Frank L. Smith

The Struggle for Soft Power in Asia: Public Diplomacy and Regional Competition

Abstract Throughout Asia, states are competing to build and leverage soft power using public diplomacy. This article examines these investments, whether they pay dividends, and why they are being made. A mix of qualitative and quantitative analysis shows little, if any, positive correlation between public diplomacy by Asian states and foreign public opinion. We therefore ask why states invest in public diplomacy when it does not seem to work. We argue that different motives are at play: The struggle for soft power is driven by both a logic of consequences and logic of appropriateness. Lastly, we suggest how this struggle might aggravate rather than ameliorate tensions in the region.

Advancing science diplomacy: Indonesia and the US Naval Medical Research Unit.

Science diplomacy supposedly builds international cooperation through scientific and technical exchange. In practice, however, there are important but often overlooked instances where it might create conflict instead – as with accusations of espionage surrounding the US Naval Medical Research Unit 2 (NAMRU-2) in Indonesia. Did American science diplomacy backfire in Indonesia and, if so, why? Most literature fails to anticipate this possibility, let alone explain it, since science diplomacy is rarely subject to critical analysis. Rather than shun politics or, similarly, simply blame the demise of NAMRU-2 on the military or avian influenza, I consider both the successes and failures of this research unit in the context of Indonesia’s transition to democracy and America’s legacy from the Cold War. Based on this history, I propose that the effects of science diplomacy depend on strategic communication and exchange, as well as elite influence and material incentives. Therefore, by challenging the conventional wisdom about science diplomacy, NAMRU-2 can help advance the theory and practice of this potentially useful tool of statecraft.

Insights into surveillance from the influenza virus and benefit sharing controversy

For more than fifty years, the World Health Organization has helped monitor flu viruses and manufacture vaccines through the Global Influenza Surveillance Network (GISN). However, GISN became a flashpoint for conflict when Indonesia refused to share its samples of avian influenza until drugs and other benefits were shared in return. Years of controversial negotiations were required to agree on a framework for virus and benefit sharing, providing important insights into disease surveillance, global norms, and international law. First, this controversy suggests that surveillance behaves like a luxury good, which complicates the conventional wisdom that it is a global public good. Second, even well-established norms were not immune to challenge, thereby limiting the significance of ‘tipping points’ and ‘normative cascades’. Finally, legal arguments were common in this controversy but equivocal and inconclusive, so international law is unlikely to affect important outcomes relating to outbreak response.

Antipodal biosecurity? Oversight of dual use research in the United States and Australia

The creation of a virulent mousepox virus in Australia and publication of this experiment in 2001 are often argued to mark a dangerous turn in dual use research (1). After this experiment and – far more consequential – September 11 and the anthrax letters, the oversight of dual use research in the life sciences received considerable attention in the United States. We argue that the American experience provides valuable lessons for Australia, three of which are highlighted here. First, the international community is ill-equipped to govern the life sciences. Like the United States, Australia should therefore help itself through national regulations and oversight. Second, like most special interest groups, scientists prefer self-regulation. While this may be a practical solution for scientific publications, federally funded research warrants independent review as a condition of funding. Third, in order to provide independent review, oversight should be truly multidisciplinary, including social, political, and biological expertise. A multidisciplinary approach stands the best chance of balancing the risks and rewards of dual use research.

Organising cyber security in Australia and beyond

ABSTRACT The Internet is an interconnected network and cyber security requires collective action. How that action is organised has important implications for national security, including the defence against cyber attacks and malicious activities. This article explains the origins and institutionalisation of cyber security in Australia—particularly ‘civilian cyber security’. The authors trace the origin of Australia’s first computer emergency response team and explain how this organisational form spread from the USA. Through it, Australia helped enable international cooperation. Domestically, however, the authors argue that the Australian government has struggled with the delegation, orchestration and abdication of responsibility for civilian cyber security, underinvesting in civilian organisations while overrelying on military and intelligence agencies. The history of this organisational field provides valuable insight into how to improve national policy and operations for cyber security.

A Casualty of Kinetic Warfare: Military Research, Development, and Acquisition for Biodefense

The US military is responsible for protecting its forces from biological weapons. However, the Department of Defense has neglected biodefense—most of the funding for which now comes from civilian organizations rather than traditional military sponsors. Why? I argue that organizational frames explain military neglect and the rise of civilian biodefense. Because the militarys frame of reference is defined by kinetic warfare involving projectile weapons and explosives, it neglects non-kinetic capabilities like biodefense. In contrast, the civilian Department of Health and Human Services has a different organizational frame and thus is more amenable to supporting biodefense. I test this theory against realism and bureaucratic interests. I find that research, development, and acquisition for biodefense support the ideational theory of organizational frames, which has important implications regarding the influence of specific ideas on national security policy.