Francis E. Hyde
University of Liverpool
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Economica | 1951
Francis E. Hyde; Bradbury B. Parkinson; Sheila Marriner
The commercial -and financial crisis of 1793 is a most interesting, though small, part of the cyclical pattern which steadily recurs, first in the British economy and then with widening regularity throughout the world, from the end of the war of American Independence to the present century.2 The year I793 was undoubtedly a turning point in this cyclical pattern; it was a trough year, and in the evidence supplied by A. F. Burns and W. C. Mitchell it is marked as such between the peak years of I792 and 1796. It is in the scale of the decline, in the isolation of particular factors and in the nature of the recovery that interest attaches to this crisis. Mercantile communities in various parts of the country suffered disproportionately; some recovered more quickly than others. In no great trading centre were the losses more severe than in Liverpool ; in no place were such energetic measures adopted to achieve a rapid recovery. An analysis of crisis conditions in Liverpool, the major exporting port for the Midlands and the North Country, can, it is hoped, provide much useful information for the economist and for the economic historian, and throw into relief some of the local factors tending to aggravate fluctuations in the history of the trade cycle. Contemporary opinions on the causes of the crisis adduced a varying range of phenomena. The Report of the House
Archive | 1975
Francis E. Hyde
The British and North American Royal Mail Steam Packet Co., having survived the first threat of serious competition and having widened the scope of its operations through its associated company by opening up trade with the Mediterranean, now turned to the problem of increasing returns from the North Atlantic trade. It was a fact well understood by most Liverpool shipowners that the evolution of the steamship could not have taken place without the increase in demand for cargo and passenger accommodation. It was a prime reason why, in 1860, the Cunard partners decided to enter the steerage business. By that date it had become obvious that the profits accruing from the Government Contract to carry mail and that from high-class cabin traffic and freight, could not sustain expansion; that in fact, despite the hazards of competition, a more lucrative form of enterprise would henceforth lie in the carriage of emigrant traffic across the Atlantic.
Business History Review | 1963
Francis E. Hyde
A distinguished British scholar and one of the Reviews International Correspondents raises interesting questions concerning the writing of business and economic history.
Archive | 1975
Francis E. Hyde
We must now return to the early 1880s. John Burns had become Chairman of the recently incorporated Company and the keynote of new activity was sounded by him in his speech at the Ordinary General Meeting on 27 April 1881. ‘The steam navigation of this country’, he declared, ‘like almost every branch of industry, is carried on under circumstances of keen competition and, for any company to succeed, it must be possessed of the best boats with which to do its work efficiently … coupled with which there has to be the strictest observance of economy in details.’1 Against the background of such an objective it was proposed to apply the Company’s reserves to the building of large powerful ships while at the same time reducing liabilities and working costs. By such a policy it was hoped that more than adequate facilities would be provided for meeting likely changes in the pattern of trade. In retrospect this was a bold decision, designed as it was to offset prospective loss and increase competitive strength in those branches of the trade likely to be subjected to fluctuating conditions.
Archive | 1975
Francis E. Hyde
The successful operation of The British and North American Royal Mail Steam Packet Company during the first forty years of its history was governed by a diverse range of economic, financial and political influences. These influences, in turn, helped in shaping policies relating to the building of new ships, in maintaining mail contracts and services; in entering new trades and in ordering the conduct of business within the framework of a strict code of discipline. The continuous endeavours of the managing partners to meet and overcome successive problems arising from the expansion of steamship services, created lines of policy which, in course of time, came to be regarded as traditional in the conduct of the Company’s affairs. What service was achieved in the first formative years has to be set against a background of both opposition and of the growing technical competence of other steamship companies. Even with government backing (or, perhaps, despite such backing) Cunard could not afford to be complacent. In commercial matters there is much evidence for the belief that the managers were equal in all respects to their rivals; but in technological development they were inhibited by varying degrees of conservatism and by the need to conform to official directive.
Archive | 1975
Francis E. Hyde
The nature of the trans-Atlantic passenger trade was such that it became extremely difficult to regulate unrestricted competition. This was because conditions affecting the levels of traffic were subject to rapid and unexpected fluctuations, so that when agreement between competing lines had been negotiated, the regulation imposed quickly became out of date. The result was that Conferences proved to be fragile instruments and were generally unsuitable except for short periods when it was absolutely necessary to mitigate the effects of intense rate wars.
Archive | 1975
Francis E. Hyde
The events between 1925 and 1934, leading ultimately to the merger of The Cunard Steam Ship Co. Ltd and White Star Line (Oceanic Steam Navigation Co. Ltd), are extremely complicated and difficult to follow. This arises from the fact that there were three areas of controversy each impinging on the other, involving at times separate and at other times joint, matters for negotiation. Firstly there was the growing involvement of the White Star Line with the mounting financial difficulties of the Royal Mail group of which this company had become a part, difficulties which were undoubtedly aggravated by the adverse trading conditions at the beginning of the 1930s. Secondly, there was the promotion of policy by The Cunard Steam Ship Co. to inaugurate a weekly two-ship express service acrosss the Atlantic, a policy which could be implemented only by putting into service ships of great size and power. Finally there was, at a somewhat later stage in the proceedings, participation of government departments and the provision of government finance as instruments in the salvation of White Star and in the building of the new large Cunarders.
Archive | 1975
Francis E. Hyde
Samuel Cunard, founder of the British and North American Royal Mail Steam Packet Co., (subsequently known as The Cunard Steam Ship Co. Ltd) was born in Halifax, Nova Scotia, on 21 November 1787. As this book is concerned primarily with the business activities of the Company in various stages of development, it is not proposed to enter into an examination of the genealogical controversy surrounding the origins of the Cunard family1 It is sufficient to know, as a starting point for this history, that Samuel was the son of Abraham Cunard who, after the War of American Independence, had emigrated to Halifax where he had established himself in his trade as a master carpenter. In this capacity, Abraham had found employment in the dockyard at Halifax and from this relatively humble beginning had laid the foundation of a prosperous business and the background to future enterprise.
Archive | 1975
Francis E. Hyde
In purely historical terms this volume should end with the death of Sir Percy Bates in 1946. There was obviously a line of division between his administration of the Company’s affairs and that pursued by his successors. There was also the need to make the Company an efficient instrument in the rapidly changing environment of a post-war world; for Cunard, as never before, had to re-establish normal peacetime operations under abnormal conditions and subject to influences beyond traditional forms of control. History, however, cannot be put into a chronological strait jacket. Even at the peak of Cunard’s achievements during the war, the processes of change were such that the future course of the Company’s history was in one sense a matter of predetermination. In the last twenty years of the Company’s history as a parent firm, the relative decline in economic strength was beset by uncontrollable external pressures and overshadowed by the struggle to make passenger ships profitable in operation. For the first time in its history the Company was in a position of having to fight a losing battle in an endeavour to meet and overcome forces alien to the good management of shipping and its widespread interests. It is not easy to obtain a perspective of these events, partly because the magnitude of source material does not lend itself easily to concise terms of analysis and partly because the nearness of events involves personalities. It is
Archive | 1975
Francis E. Hyde
From 1935 the status of The Cunard Steam Ship Co. was mainly that of a holding company. It continued the operation and control of the Liverpool—Havre cargo trade as well as that between the United Kingdom and the Mediterranean. Sources of information about the Cunard organisation as a whole, therefore, henceforth become twofold, the annual reports being concerned first with the working of The Cunard Steam Ship Co. Ltd and secondly with that of Cunard White Star Ltd. As a consequence two sets of accounts were presented annually to the shareholders. One can thus distinguish between the fortunes of the Mediterranean services and the difficulty of maintaining profitable traffic across the North Atlantic. This dichotomy is given greater significance when one attempts to compare working capacities in the years of peace from 1935 to 1939 with those during the years of war from 5939 to 1945.