Francesco Passarelli

Emotions and Political Unrest

How does political unrest influence public policy? We assume that protests are an emotional reaction to unfair treatment. Individuals have a consistent view of fairness that internalizes government constraints. Individuals accept lower welfare if the government is more constrained. This resignation effect induces a benevolent government to delay unpleasant choices and accumulate public debt to mitigate social unrest. More radical and homogeneous groups are more prone to unrest and hence more influential. Even if the government is benevolent and all groups are identical in their propensity to riot, equilibrium policy can be distorted. The evidence is consistent with these implications.

Preferences, the Agenda Setter, and the Distribution of Power in the EU

In this paper, we present a generalization of power indices which includes the preferences of the voters. Using a Multilinear Extension perspective (Owen in Manage Sci 18:p64–p72, 1972a) we measure the probability of the players’ voting “yes” for a particular political issue. Further, we randomize the issues and show the influence that the Agenda Setter can have on a player’s power. We demonstrate these results using data from the European Union to show how the power distribution may shift after enlargement and under the new Constitutional Treaty.

Financial Systemic Risk: Taxation or Regulation?

This paper describes financial systemic risk as a pollution issue. Free riding leads to excess risk production. This problem may be solved, at least partially, either by financial regulation or by taxation. From a normative viewpoint, taxation is superior in many respects. However, reality shows that financial regulation is adopted more frequently. This paper makes a positive, politico-economic argument. If the majority chooses regulation, the level is likely to be too harsh. If it chooses taxation, then the level is likely to be too low. Due to regressive effects, a tax on financial transactions receives low support from a majority of low polluting portfolio owners. The same kind of majority may strategically choose regulation in order to burden the minority with a larger share of the cost of reducing systemic risk.

Risk Aversion, Overconfidence and Private Information as Determinants of Majority Thresholds

We present and experimentally test a theoretical model of majority threshold determination as a function of voters’ risk preferences. The experimental results confirm the theoretical prediction of a positive correlation between the voters risk aversion and the corresponding preferred majority threshold. Furthermore, the experimental results show that a voters preferred majority threshold negatively relates to the voters confidence about how others will vote. Moreover, in a treatment in which individuals receive a private signal about others’ voting behaviour, the confidence-related motivation of behaviour loses ground to the signals strength.

Promises, Expectations & Causation

Why do people keep their promises? Vanberg (2008) and Ederer & Stremitzer (2017) provide causal evidence in favor of, respectively, an intrinsic preference for keeping one’s word and Charness & Dufwenberg’s (2006) expectations-based account based on guilt aversion. The overall picture is incomplete though, as no study disentangles effects in a design that provides exogenous variation of both (the key features of) promises and beliefs. We present an experimental design that does so.

The Fiscal Governance Disorder of the Eurozone: Curing the Symptoms or Curing the Causes?

Three years after the worst economic crisis since the Great Depression, economic growth has resurfaced across the world, but with significant variation. This timely book illustrates that although mature economies (the EU in particular) are still confronting sluggish economic performance, emerging markets seem to have fully recovered. It explores the reform of global economic governance after the crisis and, in this context, addresses the role of the EU and its economic prospects for the coming decade.

EU Fiscal Policy in the Age of Turbulence: Will the Lisbon Strategy Survive It?

During the current economic crisis recurring questions on the validity of the liberal economic system have resurfaced concerning the role of the state and the free market, the proactive use of fiscal policies, economic nationalism, and environmental sustainability. However, due to the depth and scope of the crisis new emphasis is being placed on these issues. This book attaches great importance to the specific consequences for the European Union by addressing critical themes surrounding its role in the new era of global economic governance. These include the coherence of common monetary policy with national fiscal policies, new financial regulation and supervision, and the future sustainability of national rescue plans and their compatibility with ambitious targets, such as those addressing climate change.