Francesca De Petrillo

Delay Choice Versus Delay Maintenance: Different Measures of Delayed Gratification in Capuchin Monkeys (Cebus apella)

Delaying gratification involves 2 components: (1) delay choice (selecting a delayed reward over an immediate one) and (2) delay maintenance (sustaining the decision to delay gratification even if the immediate reward is available during the delay). Two tasks most commonly have explored these components in primates: the intertemporal choice task and the accumulation task. It is unclear whether these tasks provide equivalent measures of delay of gratification. Here, we compared the performance on the intertemporal choice task and the accumulation task of capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella) belonging to 2 study populations. We found only limited evidence of a significant correlation in performance. Consequently, in contrast to what is often assumed, our data provide only partial support for the hypothesis that these tasks provide equivalent measures of delay of gratification.

Nonhuman gamblers: lessons from rodents, primates, and robots

The search for neuronal and psychological underpinnings of pathological gambling in humans would benefit from investigating related phenomena also outside of our species. In this paper, we present a survey of studies in three widely different populations of agents, namely rodents, non-human primates, and robots. Each of these populations offers valuable and complementary insights on the topic, as the literature demonstrates. In addition, we highlight the deep and complex connections between relevant results across these different areas of research (i.e., cognitive and computational neuroscience, neuroethology, cognitive primatology, neuropsychiatry, evolutionary robotics), to make the case for a greater degree of methodological integration in future studies on pathological gambling.

Do tufted capuchin monkeys play the odds? Flexible risk preferences in Sapajus spp.

As humans, several non-human animal species avoid risk, defined as “variability in rate of gain”. However, non-human primate studies revealed a more complicated picture, with different species ranging from risk aversion to risk proneness. Within an ecological rationality framework, a species’ feeding ecology should influence its risk preferences, as it has been shown in bonobos and chimpanzees. Although the feeding ecology hypothesis is promising, it has not been yet verified in species other than apes. Here, we aimed to assess whether this hypothesis holds true in tufted capuchin monkeys (Sapajus spp.). Ten capuchins were presented with choices between a “safe” option and a “risky” option in three conditions differing for the probability of receiving the larger reward when selecting the risky option. Similarly to chimpanzees, capuchins were risk prone. However, capuchins’ behaviour was not the result of a bias towards the choice of the risky option, since—when facing options with different probabilities of obtaining the larger outcome—they were able to flexibly modify their preferences. Capuchins’ decision-making under risk mirrors their risk-prone behaviour in the wild, where they often rely on unpredictable and/or hazardous food sources, thus satisfying the feeding ecology hypothesis.

When is it worth waiting for? Food quantity, but not food quality, affects delay tolerance in tufted capuchin monkeys

Abstract When faced with choices between smaller sooner options and larger later options (i.e. intertemporal choices), both humans and non-human animals discount future rewards. Apparently, only humans consistently show the magnitude effect, according to which larger options are discounted over time at a lower rate than smaller options. Most of the studies carried out in non-human animals led instead to negative results. Here, we tested ten tufted capuchin monkeys (Sapajus spp.) in a delay choice task to evaluate whether they show a magnitude effect when choosing between different quantities of the same food or when the options are represented by high- and low-preferred foods in different conditions. Whereas food quality did not play a role, we provided the first evidence of an effect of the reward amount on temporal preferences in a non-human primate species, a result with potential implications for the validity of comparative studies on the evolution of delay tolerance. In contrast with human results, but as shown in other animal species, capuchins’ choice of the larger later option decreased as the amount of the smaller sooner option increased. Capuchins based their temporal preferences on the quantity of the smaller sooner option, rather than on that of the larger later option, probably because in the wild they virtually never have to choose between the above two options at the same time, but they more often encounter them consecutively. Thus, paying attention to the sooner option and deciding on the basis of its features may be an adaptive strategy rather than an irrational response.

Self-control depletion in tufted capuchin monkeys (Sapajus spp.): does delay of gratification rely on a limited resource?

Self-control failure has enormous personal and societal consequences. One of the most debated models explaining why self-control breaks down is the Strength Model, according to which self-control depends on a limited resource. Either previous acts of self-control or taking part in highly demanding cognitive tasks have been shown to reduce self-control, possibly due to a reduction in blood glucose levels. However, several studies yielded negative findings, and recent meta-analyses questioned the robustness of the depletion effect in humans. We investigated, for the first time, whether the Strength Model applies to a non-human primate species, the tufted capuchin monkey. We tested five capuchins in a self-control task (the Accumulation task) in which food items were accumulated within individual’s reach for as long as the subject refrained from taking them. We evaluated whether capuchins’ performance decreases: (i) when tested before receiving their daily meal rather than after consuming it (Energy Depletion Experiment), and (ii) after being tested in two tasks with different levels of cognitive complexity (Cognitive Depletion Experiment). We also tested, in both experiments, how implementing self-control in each trial of the Accumulation task affected this capacity within each session and/or across consecutive sessions. Repeated acts of self-control in each trial of the Accumulation task progressively reduced this capacity within each session, as predicted by the Strength Model. However, neither experiencing a reduction in energy level nor taking part in a highly demanding cognitive task decreased performance in the subsequent Accumulation task. Thus, whereas capuchins seem to be vulnerable to within-session depletion effects, to other extents our findings are in line with the growing body of studies that failed to find a depletion effect in humans. Methodological issues potentially affecting the lack of depletion effects in capuchins are discussed.