Frank Holmquist

Peasant-State Relations and the Social Base of Self Help in Kenya

Peasant-state relations in developing countries are often a function of the nature and extent of stratification in peasant populations. Where there is a rigid class structure, the prospects for cooperation by members of the peasantry are low, and large landowners tend to ally themselves with the state to exploit the rural poor. Where, on the other hand, the nature of rural stratification is ambiguous, “small” and “middle” peasants are able to organize themselves for collective action and to bargain effectively for state aid to their communities. The hypothesis is confirmed using survey data about the nature of peasant participation in the Harambee selfhelp development movement in rural Kenya. Effective peasant-state bargaining in Kenya has in turn contributed to the legitimacy of the Kenyan political system.

Kenya's hopes and impediments: The anatomy of a crisis of exclusion

Abstract This paper examines the underlying causes of the December 2007, post-election Kenyan crisis. We argue that the crisis is best understood not as simply ethnic rivalry for power but rather as a product of the rising expectations due to the increase in democratic space in the last five years combined with the frustration of over a millennium of exclusion on the economic and political fronts. Kenyan institutions have not accommodated the building of an inclusive multi-ethnic nation for reasons of their design and specific political economy and this failure resulted in the crisis. We argue that for Kenya to retain its stability and achieve peace there must be a broad political and economic programme that puts inclusion at the centre of its design. This programme must address historic demands as well as deal with immediate issues of peace and justice and it must be more than an agreement between the principals in the political crisis. We also contend that the crisis provides an opportunity to redress some of the concerns and we explore some specific constitutional changes and economic policies that the government may consider to achieve these aims.

Reform and Political Impunity in Kenya: Transparency without Accountability

Abstract: Kenya has been going through a period of political reform since 1991, when section 2A of the constitution, which had made Kenya a de jure one-party state, was repealed. This reform followed a prolonged struggle on the part of citizens both inside and outside the country, and their call for democracy was one that, after the fall of the Berlin Wall, was embraced by Western countries. Via diplomatic pressure and conditionality on aid, Western donors played an important role in the repeal of section 2A, the return of multiparty elections, and the creation and reform of a number of political institutions and offices via a separation of powers. But although these changes were supported by the political opposition and much of civil society in Kenya, they did not rise organically from the national struggle over political power. Nor did these reforms lead to a determination in the country to hold the political elite accountable for their transgressions. This article argues that modern Kenyas history of economic and political inequality has resulted in a population whose very divisions make it difficult for politicians to be disciplined. Accountability has two dimensions: the horizontal accountability among branches of government that is assured by checks and balances, and the vertical accountability of the state to its citizens. Vertical accountability depends on a constituency of like-minded citizens defending broad national interests, or an electorate with a collective identity or set of identities attached to the Kenyan nation. But in the absence of such shared goals and demands, narrow personal and local interests prevail, and politicians remain unaccountable to the nation as a whole.