Francis Schrag

In Defense of Positivist Research Paradigms

Although positivism means different things to different people, it is not difficult to identify research paradigms that would be clearly identified as positivist by friends and foes of positivism alike. I briefly describe one such paradigm and identify its principal features. I argue that even outspoken critics of positivist research–such as Elliot Eisner, Frederick Erickson, Henry Giroux, and Thomas Popkewitz–are logically committed to propositions that can be tested only by means of positivist research paradigms.

Justice and the family

Using Rawlss theory as illustration, I argue that any conception of justice which includes a commitment to equality of opportunity eventually must collide with a commitment to the family. I then contend that the link between justice and equality of opportunity cannot be severed by showing that one powerful attempt to do so founders. Borrowing from Martin Buber, I try to show that the perspective required by justice is different from and opposed to that required for intimate relations. Moreover, I argue that the institution of the family provides the soil without which human intimacy withers. Finally, I try to suggest that the need for human. I‐You encounters is a response to aspects of the human condition quite different from those which give rise to institutions of justice and the state.

High stakes testing and distributive justice

Evaluation of high stakes testing regimes must consider not simply mean test scores, but their distribution among students. Taking high school graduation tests and black and white student populations to illustrate the argument, I identify two criteria of success: a larger proportion of black high school graduates and a narrower gap between the two groups. I evaluate various possible distributions against these criteria. I then consider the question of which students merit our focused attention, those students who are furthest behind or those with the greatest likelihood of passing the test given extra help. A medical triage analogy suggests we should help the former, but I show here that the analogy is misplaced.

Social science and social practice

Science breaks new trails for technology but social science has yet to break new trails for social technology. Why is this? One hypothesis explains this with reference to the complexity of the social world and the still rudimentary nature of the social sciences. This paper argues for an alternative hypothesis, claiming that social science research is incapable of generating technologies not already part of the human repertoire. Drawing on a range of social science inquiry from economics to psychology, it shows that the ‘mechanisms’ posited to explain normal and puzzling human behavior depend on familiar facts about humans which future investigations cannot overturn. Finally, it is shown that even when these familiar facts are themselves explained, the generative mechanisms posited to account for them are no longer within the sphere of the social sciences.

The School Is the Problem, Not the Solution.

To what extent is the design of American schooling adapted to the lofty aspirations educators have enunciated during the last century? I first enumerate these aspirations as well as the basic design of schooling; then I evaluate the match. After highlighting the limitations of the basic design, I point to some alternative settings offering greater likelihood of realizing these aspirations? In the conclusion, I identify three stances one might adopt with respect to the results of the analysis.

Discretion, punishment, and juvenile justice

(1991). Discretion, punishment, and juvenile justice. Criminal Justice Ethics: Vol. 10, No. 1, pp. 3-7.

Education and neuroscience: what kind of marriage?

In his editorial announcing the symposium on the relationship between neuroscience and education (Cortex, April 2009), Sergio Della Sala frames the question by saying that although most teachers think knowledge of the brain is important for the design of educational programs, “.how the interaction between the neurosciences and teachers could be made fruitful is still a matter of debate” (Della Sala, 2009). In other words, themarriage of education and neuroscience is equated to that of teachers and neuroscience. Here, I propose an alternative kind of marriage, one that needn’t be consummated in school classrooms and might not involve teachers. Neuroscientist Elkhonon Goldberg (2009) predicts that “the next few years will undoubtedly witness a boom in the cognotropic pharmacology acting on various biochemical systems” (p. 230). To take an example, a group of scientists reported recently that administering an insulin-like growth factor significantly enhances memory retention and prevents forgetting in the rat (Chen et al., 2011). Genetics also has a contribution to make. Several genes linked to developmental dyslexia contribute to brain development, opening up potential routes to treatment or prevention (Galaburda et al., 2006). Novel non-chemical modes of intervention have also yielded promising results. Cohen Kadosh et al. (2010) report on an experimental “use of noninvasive stimulation to the parietal lobe during numerical learning to selectively improve numerical abilities” (p. 1). Finally, some neuroscientists claim they can induce cognitive improvement through specialized training. The work of Michael Merzenich, Paula Tallal and their collaborators (Tallal et al., 1996, 2004) is illustrative. They have developed training software whose effectiveness with children shows promise. Of course their results are far from conclusive, but they point to training programs which students can engage in at home on their computers, programs that do not

Moral education in the ‘badlands’

The author’s initial argument concludes that parents should refrain from inculcating norms and dispositions suitable for peacetime when ruthless enemies seek to kill or imprison their children. Drawing on recent interpreters of Kant, this paper argues that teaching children to deceive pursuers is consistent with Kantian arguments against lying. This paper modifies the initial argument to take account of the need to also inculcate peacetime norms, even in wartime. It shows that the amended argument has applicability to a variety of real‐world contexts and explores its implications for schools. A final section responds to purported objections.

Is there progress in education? If not, why not?

This is the last of four essays discussing John Deweys essay, ‘Education as engineering’. It assumes that educational engineers have failed to achieve the progressive success of bridge builders, and sketches five plausible explanations for this failure. At the end, it is suggested that the assumption is itself questionable.

Comments on carl Bereiter's referent-centred and problem-centred knowledge

Bereiter is right about the limitations of fact-based and Deweyian approaches to education, but his own approach has limitations as well: it views understanding too exclusively in scientific terms.