François Randour

Belgian regional parliaments and the European Union: an analysis of parliamentary scrutiny in agricultural and environmental policies

ABSTRACT Drawing on qualitative case studies of two specific European decision-making processes in the agricultural and environmental sectors, this paper discusses how and why Belgian regional parliaments activated (or not) their control mechanisms to scrutinise their respective regional ministers. The findings show that parliamentary scrutiny of the agricultural and environmental policy fields has undergone a process of institutional and behavioural Europeanisation. Belgian regional parliaments rely mostly on classical parliamentary tools aimed at gathering information and, to a lesser extent, on constraining instruments aimed at influencing their government. Rather than trying to influence the EU negotiations, the MPs try to assess the potential impact of the reforms on their regional policy sectors. The findings also demonstrate that domestic media coverage and political salience of the EU negotiation associated with important implementing powers of regional parliaments have a positive effect on the level of scrutiny conducted by Belgian regional assemblies.

Belgium: institutional and administrative adaptation but limited political interest

Belgium is usually considered one of the most ‘pro-European Union’ member states, preferring a strong supranational — and even federal — European Union (EU). This pro-EU orthodoxy can be explained by practical factors, such as the omnipresence of European institutions in Brussels; Belgium’s economy, which is largely export oriented; and its federal state structure, which makes living in a multi-level political system seem very natural in Belgium (Justaert et al., 2012). A federalist European policy has been an element of continuity in Belgium’s foreign policy since the 1970s.1 Belgium has advocated a stronger supranational institutional framework and a considerable extension to the ‘Community method’, a strengthened role for the EU at the international level and own financial resources for the EU. Remarkably, Belgium’s federalist stance in the debate on the EU’s institutional structure sharply contrasts with its record of implementation of EU legislation. In 2013, for instance, Belgium had the fourth-worst record of all member states on the timely transposition of EU directives. Similarly, only four other member states had more infringement cases opened against them than Belgium (European Commission, 2014, pp. 4, 11).

The reform of the Belgian federal administration 10 years on: What balance has been achieved between operational autonomy of top managers and the supervision carried out by the horizontal ministerial departments?

In the wake of the Copernic reform, Belgium’s senior federal civil servants are now appointed for a fixed term and guided on performance via management plans. This article sets out to assess the impact of the introduction of the fixed-term system on the autonomy of senior civil servants with regard to the horizontal departments responsible for the budget, on the one hand, and human resources, on the other hand, within Belgium’s federal administration. Based on the so-called ‘inconsistencies’ approach, the article focuses briefly on three inconsistencies: internal, discursive and contextual. An analysis of these inconsistencies confirms one of the forms of ‘cheating’ in the relationship between ministers and senior civil servants formulated by Hood and Lodge (2006), namely that the first can be inclined to reduce the margin of discretion of the latter by maintaining formal or informal mechanisms to exercise control over the provision of resources. Points for practitioners Greater managerial autonomy for senior civil servants, as advocated by NPM, cannot succeed without a transformation of the traditional modes of operation of the political-administrative relationship accompanying structural reforms. The low degree of autonomy of senior civil servants does not stem so much from the introduction of a ‘contractual’ relationship, but from the lack of support shown by the latter in the implementation of such reforms. In the case studied, senior civil servants can only be made more accountable and given greater autonomy if the ‘pyramid’ of control is reformed and internal audit activities developed.