François Claveau

Evidential variety as a source of credibility for causal inference: beyond sharp designs and structural models

There is an ongoing debate in economics between the design-based approach and the structural approach. The main locus of contention regards how best to pursue the quest for credible causal inference. Each approach emphasizes one element – sharp study designs versus structural models – but these elements have well-known limitations. This paper investigates where a researcher might look for credibility when, for the causal question under study, these limitations are binding. It argues that seeking variety of evidence – understood specifically as using multiple means of determination to robustly estimate the same causal effect – constitutes such an alternative and that applied economists actually take advantage of it. Evidential variety is especially relevant for a class of macro-level causal questions for which the design-based and the structural approaches appear to have limited reach. The use of evidential variety is illustrated by drawing on the literature on the institutional determinants of the aggregate unemployment rate.

Macrodynamics of Economics: A Bibliometric History

A history of specialties in economics since the late 1950s is constructed on the basis of a large corpus of documents from economics journals. The production of this history relies on a combination of algorithmic methods that avoid subjective assessments of the boundaries of specialties: bibliographic coupling, automated community detection in dynamic networks and text mining. These methods uncover a structuring of economics around recognizable specialties with some significant changes over the time-period covered (1956-2014). Among our results, especially noteworthy are (a) the clearcut existence of 10 families of specialties, (b) the disappearance in the late 1970s of a specialty focused on general economic theory, (c) the dispersal of the econometrics-centered specialty in the early 1990s and the ensuing importance of specific econometric methods for the identity of many specialties since the 1990s, (d) the low level of specialization of individual economists throughout the period in contrast to physicists as early as the late 1960s.

The Independence Condition in the Variety-of-Evidence Thesis

The variety-of-evidence thesis has been criticized by Bovens and Hartmann. This article points to two limitations of their Bayesian model: the conceptualization of unreliable evidential sources as randomizing and the restriction to comparing full independence to full dependence. It is shown that the variety-of-evidence thesis is rehabilitated when unreliable sources are reconceptualized as systematically biased. However, it turns out that allowing for degrees of independence leads to a qualification of the variety-of-evidence thesis: as Bovens and Hartmann claimed, more independence does not always imply stronger confirmation.

The Russo–Williamson Theses in the social sciences: Causal inference drawing on two types of evidence

This article examines two theses formulated by Russo and Williamson (2007) in their study of causal inference in the health sciences. The two theses are assessed against evidence from a specific case in the social sciences, i.e., research on the institutional determinants of the aggregate unemployment rate. The first Russo-Williamson Thesis is that a causal claim can only be established when it is jointly supported by difference-making and mechanistic evidence. This thesis is shown not to hold. While researchers in my case study draw extensively on both types of evidence, one causal claim out of the three analyzed is established even though it is exclusively supported by mechanistic evidence. The second Russo-Williamson Thesis is that standard accounts of causality fail to handle the dualist epistemology highlighted in the first Thesis. I argue that a counterfactual-manipulationist account of causality--which is endorsed by many philosophers as well as many social scientists--can perfectly make sense of the typical strategy in my case study to draw on both difference-making and mechanistic evidence; it is just an instance of the common strategy of increasing evidential variety.

Epistemic contributions of models: Conditions for propositional learning

This article analyzes the epistemic contributions of models by distinguishing three roles that they might play: an evidential role, a revealing role and a stimulating role. By using an account of learning based on the philosophical understanding of propositional knowledge as true justified belief, the paper provides the conditions to be fulfilled by a model in order to play a determined role. A case study of an economic model of the labor market—the DMP model—illustrates the usefulness of these conditions in articulating debates over the epistemic contributions of a given model.

The Variety-of-Evidence Thesis: A Bayesian Exploration of its Surprising Failures

Diversity of evidence is widely claimed to be crucial for evidence amalgamation to have distinctive epistemic merits. Bayesian epistemologists capture this idea in the variety-of-evidence thesis: ceteris paribus, the strength of confirmation of a hypothesis by an evidential set increases with the diversity of the evidential elements in that set. Yet, formal exploration of this thesis has shown that it fails to be generally true. This article demonstrates that the thesis fails in even more circumstances than recent results would lead us to expect. Most importantly, it can fail whatever the chance that the evidential sources are unreliable. Our results hold for two types of degrees of variety: reliability independence and testable aspect independence. We conclude that the variety-of-evidence thesis can, at best, be interpreted as an exception-prone rule of thumb.

On the Meaning of Causal Generalisations in Policy-oriented Economic Research

Current philosophical accounts of causation suggest that the same causal assertion can have different meanings. Yet, in actual social-scientific practice, the possible meanings of some causal generalisations intended to support policy prescriptions are not always spelled out. In line with a standard referentialist approach to semantics, we propose and elaborate on four questions to systematically elucidate the meaning of causal generalisations. The analysis can be useful to a host of agents, including social scientists, policy-makers, and philosophers aiming at being socially relevant. To illustrate our proposal, we analyse the complexities related to the meaning of causal generalisations in the context of a concrete case of economic research which is explicitly intended to guide public policy, namely, the OECD research on the causes of unemployment.

Network Analysis in the History of Economics

We present social network analysis as a complement to other methods in the history of economics. We first discuss why social network analysis is especially promising for the study of the history of recent economics. We then use an example of research using it to highlight some of its characteristics.

Causal Generalisations in Policy-oriented Economic Research: An Inferentialist Analysis

ABSTRACT The most common way of analysing the meaning of causal generalisations relies on referentialist semantics. In this article, we instead develop an analysis based on inferentialist semantics. According to this approach, the meaning of a causal generalisation is constituted by the web of inferential connections in which the generalisation participates. We distinguish and discuss five classes of inferential connections that constitute the meaning of causal generalisations produced in policy-oriented economic research. The usefulness of our account is illustrated with the analysis of generalisations about unemployment put forward by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development in its highly influential 1994 OECD Jobs Study. The article ends with a discussion of some crucial philosophical questions about the use of inferentialism in the analysis of causal generalisations.

The Elgar companion to recent economic methodology

John B. Davis and D. Wade Hands, Cheltenham, Edward Elgar, 2011, x+542 pp., £155.00 (hardback) ISBN 978-1-84844-754-7 What economic methodology is all about has changed. It has changed both because...