Francesca Ervas

Argumentation as a Bridge Between Metaphor and Reasoning

The aim of this chapter is to explore the relationship between metaphor and reasoning, by claiming that argumentation might act as a bridge between metaphor and reasoning. Firstly, the chapter introduces metaphor as a framing strategy through which some relevant properties of a (generally more concrete and known) source domain are selected to understand a (generally less concrete and known) target domain. The mapping of properties from the source to the target domain implicitly forces the interpreter to consider the target from a specific perspective. Secondly, the chapter presents metaphor as an implicit argument where some inferences can be drawn from the comparison between the source and the target domain. In particular, this chapter aims to understand whether and to what extent such an argument might be linked to analogical reasoning. The chapter argues that, in case of faulty analogy, this kind of argument might have the form of a quaternio terminorum, where metaphor is the middle term. Finally, the chapter presents the results of an experimental study, aiming to test the effect of the linguistic nature of the middle term on the detection of such faulty analogy. The chapter concludes that a wider context is needed to make sense of an analogical argument with novel metaphors, whilst in a narrow context, a lexicalised metaphor might be extended and the overall argument might be interpreted as metaphoric.

Review of Multimodal Argumentation and Rhetoric in Media Genres, edited by Assimakis Tseronis and Charles Forceville (2017). Amsterdam: John Benjamins. 301 pp.

The papers collected in the reviewed volume question the hegemony of the verbal in argumentation theory, focusing on different modes of arguing, ranging from the audio and visual to the gestural, across a variety of media genres. The volume aims at presenting the ways in which the different modes structure argumentation and coherently interact in multimodal text.

Creative Argumentation: When and Why People Commit the Metaphoric Fallacy

This article aims to understand when and why people accept fallacious arguments featuring metaphors (metaphoric fallacy) as sound arguments. Two experiments were designed to investigate, respectively, when and why participants fell into the metaphoric fallacy. In the first experiment, participants were provided with a series of syllogisms, presented in natural language, containing in their first premise either a lexically ambiguous, literal middle term or a metaphorical middle term, i.e. the term that “bridges” the first premise with the second premise, and ending with a true, false or plausible conclusion. For each argument they were asked to evaluate whether the conclusion followed from the premises. Results show that the metaphoric fallacy is harder to detect in case of arguments with plausible conclusion with a conventional metaphor rather than a novel metaphor as middle term. The second experiment investigated why participants considered the metaphoric fallacy with plausible conclusion as a strong argument. Results suggest that participants’ belief in the conclusion of the argument, independent from the premises, is a predictor for committing the metaphoric fallacy. We argue that a creative search for alternative reasons justifies participants’ falling into the metaphoric fallacy, especially when the framing effect of a metaphor covertly influences the overall reading of the argument. Thus, far from being a source of irrationality, metaphors might elicit a different style of reasoning in argumentation, forcing participants to find an alternative interpretation of the premises that guarantees the believed conclusion. In this process, conventional metaphors are revitalized and extended through the second premise to the conclusion, thereby entailing an overall metaphorical reading of the argument.

Emotions as Intrinsic Cognitive Load: An Eye Movement Analysis of High and Low Intelligent Individuals

Cognitive load is the measure of cognitive effort imposed by a task demand. Emotion is considered to be an extraneous variable to influence the overall cognitive load. In this study we try to embed the positive and negative emotions in the cognitive task itself to make it a part of intrinsic load. We assumed that the embedded emotional valence will interfere with the parallel cognitive processing and influence the cognitive load of individuals with high and low intelligence. Our eye movement and blink rate results suggest that negative emotion significantly increases the cognitive load of individuals with lesser intelligence but not of individuals with higher intelligence.

Argomenti metaforici: come integrare persuasione e argomentazione / Metaphor in Arguments: How to Integrate Persuasion and Argumetation

The persuasive power of metaphor is often seen in opposition to rational procedures in argumentation, which should guarantee deliberative democracy in the public sphere. Against this view, referable to the classic theory of argumentation, we adopt the argumentative theory of reasoning (MERCIER, SPERBER 2011) and present the results of an experimental study on the role of metaphors in a specific argumentative fallacy, the quaternio terminorum (ERVAS, LEDDA 2014; ERVAS, GOLA, LEDDA, SERGIOLI 2015). In light of the experimental evidence, we argue that (1) it is no longer possible to evaluate the role of metaphors in argumentation without distinguishing different kinds of metaphors (in the experimental study the distinction between dead and live metaphors is analysed); (2) it is possible to identify different argumentative styles (i.e. argumentative persuasion and reflective argumentation). Connecting different kinds of metaphors with different argumentative styles, we propose an interpretative framework able to integrate persuasion and argumentation.

Come affinare le armi della seduzione: emozioni e vigilanza epistemica / How to Sharpen the Seduction Weapons: Emotions and Epistemic Vigilance

Seduction is often seen as a deceptive strategic game, which hampers deliberation. However, in case of seduction, emotions play a central role in modulating communicated contents. In this sense, seduction is not a form of deception, but an impulse to know. How to provide a cognitive account of seduction able to distinguish it from deception? Within philosophical Western tradition, emotions have a negative role in deliberation as they are automatic, unconscious and obliged. In contrast with this tradition, Mascaro and Sperber have recently argued that the capacity for epistemic vigilance enables people to filter misinformation, based not only on epistemic but also on affective knowledge. Some of the cognitive mechanisms presupposed by epistemic vigilance are targeted at the source of information, others at its content. Within the framework of the argumentative theory of reasoning, we propose a cognitive account of seduction able to distinguish it from deception, by focusing on the affective component of epistemic vigilance. We argue that in seduction emotions, far from being totally automatic, unconscious and obliged, contribute to the appreciation of both the source and content of information. Diversely from deception, seduction presupposes a positive role of emotions which induces a creative style of argumentation.

Arguing by metaphors

Recent work in rhetorical citizenship by Christian Kock and Lisa Villadsen combines the theories of political argumentation and deliberation with rhetorical agency. A theory of rhetorical citizenship where deliberation in the context of political argumentation plays a crucial role makes use of rhetorical theory in both an epistemic and evaluative capacity. However, as much as deliberation is about weighing two sides of an issue, or two issues side by side, the metaphor of weight is not listed as a rhetorical concept in rhetorical canon. This essay explores a common sense scientific understanding of weight to explicate the senses in which we use the term “weight” metaphorically.