François Osiurak

Grasping the Affordances, Understanding the Reasoning: Toward a Dialectical Theory of Human Tool Use.

One of the most exciting issues in psychology is, What are the psychological mechanisms underlying human tool use? The computational approach assumes that the use of a tool (e.g., a hammer) requires the extraction of sensory information about object properties (heavy, rigid), which can then be translated into appropriate motor outputs (grasping, hammering). The ecological approach suggests that humans perceive not the properties of tools per se but what they afford (a heavy, rigid object affords pounding). This is the theory of affordances. In this article, we examine the potential of the computational view and the ecological view to account for human tool use. To anticipate our conclusions, neither of these approaches is likely to be satisfactory, notably because of their incapacity to resolve the issue of why humans spontaneously use tools. In response, we offer an original theoretical framework based on the idea that affordance perception and technical reasoning work together in a dialectical way. The thesis we defend here is that humans have the ability to view body action as a problem to be solved. It is precisely at this point that technical reasoning occurs. However, even if the ability to do technical reasoning gives humans the illusion of constantly doing less (e.g., TV remote control), they are still forced to use body action-and to perceive affordances-to operate the product of the reasoning (pushing buttons with the fingers). This is the principle of dialectic.

Unusual use of objects after unilateral brain damage. The technical reasoning model

It has been suggested that gesture engrams, conceptual knowledge and/or the ability to infer function from structure can support object use. The present paper proposes an alternative view which is based upon the idea that object use requires solely the ability to reason about technical means provided by objects. Technical means are abstract principles which are not linked with any object representation (e.g., cutting involves the opposition between dense and permeable material). The technical reasoning model predicts that the inability to perform technical reasoning should impair performance in any situation requiring the use of objects (in a conventional way or not). Twenty left brain-damaged (LBD) patients, 11 right brain-damaged (RBD) patients and 41 healthy controls were examined on experimental tests assessing the conventional use of objects (e.g., screwing a screw with a screwdriver), conceptual knowledge about object function, pantomime of object use and recognition of object utilization gestures. We also designed the Unusual Use of Objects Test, which demands unusual applications of objects to achieve a purpose for which the usually applied object is not provided (e.g., screwing a screw with a knife). The key findings are that only LBD patients have more difficulties on the Unusual Use of Objects Test than controls or RBD patients, and that the severity of their impairment is correlated with that on conventional use of objects. Correlations with tests assessing conceptual knowledge as well as with tests of pantomime of object use and recognition of object utilization gestures were weaker. These results support the technical reasoning model and question the role of conceptual knowledge and gesture engrams in object use. Since the technical reasoning model also predicts two distinct technical disorders, the discussion focuses on the existence of these disorders in regard to individual performance profiles obtained in the Unusual Use of Objects Test.

Re-examining the gesture engram hypothesis. New perspectives on apraxia of tool use.

In everyday life, we are led to reuse the same tools (e.g., fork, hammer, coffee-maker), raising the question as to whether we have to systematically recreate the idea of the manipulation which is associated with these tools. The gesture engram hypothesis offers a straightforward answer to this issue, by suggesting that activation of gesture engrams provides a processing advantage, avoiding portions of the process from being reconstructed de novo with each experience. At first glance, the gesture engram hypothesis appears very plausible. But, behind this beguiling simplicity lies a set of unresolved difficulties: (1) What is the evidence in favour of the idea that the mere observation of a tool is sufficient to activate the corresponding gesture engram? (2) If tool use can be supported by a direct route between a structural description system and gesture engrams, what is the role of knowledge about tool function? (3) And, more importantly, what does it mean to store knowledge about how to manipulate tools? We begin by outlining some of the main formulations of the gesture engram hypothesis. Then, we address each of these issues in more detail. To anticipate our discussion, the gesture engram hypothesis appears to be clearly unsatisfactory, notably because of its incapacity to offer convincing answers to these different issues. We conclude by arguing that neuropsychology may greatly benefit from adopting the hypothesis that the idea of how to manipulate a tool is recreated de novo with each experience, thus opening interesting perspectives for future research on apraxia.

Apraxia of tool use: More evidence for the technical reasoning hypothesis

Various distinct cognitive processes such as semantic memory, executive planning or technical reasoning have been shown to support tool use. The aim of this study is to investigate the relationship between these processes. To do so, a large apraxia battery was submitted to 16 patients with left brain-damage (LBD) and aphasia and 19 healthy controls. The battery included: classical apraxia tests (Pantomime of Tool Use and Single Tool Use), familiar and novel tool use tests (Tool-Object Pairs and Sequential Mechanical Problem-Solving), semantic memory tests (Recognition of tool utilization gestures and Functional and Categorical Associations) as well as the Tower Of London. The Sequential Mechanical Problem-Solving task is a new task which permits the evaluation of pre-planning in unusual tool use situations. In this task as well as in the Tool-Object Pairs task, participants solved a tool use problem in a Choice and a No-Choice condition to examine the effect of tool selection. Globally, left brain damaged patients were impaired as compared to controls. We found high correlations in left brain damaged patients between performances on classical apraxia tests, familiar and novel tool use tests and Functional and Categorical Associations but no significant association between these performances and Tower Of London or Recognition of tool utilization gestures. Furthermore, the two conditions (Choice and No-Choice) of Tool-Object Pairs and Sequential Mechanical Problem-Solving were associated. In sum, all tasks involving tool use are strongly associated in LBD patients. Moreover, the ability to solve sequential mechanical problems does not depend on executive planning. Also, tool use appears to be associated with knowledge about object function but not with knowledge about tool manipulation. Taken together, these findings indicate that technical reasoning and, to a lesser extent, semantic memory may both play an important role in tool use.

What Neuropsychology Tells us About Human Tool Use? The Four Constraints Theory (4CT): Mechanics, Space, Time, and Effort

Our understanding of human tool use comes mainly from neuropsychology, particularly from patients with apraxia or action disorganization syndrome. However, there is no integrative, theoretical framework explaining what these neuropsychological syndromes tell us about the cognitive/neural bases of human tool use. The goal of the present article is to fill this gap, by providing a theoretical framework for the study of human tool use: The Four Constraints Theory (4CT). This theory rests on two basic assumptions. First, everyday tool use activities can be formalized as multiple problem situations consisted of four distinct constraints (mechanics, space, time, and effort). Second, each of these constraints can be solved by the means of a specific process (technical reasoning, semantic reasoning, working memory, and simulation-based decision-making, respectively). Besides presenting neuropsychological evidence for 4CT, this article shall address epistemological, theoretical and methodological issues I will attempt to resolve. This article will discuss how 4CT diverges from current cognitive models about several widespread hypotheses (e.g., notion of routine, direct and automatic activation of tool knowledge, simulation-based tool knowledge).

On the neurocognitive origins of human tool use : A critical review of neuroimaging data

Since more than a century, neuropsychological models have assumed that the left inferior parietal cortex is central to tool use by storing manipulation knowledge (the manipulation-based approach). Interestingly, recent neuropsychological evidence indicates that the left inferior parietal cortex might rather support the ability to reason about physical object properties (the reasoning-based approach). Historically, these two approaches have been developed from data obtained in left brain-damaged patients. This review is the first one to (1) give an overview of the two aforementioned approaches and (2) reanalyze functional neuroimaging data of the past decade to examine their predictions. Globally, we demonstrate that the left inferior parietal cortex is involved in the understanding of tool-use actions, providing support for the reasoning-based approach. We also discuss the functional involvement of the different regions of the tool-use brain network (left supramarginal gyrus, left intraparietal sulcus, left posterior temporal cortex). Our findings open promising avenues for future research on the neurocognitive basis of human tool use.

Tool use and affordance: Manipulation-based versus reasoning-based approaches.

Tool use is a defining feature of human species. Therefore, a fundamental issue is to understand the cognitive bases of human tool use. Given that people cannot use tools without manipulating them, proponents of the manipulation-based approach have argued that tool use might be supported by the simulation of past sensorimotor experiences, also sometimes called affordances. However, in the meanwhile, evidence has been accumulated demonstrating the critical role of mechanical knowledge in tool use (i.e., the reasoning-based approach). The major goal of the present article is to examine the validity of the assumptions derived from the manipulation-based versus the reasoning-based approach. To do so, we identified 3 key issues on which the 2 approaches differ, namely, (a) the reference frame issue, (b) the intention issue, and (c) the action domain issue. These different issues will be addressed in light of studies in experimental psychology and neuropsychology that have provided valuable contributions to the topic (i.e., tool-use interaction, orientation effect, object-size effect, utilization behavior and anarchic hand, tool use and perception, apraxia of tool use, transport vs. use actions). To anticipate our conclusions, the reasoning-based approach seems to be promising for understanding the current literature, even if it is not fully satisfactory because of a certain number of findings easier to interpret with regard to the manipulation-based approach. A new avenue for future research might be to develop a framework accommodating both approaches, thereby shedding a new light on the cognitive bases of human tool use and affordances. (PsycINFO Database Record

Tool use and perceived distance: when unreachable becomes spontaneously reachable

An interesting issue about human tool use is whether people spontaneously and implicitly intend to use an available tool to perform an action that would be impossible without it. Recent research indicates that targets presented just beyond arm’s reach are perceived closer when people intend to reach them with a tool rather than without it. An intriguing issue is whether this effect also occurs when people are not explicitly instructed to use a tool to reach targets. To address this issue, we asked participants to estimate distances that were beyond arm’s reach in three conditions. Participants who held passively a long baton underestimated the distances as compared to participants with no baton (Experiment 1). To examine whether this effect resulted from holding the baton, we asked participants to estimate distances while holding passively a shorter baton (Experiment 2). We found that holding this short baton did not influence distance perception. Our findings demonstrate that when people aim at performing a task beyond their action capabilities, they spontaneously and implicitly intend to use a tool if it substantially extends their action capabilities. These findings provide interesting insights into the understanding of the link between the emergence of tool use, intention, and perception.

Object utilization and object usage: A single-case study

ABSTRACT It has been suggested that both conceptual knowledge and the ability to infer function from structure can support object use. By contrast, we propose that object use requires solely the ability to reason about technical ends. Technical ends (e.g., cutting) are not purposes (e.g., eating), but the technical way to achieve them. This perspective suggests that there is no mutual relationship between technical ends and purposes since the same purpose (e.g., writing) can be achieved thanks to distinct technical ends (graving, tracing), and, inversely, the same technical end (e.g., tracing) can achieve different purposes (making up, writing). Thus, conceptual knowledge might determine which technical end is usually associated with a given purpose. To contribute to the discussion, we described the behaviour of a female patient with left temporal lobe lesions and bilateral frontal lobe lesions following a closed-head injury. Conceptual knowledge was impaired. She encountered difficulties in demonstrating the use of objects in isolation (e.g., using a screwdriver without the screw). The presence of a recipient (e.g., using a screwdriver with the screw) improved her performance. The performance was also normal when asked to perform unusual applications of objects to achieve a goal for which the usually applied object was not provided (e.g., screwing a screw with a knife). Consistent with the theoretical framework supported here, her performance profile suggests an intact ability to reason about technical ends (i.e., utilization), in the presence of a defective ability to determine the usual relationship between technical ends and purposes (i.e., usage).

Apraxia and Alzheimer’s Disease: Review and Perspectives

Apraxia is one of the cognitive deficits that characterizes Alzheimer’s disease. Despite its prevalence and relevance to diagnosing Alzheimer’s disease, this topic has received little attention and is without comprehensive review. The review herein is aimed to fill this gap by first presenting an overview of the impairment caused in different clinical situations: pantomime of tool use, single tool use, real tool use, mechanical problem solving, function and manipulation knowledge tasks, and symbolic/meaningless gestures. On the basis of these results, we then propose alternative interpretations regarding the nature of the underlying mechanisms impaired by the disease. Also presented are principal methodological issues precluding firm conclusions from being drawn.