Francesco Castiglia

Risk assessment of component failure modes and human errors using a new FMECA approach: application in the safety analysis of HDR brachytherapy

Failure mode, effects and criticality analysis (FMECA) is a safety technique extensively used in many different industrial fields to identify and prevent potential failures. In the application of traditional FMECA, the risk priority number (RPN) is determined to rank the failure modes; however, the method has been criticised for having several weaknesses. Moreover, it is unable to adequately deal with human errors or negligence. In this paper, a new versatile fuzzy rule-based assessment model is proposed to evaluate the RPN index to rank both component failure and human error. The proposed methodology is applied to potential radiological over-exposure of patients during high-dose-rate brachytherapy treatments. The critical analysis of the results can provide recommendations and suggestions regarding safety provisions for the equipment and procedures required to reduce the occurrence of accidental events.

γ-radiation effects on a polycarbonate

Abstract The γ-radiation effects on a commercial poly-carbonate have been observed through rheological measurements, performed both on solutions and on the bulk polymer, and through dynamic-mechanical tests. All the data show that while at small doses a crosslinking effect predominates at higher doses the main chain scission is more effective.

Fuzzy modelling of HEART methodology: application in safety analyses of accidental exposure in irradiation plants

This study refers to the results obtained by Fuzzy Fault Tree analyses of accidental scenarios that entail the potential exposure of operators working in irradiation industrial plants. For these analyses, the HEART methodology, a first generation of the Human Reliability Analysis method, has been employed to evaluate the probability of human erroneous actions. This technique has been modified on the basis of a fuzzy set concept to more directly take into account the uncertainties of the so-called error-promoting factors, on which the method is grounded. The results also allow us to provide some recommendations on procedures and safety equipment to reduce the risk of radiological exposure.

Risk analysis using fuzzy set theory of the accidental exposure of medical staff during brachytherapy procedures

Using fuzzy set theory, this paper presents results from risk analyses that explore potential exposure of medical operators working in a high dose rate brachytherapy irradiation plant. In these analyses, the HEART methodology, a first generation method for human reliability analysis, has been employed to evaluate the probability of human error. This technique has been modified on the basis of fuzzy set concepts to take into account, more directly, the uncertainties of the so-called error-promoting factors on which the method is based. Moreover, with regard to some identified accident scenarios, fuzzy potential dose was also evaluated to estimate the relevant risk. The results also provide some recommendations for procedures and safety equipment to reduce the occurrence of radiological exposure accidents.

Decay Heat Removal and Transient Analysis in Accidental Conditions in the EFIT Reactor

The development of a conceptual design of an industrial-scale transmutation facility (EFIT) of several 100 MW thermal power based on accelerator-driven system (ADS) is addressed in the frame of the European EUROTRANS Integral Project. In normal operation, the core power of EFIT reactor is removed through steam generators by four secondary loops fed by water. A safety-related decay heat removal (DHR) system provided with four independent inherently safe loops is installed in the primary vessel to remove the decay heat by natural convection circulation under accidental conditions which are caused by a loss-of-heat sink (LOHS). In order to confirm the adequacy of the adopted solution for decay heat removal in accidental conditions, some multi-D analyses have been carried out with the SIMMER-III code. The results of the SIMMER-III code have been then used to support the RELAP5 1D representation of the natural circulation flow paths in the reactor vessel. Finally, the thermal-hydraulic RELAP5 code has been employed for the analysis of LOHS accidental scenarios.

Fuzzy risk analysis of a modern γ-ray industrial irradiator.

Fuzzy fault tree analyses were used to investigate accident scenarios that involve radiological exposure to operators working in industrial &ggr;-ray irradiation facilities. The HEART method, a first generation human reliability analysis method, was used to evaluate the probability of adverse human error in these analyses. This technique was modified on the basis of fuzzy set theory to more directly take into account the uncertainties in the error-promoting factors on which the methodology is based. Moreover, with regard to some identified accident scenarios, fuzzy radiological exposure risk, expressed in terms of potential annual death, was evaluated. The calculated fuzzy risks for the examined plant were determined to be well below the reference risk suggested by International Commission on Radiological Protection.

TREEZZY2, a Fuzzy Logic Computer Code for Fault Tree and Event Tree Analyses

In conventional approach to reliability analysis using logical trees methodologies, uncertainties in system components or basic events failure probabilities are approached by assuming probability distribution functions. However, data are often insufficient for statistical estimation, and therefore it is required to resort to approximate estimations. Moreover, complicate calculations are needed to propagate uncertainties up to the final results. In our work, in order to take account of the uncertainties in system failure probabilities, the methodology based on fuzzy sets theory is used both in fault tree and event tree analyses. This paper just presents our work in this issue, which resulted in a computer program named TREEZZY (TREE fuZZY).

RELAP5-3D thermal hydraulic analysis of the target cooling system in the SPES experimental facility

The SPES (Selective Production of Exotic Species) experimental facility, under construction at the Italian National Institute of Nuclear Physics (INFN) Laboratories of Legnaro, Italy, is a second generation Isotope Separation On Line (ISOL) plant for advanced nuclear physic studies. The UCx target-ion source system works at temperature of about 2273 K, producing a high level of radiation (105 Sv/h), for this reason a careful risk analysis for the target chamber is among the major safety issues. In this paper, the obtained results of thermofluid-dynamics simulations of accidental transients in the SPES target cooling system are reported. The analysis, performed by using the RELAP5-3D 2.4.2 qualified thermal-hydraulic system code, proves good safety performance of this system during different accidental conditions.

Analysis of Protected Accidental Transients in the EFIT Reactor With the RELAP5 Thermal-Hydraulic Code

The European Facility for Industrial Transmutation (EFIT) is aimed at demonstrating the feasibility of transmutation process through the Accelerator Driven System (ADS) route on an industrial scale. The conceptual design of this reactor of about 400 MW thermal power is under development in the frame of the European EUROTRANS Integrated Project of the EURATOM Sixth Framework Program (FP6). EFIT is a pool-type reactor cooled by forced circulation of lead in the primary system where the heat is removed by steam generators installed inside the reactor vessel. The reactor power is sustained by a spallation neutron source supplied by a proton beam impinging on a lead target at the core centre. A safety-related Decay Heat Removal (DHR) system provided with four independent inherently safe loops is installed in the primary vessel to remove the decay heat in case of loss of secondary circuits heat removal capability. A quite detailed model of the EFIT reactor has been developed for the RELAP5 thermal-hydraulic code to be used in preliminary accidental transient analyses aimed at verifying the validity of the adopted solutions for the current reactor design with respect to the safety requirements, and confirm the inherent safety behavior of the reactor, such as decay heat removal in accidental conditions relying on natural circulation in the primary system. The accident analyses for the EFIT reactor include both protected and unprotected transients, on whether the reactor automatic trip, consisting in proton beam switch off, is actuated or not by the protection system. In this paper, the main results of the analyses of some protected transients with RELAP5 are presented. The analyzed transients concern the Protected Loss of Heat Sink (PLOHS), in which the DHR system plays a key role in bringing the reactor in safe conditions, and the Protected Loss of Flow (PLOF) transients with partial or total loss of forced circulation in the primary system.Copyright

Safety analysis in the LBE-Cooled XADS plant through an integrated use of HAZOP, FAULT TREE and thermalhydraulic transient analyses

A detailed description of possible accidental scenarios, with their frequency of occurrence and their consequences, taking into account both internal and external causes that might contribute to them, can be attained by using the most important risk analysis methodologies (HAZard and OPerability studies, HAZOP; Event Tree, ET; Fault Tree, FT; etc.). As it is known, the Fault Tree methodology is aimed at the evaluation of the frequency of an undesired accidental event (Top Event, TE), and is used to describe this one as a combination of primary events identified, for example, by a HAZOP analysis [1]. However, the classic HAZOP analysis, while allowing to perform an exhaustive study of the examined plant process, generally doesn’t permit to reconstruct the sequences that might bring the plant to the identified accidental events [2].