While clustering in time turns out to be insignificant, stock-market effects can be either an attracting or a repelling force, depending on the type of deal examined. This supports the view that merger waves are largely driven by industry shocks.