Francesca Minerva

After-birth abortion: why should the baby live?

Abortion is largely accepted even for reasons that do not have anything to do with the fetus health. By showing that (1) both fetuses and newborns do not have the same moral status as actual persons, (2) the fact that both are potential persons is morally irrelevant and (3) adoption is not always in the best interest of actual people, the authors argue that what we call ‘after-birth abortion’ (killing a newborn) should be permissible in all the cases where abortion is, including cases where the newborn is not disabled.

Conscientious objection in Italy

The law regulating abortion in Italy gives healthcare practitioners the option to make a conscientious objection to activities that are specific and necessary to an abortive intervention. Conscientious objectors among Italian gynaecologists amount to about 70%. This means that only a few doctors are available to perform abortions, and therefore access to abortion is subject to constraints. In 2012 the International Planned Parenthood Federation European Network (IPPF EN) lodged a complaint against Italy to the European Committee of Social Rights, claiming that the inadequate protection of the right to access abortion implies a violation of the right to health. In this paper I will discuss the Italian situation with respect to conscientious objection to abortion and I will suggest possible solutions to the problem.

Cosmetic surgery and conscientious objection

In this paper, I analyse the issue of conscientious objection in relation to cosmetic surgery. I consider cases of doctors who might refuse to perform a cosmetic treatment because: (1) the treatment aims at achieving a goal which is not in the traditional scope of cosmetic surgery; (2) the motivation of the patient to undergo the surgery is considered trivial; (3) the patient wants to use the surgery to promote moral or political values that conflict with the doctors ones; (4) the patient requires an intervention that would benefit himself/herself, but could damage society at large.

Clarifications on the moral status of newborns and the normative implications

In this paper we clarify some issues related to our previous article ‘After-birth abortion: why should the baby live?’.

New threats to academic freedom.

Using a specific case as an example, the article argues that the Internet allows dissemination of academic ideas to the general public in ways that can sometimes pose a threat to academic freedom. Since academic freedom is a fundamental element of academia and since it benefits society at large, it is important to safeguard it. Among measures that can be taken in order to achieve this goal, the publication of anonymous research seems to be a good option.

Reasons and freedom.

One of three commentaries on -Scholarly Discussion of Infanticide?” by Mirko D. Garasic, and “Reflections from a Troubled Stream: Giubilini and Minerva on ‘After-Birth Abortion,’” by Michael Hauskeller, from the July-August 2012 issue.

Why Publishing Pseudonymously Can Protect Academic Freedom

In ‘New Threats to Academic Freedom’ I suggested that new media may represent a threat to academic freedom. In particular, I argued that academic freedom may be limited ab ovo if people fear that they will have to go through media storms when publishing papers that might be perceived as controversial. But if only uncontroversial ideas or questions were discussed, would we ever stimulate progress? Of course, academics are not the only ones who should be allowed and indeed encouraged to think freely. I do not think academics have ‘special epistemic powers’ (see Dawson’s response to my article). However, I was interested in academic freedom because not only do academics share (with every member of society) the right to freely think, but they also have a duty to communicate the results of their research. Bioethics invited four philosophers to comment on my proposal and I am grateful that they considered such a proposal worth discussing. I found their observations, comments and criticisms on my article very engaging and I am delighted that the article prompted such a fascinating discussion. Michael Tooley shares my concerns about the new media being a threat to academic freedom and he agrees that we should do something to prevent this from happening. His proposal for solving the problem is extremely interesting. In my article I used ‘anonymous’ and ‘pseudonymous’ publications almost interchangeably. However, Tooley correctly points out that a system that allows one to publish under a pseudonym offers distinct advantages over publishing anonymously. In particular, I would welcome a website of the kind Tooley proposes: one that allows academic journals to publish papers they would otherwise hesitate to publish. I hope that someone does in fact develop such a website. There is only one point on which I do not fully agree with Tooley, and this is where he suggests that the real identity of the author should be withheld even from the editor. I think it might be better to make sure that the editor always knows the identity of the author, but these are details that can be discussed once the system is in place and we have a better idea of how to improve it. Baker’s paper is focussed on an episode that occurred in 1894 and which brought about the decision to ban pseudonymous publications from the Journal of the American Medical Association (JAMA). The JAMA controversy was apparently due to misbehaviour by the editor, who allowed the publication of pseudonymous letters (some of which were written by himself). However, these letters were not peer-reviewed, and I think this is an essential difference between the JAMA case and the solution I propose. Peer review may not be a perfect system, but it is the best system we have for maintaining the standard of academic publishing. I doubt that papers containing (for example) anti-Semitic, anti-Muslim or homophobic statements would pass standard peer-review scrutiny in a respectable academic journal. If anything, the JAMA case seems to support an argument in favour of limited powers for editors rather than an argument against pseudonymous publication of peer-reviewed research. Baker also raises an excellent point about conflicts of interest. I agree that possible conflicts of interests are an issue we should take into account, not just with respect to anonymous or pseudonymous publications, but for all academic publications. I think that instead of relying on ‘watchdog scholars’ who occasionally and by accident spot these conflicts, someone should be paid to perform this task. These professional ‘watchdogs’ could then be permitted access to the website proposed by Tooley, 1 F. Minerva. New Threats to Academic Freedom, Bioethics, doi:10.1111/bioe.12066. 2 A. Dawson. Academic freedom and the professional responsibility of applied ethicists: a comment on Minerva. Bioethics; 28: 174–177. 3 M. Tooley. Solutions to the New Threats to Academic Freedom? Bioethics; 28: 163–165. 4 R. Baker. Against Anonymity. Bioethics; 28: 166–169.