Franck Missonier-Piera

The Agency Structure of Loan Syndicates

Leaders of loan syndicates often delegate some administrative tasks to banks known as co-agents. One reason is that co-agents are specialized banks that help split the costs of managing the syndicate. Another reason is that co-agents monitor the leader on behalf of syndicate members to mitigate informational asymmetry problems. Large sample tests on the Dealscan database provide support for both arguments. Evidence of repeated contracting between the same banks explains the moderate magnitude of monitoring effects.

Value creation and the impact of corporate real estate assets

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to investigate the impact of corporate real estate (CRE) ownership on value creation for non‐financial French listed companies.Design/methodology/approach – Using a pool sample composed of SBF 250 companies over the period 1999‐2004, this paper investigates the association between economic value added (EVA) and market value added (MVA) as proxies for the value generated by French listed companies and the proportion of real estate in their asset portfolio.Findings – The empirical results show that an increase in the proportion of real estate assets (over total assets) is negatively associated with EVA, but only for firms in service industries exhibiting low real estate intensity. The regression on MVA shows a negative association with the increase in the proportion of real estate for firms outside the service industries.Research limitations/implications – Recent trends show that many large companies have sold a significant portion of their CRE assets. The underlying m...