Frank Jackson

Functionalism and type-type identity theories

ConclusionToken-token identity theorists do not and need not deny that it may frequently be the same (kind of) brain state which on different occasions fills the functional rôle definitive of a given mental state. That is not at issue. What is at issue is whether functionally-oriented identity theorists should make two claims or three claims.The two claims they customarily make are, first, that each instance of a mental state is an instance of a brain state, and, secondly, that being in a mental state is having in one a state filling the relevant functional rôle. But to be in a mental state is to have that state in one. To be in pain is to have pain, to desire water is to have desire for water, and so on; just as to be poisoned is to have poison in you. (It is to have what is poison for you at the time, of course; and likewise for pain, desire and so on.)Our paper has been about a third sort of claim — relating particularly not to being in a mental state, nor to instances of that state, but to the mental state itself. We have argued that functionally-oriented identity theorists can and should make, in addition to the first two claims, the third type-type identity claim that mental states are brain states. Consequently a token brain state is a token of pain in a derivative sense. What makes it a token of pain is that it is a token of the type of brain state which realizes the pain-rôle for the organism at the time.

Ontological Commitment and Paraphrase

It is persons who are ontologically committed. But a person is not ontologically committed by virtue of his character, his height, his social standing or whatever, but by virtue of the sentences he assents to. Hence we should look to sentences for a criterion of ontological commitment. This is precisely what is done by advocates of what I will call the Referential theory. In this paper I argue that the Referential theory faces serious objections related to the role paraphrase must play in it. I then present a modified Referential theory and go on to discuss certain implications of the modified theory. More precisely, the paper divides up as follows. In ?i I present the Referential theory. In ?2 I argue that it is in trouble over paraphrase. In ?3 I consider a general objection to the arguments of ?2. In ?4 I present the modified theory. In ?5 I consider the implications of the modified theory for polemic over what there is and for the existence of properties or universals.

Review symposium : Sir Karl Popper and sir John Eccles. The self and its brain. New York: Springer verlag, 1977. Pp. XVI + 597.

In this world of appearances, there is no question but that human mental experience can be sharply distinguished from that which is experienced. The issue has been labelled ’intentionality’ (or intentional existence) by Brentano (1973) and has given rise to inferences about the nature of reality (Chisholm 1960). The question is often phrased: are my perceptions (my phenomenal experiences) the really ’real’ or does the content of those perceptions make up the ’real’ world? My phenomenal experiences are mental, the world as it appears to me is material. I can give primacy to my experience and become a phenomenologist or I can give primacy to the contents of the experience and become a materialist. But, I can also give primacy to neither and attest to the dual nature of reality. Materialism and phenomenology run into difficulty only when each attempts to deny the other. As long as only primacy is at stake, either view can be made consistent. After all, our experiences are primary and empiricism is not inimical to a real material world. And we do appear to be experiencing something(s), so

17.90. Unpacking some dualities inherent in a mind/brain dualism Karl H.Pribram psychology, Stanford university

How are brain and mind related? What connection is there between the highly complex neurophysiologies of minded creatures and their being minded? It is clear that there is some intimate connection because only beings with very complex nervous systems have mental states like perceivings, sensings, emotions and beliefs, but what is it exactly? The connection between the two is spelt out nicely by the functionalist identity theory. Kick a stone and nothing much happens to the stone. It moves a bit and that’s about all. Kick a person, and lots happens; and moreover what happens depends in a highly intricate way on current circumstances, past happenings, prospects, attitudes and beliefs, and so on and so forth. For stones there is a relatively simple function from input to output, not so for people. This difference is (i) crucial for our believing people are minded, and (ii) explained by people having and stones lacking central nervous systems. We can (unoriginally) develop this into a philosophy of mind as follows. The defining characteristic of minded organisms is that there is a set of internal states-the mental states-each of which plays or occupies in the organism the functional role of being responsible for the complex and varied relations between input or stimulus, output or response, and also others of these internal states. It is these relations which mark off us and sentient creatures in general from stones and non-sentient creatures in general. Two distinguishable questions arise. How to pair off mental state and functional role, and how to pair off mental state and occupant of functional role. In a bank a teller, the accountant and the manager fill three different functional roles-which involve inputs, outputs and their own inter-relations-and we can specify these roles without knowing who is teller, accountant or manager. That is the first kind of question; while the second concerns, for example, whether it is Smith or Jones who is the accountant. What we know to date makes it highly plausible that states of the brain occupy the functional roles definitive of the mental states, though we do not know exactly which states of the brain fill which roles. The theory just sketched is thus